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Preface 
 
It was 2009 when I assisted Simon Franzmann in a project on the dynamics of party 
competition. Becoming interested in the relevant concepts, I read his working paper on 
programmatic heterogeneity and ideological polarization of the European party systems. I found 
his conceptual clarification of polarization very enlightening. According to Franzmann, 
polarization connects to both sides of the political market, parties and voters, as it occurs when 
parties politicize latent lines of conflict present in a society. In distinction to polarization, 
Franzmann introduces the concept of programmatic heterogeneity which solely captures the 
diversity in the programmatic offerings of parties. Based on his empirical findings, he ascertains 
that new parties often form when the programmatic heterogeneity of existing parties is low. It 
is exactly this hypothesis which sparked my interest in the topic of new political parties. I am 
very thankful to Simon Franzmann for his encouragement to elaborate on this initial hypothesis 
and also for his advice in the following years. 
 
It seemed plausible to me to start from the side of parties when theorizing about new political 
parties as the programmatic supply of existing parties should influence the chances of new 
contestants. Although this influence of existing parties plays an important role in the literature 
on new parties, studies had a stronger focus on triggers for new party formations on the electoral 
side. However, there are also cases in which the formation of a new party is not preceded by 
strong and neglected electoral demands. At this point, the German Pirate Party provides a 
fitting example. The party presented itself as a clear alternative to existing parties with regard 
to its policy focus on internet related issues, when the party formed in 2006. Nevertheless, at 
the time, there did not exist strong electoral interests in the policy focus of the Pirate Party. 
Only later when the regulation of the internet became a publicly debated issue, the party started 
to attract stronger attention on the side of the electorate. The picture looks different for the 
Alternative for Germany. In this case, the formation followed on the heels of the dissatisfaction 
in parts of the electorate regarding the treatment of the Euro crisis by the existing parties. These 
two examples illustrate that the occurrence of new parties is not only and always triggered by 
unsatisfied electoral demands but, in general, it is the programmatic supply by existing parties 
which determines the room for new policy offerings with which new parties can appeal to 
voters. 
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Following the relationship between the formation and success of new parties, I then started to 
think to what extent the electoral performance of newly formed parties is dependent on the state 
of the programmatic supply side. Simultaneously, I also noticed that the existing literature on 
new party success did not fully consider the influence of their own complete programmatic 
profiles and their evolution over time. Based on these ideas, I developed the plan of this 
dissertation: a comparative and systematic analysis of the formation and success of new 
political parties in established democracies which focuses on the programmatic competition 
between parties. 
 
Executing and finalizing this plan would not have been possible without the on-going advice 
and support of my two supervisors, André Kaiser and Ingo Rohlfing, for which I am very 
grateful. Working as student assistant at the Chair of Comparative Politics of André Kaiser over 
many years and visiting several of his seminars provided me with the best possible preparation 
for conducting this dissertation. In particular, I would also like to highlight the Research 
Seminar in which students and colleagues alike present their current research. Getting insights 
in actual research projects and their problems as well as following André Kaiser’s comments 
on matters of research design served as invaluable lessons for my own research. Moreover, the 
way how he conducts this seminar and establishes an atmosphere of rigorous and, at the same 
time, constructive criticism, represents a role model for interacting in the scientific community. 
Throughout the dissertation, André Kaiser handed out advice on all matters of my research and 
was also willing to share his own wealth of experience with me. For all of this, I owe him 
special thanks. The same holds true for Ingo Rohlfing. He allowed for an open and on-going 
dialogue about all parts of this dissertation which inspired and helped me greatly. I have 
benefited from his intellectual precision and his broad knowledge on methodology, research 
design as well as party research. Added to this, I would also like to thank him for his personal 
encouragement when I felt stuck in my research process. His openness and his willingness to 
treat me not only as a PhD student but also as a colleague motivated and helped me to overcome 
these challenges. 
 
A major landmark for this dissertation was my research stay at the University of Sussex where 
I found a stimulating and friendly atmosphere. I am very thankful to my advisors at Sussex, 
Sabina Avdagic and Paul Webb. They both showed great interest in my work and gave many 
useful comments which led to multiple improvements in my work. I am also glad that I had the 
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opportunity to meet other PhD students and to discuss my ideas with them. Here, my special 
thanks goes to Nikoleta Kiapidou for her great support and friendship. 
 
Dealing extensively with one topic over a long period of time can be quite demanding. The best 
allies in this task are your colleagues. I was very fortunate to always work around supportive, 
intelligent and friendly people. This includes Sarah Berens and Christina Zuber with whom I 
shared offices over long periods of time. Although Sarah and I were working on different topics, 
she was always interested in my work and offered great advice on many issues. Christina and I 
shared an interest in theories of party competition and had long conversations about them. She 
was always keen on discussing new ideas and thoughts. I also owe special thanks to Saskia 
Ruth and Holger Reinermann who commented on the introductory chapter of the dissertation. 
Besides, I am grateful for many inspiring and helpful conversations with Jan Sauermann, 
Andreas Kammer, Ulrich Glassmann and Leonce Röth.  
 
I think, many people who have completed a dissertation would agree that doing so is not only 
an academic but also a personal challenge. For me, it was only possible to meet these challenges 
through the close support of my friends, family and my partner. My oldest and closest friends, 
Sebastian and Jörn, were never tired of listening to my troubles. They ensured that I kept a clear 
head and always reminded me that life is not all about my dissertation – and so did my brother, 
Matthias. I am also deeply thankful to my close friend Julia whose presence and support I will 
never forget. During writing this dissertation, I was very fortunate to meet my partner, Bettina, 
who changed my life for the better in so many ways. I admire her for her loving patience, 
understanding and ability to calm me down for which I cannot thank her enough – she really 
was my tower during this time. Without doubt, the biggest thanks has to go to my parents. 
Without her unconditional love, support and believe in me throughout my entire life, it would 
have been impossible for me to get this far. For this reason, I dedicate this dissertation to them. 
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Introduction 
 
Regarding the occurrence and performance of new political parties, political science has long 
concentrated on explanations which are rooted outside the mere programmatic competition 
between parties. This is due to the fact that the phenomenon of new party formation is located 
in the more general literature on party systems and party system change in which institutional 
and sociological explanations have predominated for a long time. While the former concentrates 
on the effects of electoral systems (Duverger 1967; Riker 1982; Lijphart 1994; Cox 1997; 
Norris 2004) the latter regards the societal cleavage structure as the driving force behind the 
condition of party systems (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Rokkan 1970). Yet another strand of this 
literature (Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994; Neto and Cox 1997; Geys 2006; Cox 1997: 23–7) 
connects institutional and sociological factors, highlighting the importance of interactions 
between the two. Nevertheless, in the perspective of these approaches, the appearance and 
success of new political parties are expected to be rare since they should only occur as a 
consequence of major shifts in the institutional or societal configuration of a political system.  
 
The first comparative studies on the formation and success of new political parties acknowledge 
the central role of existing parties. Apart from cleavages and institutional features, Hauss and 
Rayside (1978: 37) subsume the behavior of existing parties under political facilitators for new 
party development and argue that ‘[i]f voters believe that the existing parties have failed to 
provide a solution for the aggrieved group problems […], the chances of a new party’s 
development are rather good’ (Hauss and Rayside 1978: 38). Similarly, Harmel and Robertson 
(1985: 502) connect the rise of new parties to unsatisfied representational needs in the society. 
This line of reasoning emanates from the voter side and follows a purely representational view 
on parties according to which new parties solely form as a consequence of societal 
developments. Accordingly, this perspective prevents to capture how the dynamics of the 
programmatic competition between parties themselves can trigger the formation of new parties 
and, thus, disregards the possibility that political actors form parties without strong pre-existing 
and salient electoral demands. 
 
In his seminal contribution, Hug (2001) touches on this point and adds to the aforementioned 
previous research by providing a game-theoretical model explaining the emergence of new 
parties as a consequence of existing parties rejecting demands of ‘potential new parties’ (Hug 
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2001: 14–5). On the one hand, in contrast to the pure representational view on parties, these 
potential new parties and their demands are not solely attributed to the societal side of the 
political market (Hug 2001: 40). On the other hand, in the empirical analysis, the corresponding 
concept of new issues is then captured by macro indicators exclusively linked to the side of 
voters and the state of the economy (Hug 2001: 88–99). 
 
This dissertation connects to Hug’s approach by examining the phenomenon of new political 
parties starting from the programmatic level of party competition. It provides a coherent 
analysis of how the programmatic supply by existing parties shapes the conditions of the 
formation and success of new parties and shows how the long-term electoral success of new 
parties is affected by their own programmatic profiles. In this way, it theoretically 
acknowledges that the phenomenon of new parties is located on the supply side of the political 
market and is influenced by the conditions prevailing in the competition between parties. The 
precondition for this approach is a clear distinction between the supply side, which is the side 
of parties, and the demand side, the electorate, in both, theoretical and empirical terms. On the 
supply side, I seize on and refine the concept of programmatic innovation (Franzmann 2011) 
which stands for new policy offerings of parties towards voters (Hindmoor 2008: 499) and is 
rooted in salience theory (Robertson 1976; Budge and Farlie 1983; Budge 2015). I differentiate 
between programmatic innovations which connect to already existing unsatisfied demands in 
the electorate and programmatic innovations for which demand has to be created first (De Vries 
and Hobolt 2012). Thereby, I avoid any ambiguity regarding the concept of new issues and its 
connection to the supply and demand side of the political market. I start from the premise that 
preference shaping between parties and voters can occur in both directions (Robertson 2006: 
168–9) – an idea which is also present in the general literature on party systems and their 
reinforcing relationship to societies (Sartori 2005: 170, 257/260; Mair 1998: 8). In the analysis 
of the electoral success of new parties, I connect to the literature on niche parties. New parties 
and niche parties are overlapping concepts. The new party definition given by Hug (2001, p. 
14) rests on purely organizational criteria of a party, tied to the first appointment of candidates 
at a national election. Following this definition, a party stops to be considered as new when it 
takes part in a national election for the second time. Although deduced from the literature on 
new parties1, the original niche party definition of Meguid (2008, pp. 3–4) and following 
approaches (Adams et al. 2006; Wagner 2012; Meyer and Miller 2015; Bischof 2015) rest on 
                                        
1 Meguid (2008: 3) introduces the concept of niche parties when referring to waves of new parties in the second 
half of the 20th century. 
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criteria linked to the programmatic profile of a party, irrespective of how many times that party 
has (already) participated in an election. As a common core, all niche party definitions share 
the attribute that these parties show programmatic differences in general or in specific policy 
fields compared to their competitors. Therefore, the concepts of new parties and niche parties 
are not identical but overlapping. For their first participation in an election, niche parties then 
however build a subgroup of all new parties. As niche parties per definition address issues not 
previously dealt with in the competition between parties, they are prime examples of 
programmatic innovators when they start as new parties. 
 
With regard to the research design, throughout the dissertation, I take account of the distinction 
between the formation of new political parties and their electoral performance as factors 
facilitating their formation cannot be assumed to affect their success in the same way (Harmel 
and Robertson 1985: 502). Thus, the way the programmatic competition between parties affects 
the formation of a new party has to be distinguished from the way it impacts on the electoral 
performance once the new party has formed. Concerning the analysis of the electoral success 
of new parties, this dissertation considers the temporal dimension of this phenomenon as new 
parties, once formed, undergo a programmatic evolution that may not only include changes in 
their platforms over time but also changing electoral effects of their programmatic features – a 
point that previous research has not fully considered. Regarding the research design for the 
analysis of the electoral performance of new parties, there exist two different possible levels on 
which such an analysis can be approached. The level of parties represents the first option. 
Studies following this approach take vote shares of parties as their dependent variable (Meguid 
2005; 2008; Hug 2001; Hino 2012; Willey 1998). The second option centers on the individual 
level and takes the individual vote choice as the dependent variable. To the best of my 
knowledge, there exists no study which opts for this second approach. This dissertation uses 
both of these angles to fully illuminate how programmatic factors influence the electoral 
success of new political parties. 
 
Due to the focus of the dissertation on the programmatic competition between parties, I use 
various concepts on the party system and party level which refer to the state of the overall 
programmatic supply by parties and to programmatic profiles of single parties. For the 
measurement of these concepts, I rely on the analysis of manifesto data provided by the 
Manifesto Research Group/Comparative Manifestos Project (MRG/CMP) (Budge et al. 2001; 
Klingemann et al. 2006; Volkens et al. 2013). Manifestos represent a valuable source for 
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capturing programmatic profiles of parties as they officially state a party’s stance on policies 
vis-à-vis the electorate (Laver 2001: 72). By means of these concepts and these measurements, 
this dissertation offers a coherent analysis in theoretical and empirical terms. 
 
The remainder of this introduction is structured as follows: in section 1, I elaborate on the 
existing literature on the formation and success of new parties and how this dissertation adds to 
the existing research in the field. In section 2, I present my key arguments in greater detail and 
explain important aspects of the research design. Finally, in section 3, I give an overview on 
the individual parts of this dissertation. 
1. State of the Art 
As outlined above, the research on the formation and success of new political parties connects 
to the broader literature on party systems and party system change. Originally, the party system 
literature was heavily influenced by two different schools. The first school emanates from the 
work of Lipset and Rokkan (1967) who regarded party systems as manifestations of major 
cleavages prevalent in European societies. According to this view, which also finds expression 
in the related model of the mass party (Duverger 1967; Krouwel 2006), societies are structured 
along these cleavages. The belonging to a certain group or class which depicts the existing 
cleavage structure then determines political preferences. Consequently, parties are considered 
to be agents of groups or classes which have built around these cleavage structures (Katz and 
Mair 1995: 6–7). With regard to preference shaping, this approach assumes that parties align to 
preferences of broad segments in the electorate. Following this sociological view on parties and 
party systems, new and prospering parties can only be expected when new cleavages emerge 
or existing parties fail to represent existing social groups. When Lipset and Rokkan (1967) 
conducted their research, social cleavage structures had been persistent over a long period of 
time and with them the corresponding party systems. This led the authors to formulate their 
well-known freezing hypothesis (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) according to which the emergence 
and success of new parties should be an unlikely and rare phenomenon. 
 
The second school in the literature on party systems focuses on the effects of electoral systems 
and dates back to the work of Duverger (1967). His core argument relates the state of party 
systems to the degree of proportionality of electoral systems through its conditioning effect on 
voting behavior. More specifically, plurality systems are associated with two-party systems 
while proportional electoral systems result in multi-party systems. The microfoundation of what 
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has become known as Duverger’s law rests upon a mechanical effect and a psychological effect 
(Duverger 1967; Riker 1982). The mechanical effect relates to the translation from votes into 
seats. In contrast to proportional systems, majoritarian systems favor concentration of seats 
among the strongest parties in terms of votes. The psychological effect refers to voters’ 
anticipation of the mechanics of an electoral system. The effect assumes that voters do not want 
to waste their votes on non-viable candidates or parties, and hence, adjust their voting behavior 
accordingly, i.e. they vote strategically (Cox 1997). Following this perspective, party systems 
and the number of viable parties are expected to be stable as well, since fundamental changes 
of electoral systems are rare, at least in developed democracies. In this view, the emergence and 
success of new parties are only likely in case of major changes in an electoral system. 
 
In contrast to these expectations, however, the second half of the 20th century showed a 
considerable number of new emerging parties. For example, Harmel and Robertson (1985: 507) 
identify 233 new parties in 19 West European and Anglo-American countries between 1960 
and 1980. Moreover, Tavits (2006: 106) counts 358 new parties in 22 OECD countries between 
1960 and 2002. Apart from this high number, sociological and institutionalist approaches have 
difficulties to explain variation in the number of new parties in single countries over time, as 
they focus on explanatory factors which show high levels of persistence. Comparative research 
on new political parties thus started to extend these sociological and institutional explanations 
by providing a more general framework for a systematic analysis of the emergence and success 
of new political parties (Hauss and Rayside 1978: 37; Harmel and Robertson 1985: 503). Apart 
from incorporating social and institutional factors, this framework explicitly takes political 
factors into account, in particular the role of existing parties and party competition as such. The 
stronger focus on parties and their behavior can also be linked to the shift away from the mass 
party model (Duverger 1967: 63; Krouwel 2006) towards the catch-all party model 
(Kirchheimer 1966) and a more issue-based competition between parties (Mair 2008: 219–20). 
Nevertheless, these first comparative studies on new parties are also guided by the assumption 
that events on the side of parties are triggered by changing demands in the electorate as their 
core argument is that ‘new parties are formed primarily to fill representational needs of the 
society’ (Harmel and Robertson 1985: 502). According to this argument, the failure of existing 
parties to address (new) electoral demands which can also be linked to the concept of new issues 
(Tavits 2006: 101; Hug 2001: 38) leads to the emergence of new parties. Lago and Martinez 
(2010) describe this scenario as electoral market failure. Studies on the emergence of the green 
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and extreme right party families also support this argument (Müller-Rommel 1993; Ignazi 1992; 
Müller‐Rommel 1982).  
 
Extending the focus on the side of parties, Hug (2001) provides a game-theoretical model 
according to which the formation of a new party is the result of an interaction between an 
existing party and a potential new party under uncertainty. In the model, a new party forms 
when the existing party does not take up a demand of the potential new party and when, at the 
same time, the potential new party has the capacity to realize its threat of formation and entering 
the electoral market (Hug 2001: 50–4). According to the description of this model, no 
assumption is made about the specific origin of the raised demands: 
‘The potential new party can be a social movement, a citizen initiative, 
a political entrepreneur, or even a group of members of an existing 
party. It is characterized and defined by the fact that it has a new 
demand or neglected issue that it would like to have addressed by the 
polity’ (Hug 2001: 40). 
 
In the subsequent empirical analysis, Hug (2001: 88–99) does not pursue this aspect any further 
when he refers to the concept of new issues by indicators which are solely connected to societal 
and economic factors, disregarding the supply side of the political market. In a similar way, 
Tavits (2006: 103) connects the concept of new issues to the societal side and uses macro 
indicators like population size and ethnic fragmentation.  
 
Following the initial point of Hug’s game-theoretical model that potential new parties and their 
demands do not have to descend solely from the societal side, I offer a theoretically and 
empirically coherent analysis of the formation of new parties which starts from the state of the 
programmatic competition between parties and does not assume unidirectional preference 
shaping between parties and the electorate. Before I will present the main points of this 
approach in greater detail, I will elaborate on the literature on the success of new political parties 
in order to highlight at which points this dissertation adds to the existing research in this field. 
 
As distinguished from formation, the success of new political parties can be defined in various 
ways. To start with, it can be linked to the goals of vote-, office- and policy-seeking (Strom 
1990). Success in terms of office manifests itself in government participation of new or former 
new parties when they enter government for the first time (Deschouwer 2008). With regard to 
policy-seeking, it is critical to what extend established parties react to the platform offered by 
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a new party (Harmel and Svasand 1997). Meguid (2005; 2008: 27–30) describes strategies of 
mainstream parties which are linked to the offerings of niche parties and target other 
mainstream competitors. For example, green parties in the 70s and 80s of the last century 
formed in order to promote policies aiming for the protection of the environment and natural 
resources. Meanwhile, these ideas and policies have spread to other parties and are approved 
by large parts of the electorates in developed democracies. Although this can be considered a 
success in terms of policy, the takeover of ideas of (former) new parties by competitors can 
electorally hurt these parties, which have initially promoted these policies. This is an important 
reason why it is crucial to distinguish these different dimensions of success.2 
 
The main focus in the literature is on the electoral success of new parties which can be captured 
by the initial success at the first election or by focusing on its long-term success.3 With regard 
to the initial success, the literature concentrates on factors also present in the analysis of the 
formation of new parties. Differentiating between credible and non-credible (potential) new 
parties4 and taking into account the dependence between formation and electoral success, Hug 
(2001: 141) finds a positive impact of new issues on the initial success of new parties. The 
concept of new issues and their upcoming are, however, solely operationalized through the size 
of the population. Main points of criticism raised by Hug (2001: 144–5) himself related to these 
findings are targeted in the part of the dissertation investigating the success of the new parties: 
first, the analysis of the electoral success of new parties has to consider the impact of the 
programmatic competition between parties; secondly, such an analysis has to investigate 
whether and how voters react to the appearance of new parties. 
 
Concerning the first of Hug’s points, I tie in with the literature on niche parties which considers 
the impact of the programmatic competition on the electoral performance of these parties. The 
niche party literature explicitly takes into account the link between inter-party programmatic 
competition and electoral performance. Meguid (2005; 2008) finds that the electoral destiny of 
niche parties is mainly dependent on programmatic strategies of established mainstream parties. 
This argument is based on the assumption that mainstream parties are able to set the agenda 
(Meguid 2008: 14–6). According to this theory, niche parties suffer electorally when 
                                        
2 Another angle for defining success of new political parties is their organizational persistence or durability 
(Harmel and Robertson 1985: 513; Bolleyer 2013: 12). 
3 Bolleyer and Bytzek (2013) use entering and re-entering parliament as another criterion linked to electoral 
success. 
4 Credibility exists when the benefits of a formation exceeds its costs (Hug 2001: 50). 
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mainstream parties either ignore the issues promoted by the niche party (dismissive strategy) 
or when they take over programmatic offerings of niche parties to offer an alternative choice 
for voters caring about the corresponding issues (accommodative strategy). In contrast, a niche 
party benefits when a mainstream party takes opposing positions on issues promoted by the 
niche party (adversarial strategy). In this case, attention is drawn to the issue priorities of the 
niche party which, at the same time, can preserve its unique programmatic characteristic. The 
empirical analysis of 43 niche parties (Meguid 2008: 45–6), including green and radical right 
parties, in 17 West European Countries, confirms the expected effects of mainstream party 
strategies on the electoral performance of niche parties (Meguid 2008: 58–9). While 
highlighting the essential role of the strategic behavior of parties on the programmatic level of 
party competition for the electoral success of niche parties, this approach does not regard 
whether and how niche parties’ actual programmatic profiles impact their electoral 
performance. As I will outline in the next section, I investigate the electoral effects of 
programmatic features of niche parties starting as new parties in this dissertation. Unlike former 
studies, I consider the possibility that these parties change their profiles over time and exert 
influence on their own electoral fate. 
 
Hino (2012) also examines the long-term success of niche parties5. There exist two important 
differences compared to Meguid’s analysis. First, following Hug (2000; 2001: 65–78), Hino 
(2012: 2–4) acknowledges that niche parties start as new parties by differentiating between their 
formation and subsequent electoral performance. Secondly, and in difference to Meguid, Hino 
(2012: 95, 149) does not only focus on the programmatic behavior of competing parties but also 
incorporates the policy profiles of niche parties themselves. His key variable is the difference 
in the emphasis of pre-defined core issues between the given niche party and the remaining 
parties. The empirical analysis of 26 left niche parties6 across 15 West European Countries 
(Hino 2012: 53–6), mainly consisting of green parties, reveals that a lower emphasis of these 
core issues by existing parties, on the one hand, positively influences the probability to emerge 
but, on the other hand, impacts their subsequent electoral performance negatively (Hino 2012: 
102–3). For a group of 24 extreme right parties (Hino 2012: 57–9), this positive effect on new 
party emergence is also present, however, no significant effect is found with respect to the 
electoral performance of extreme right parties (Hino 2012: 152–3).  
                                        
5 Hino (2012) uses the term challenger parties. However, he selects parties according to programmatic criteria 
which are in line with, for example, the definition of niche parties given by Meguid (2008: 3–4).  
6 Hino (2012: 14–7) uses the term new politics parties and defines them on the basis of their programmatic focus 
on certain policy areas like environmental protection, multiculturalism or pacifism. 
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While Hino takes into account the programmatic features of niche parties with respect to their 
electoral performance, his focus is on pre-defined core issues of these parties. However, profiles 
of these parties cover other issues as well which might also affect their electoral performance. 
Apart from this, there is an important aspect which is linked to the temporal dimension in the 
analysis of the long-term electoral success of new parties and has not been addressed in the 
existing literature on niche parties so far. This is the time-dependency of electoral effects of 
parties’ programmatic features. Although defined in programmatic or ideological terms, niche 
parties start as new parties when they first participate in an election. Thereafter, they undergo 
what I call a programmatic evolution. For the analysis of the long-term electoral success of 
niche parties as former new parties their programmatic evolution has two implications: first, 
platforms of these parties may change over time, and, secondly, parties face different challenges 
throughout their lifecycle, hence, the effect of programmatic characteristics of these parties on 
their electoral performance may differ over time. 
2. My Contribution 
This dissertation investigates how programmatic competition between parties affects the 
formation of new parties as well as their electoral success. Regarding the formation of new 
parties, I make use of the conceptual distinction between the supply side (parties) and the 
demand side (voters) of the political market. More specifically, I explore how the programmatic 
structure of the former is central for the probability of new party formation. The programmatic 
structuration of the supply side of political competition is most relevant in this respect since it 
shapes the room for new policy offerings by parties towards voters which represent 
programmatic innovations (Franzmann 2011). Programmatic innovations can first consist of 
the introduction of new topics or issues previously not addressed by parties. These may also 
include neglected issues which have been dealt with in the past. The second form of 
programmatic innovation is the offering of a new policy mix, which is the combination of issues 
previously not united in a single platform.7 Innovations provide new parties with the 
opportunity to appeal to voters. Regarding the success of new parties, I explore how their 
programmatic features impact their electoral performance over time. Thereby, I specifically 
introduce a temporal dimension into the analysis of the electoral performance of new parties. 
Furthermore, in collaboration with Ingo Rohlfing, I take a direct look at the demand side of the 
                                        
7 In this context, Robertson (2006: 172) refers to ‘governing methodologies’ or ‘an idea, a methodology, a prime 
value, which tends towards organising a party’s policy offerings across all of what it does’.  
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political market by investigating individual voting behavior with regard to new parties.8 In 
particular, we examine how the programmatic offerings of existing parties influence voters’ 
reactions to new parties on the ballot.  
 
Concerning the formation of new parties, my argumentation starts from the side of parties and 
not from the side of voters as it is the former which influences the room available for new 
programmatic offerings (i.e. innovations) by new parties towards voters. Although I do not 
exclude that new parties connect to unsatisfied demands present in the electorate, at the same 
time, I do not assume that this is the only way in which preference shaping between parties and 
voters can take place. A new party can also come up with programmatic innovations which aim 
at inducing demands on the side of voters that are not yet present or salient when the new party 
forms (De Vries and Hobolt 2012; Robertson 2006: 168–9). The focus on the concept of 
programmatic innovation to explain the formation and success of new parties is based on the 
assumption that parties and voters connect through a programmatic linkage. For the purpose of 
this dissertation, this assumption is reasonable, since it analyses new political parties in the 
context of developed democracies. The assumption of programmatic party competition, 
however, does not hold to the same extent in contexts in which other party-voter linkages – like 
clientelism and personalism – prevail (Kitschelt 2000).  
 
The concept of programmatic innovation draws on salience theory (Robertson 1976; Budge and 
Farlie 1983; Budge 2015). According to salience theory, parties do not (only) compete via 
positioning themselves on certain issues or dimensions but (also) through the emphasis they put 
on different issues (Marks and Steenbergen 2004: 166–7; Laver 2001). Against this, spatial 
models of party competition in the tradition of Downs (1957) locate parties on 
left-right-dimensions and share a focus on strategic equilibria between parties (Laver 2005; 
Adams 2012: 402). Here, new policy offerings by parties are then merged into distinct party 
positions. This transmission is highly dependent on how these models are theoretically designed 
(De Vries and Marks 2012). Consequently, salience theory with its stronger focus on issue 
emphasis is better suited for capturing processes linked to programmatic innovation aiming to 
influence the relation between supply and demand on the political market (Hindmoor 2008). 
This is also because salience theory includes the idea that the supply and the demand side can 
                                        
8 I developed the initial proposal of examining the influence of the programmatic supply of existing parties in an 
analysis of individual voting behavior with respect to new parties. After this, Ingo Rohlfing and I contributed 
equally to all following steps in the research process (elaborating the theoretical argumentation, preparing data, 
conducting the empirical analysis). 
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differ with respect to (salient) dimensions or issues (Robertson 2006: 168–9; 1976: 57–8). 
Hence, it is also important to carefully distinguish strategic equilibria between parties on the 
supply side, stressed by spatial models, and equilibria between the supply and demand side on 
the issue market (Franzmann 2011: 330) where programmatic offerings of parties in the form 
of issues meet demands of voters. Three aspects impede the existence and stability of equilibria 
on the issue market. First, although in general parties may have a good idea about voters’ 
demands, it cannot be assumed that they meet all of them due to imperfect information9 and the 
fact that these demands are subject to change. Secondly, parties pursue varying, sometimes 
conflicting goals (Strom 1990). They also face different restrictions for ideological and 
intra-party reasons (Robertson 1976: 31–5) which may prevent them from addressing voters’ 
demands in some cases. Thirdly, political actors can seek to reshape the prevailing structures 
on the issue market by changing the issue agenda through inducing and provoking certain 
demands in the electorate (De Vries and Hobolt 2012). These three points lead to the 
contestability10 of the issue market and enable the formation of new parties promoting 
programmatic innovations. The room for such innovations is influenced by the programmatic 
supply of existing parties. Following the perspective of salience theory, the latter can be 
characterized according to its diversity in emphasized issues (Franzmann 2008). Concerning 
the formation of new parties, the central hypothesis of the second chapter of this dissertation 
states that a lower programmatic diversity of existing parties increases the probability of the 
formation of new parties as it leaves more room for programmatic innovations which provide 
new parties with the opportunity to appeal to voters.  
 
From the perspective of programmatic competition between parties, investigating the electoral 
success of new parties means to analyze how it is affected by their programmatic profiles and 
the programmatic actions of their competitors. Against the backdrop of this dissertation and its 
framework, this requires to account for programmatic profiles in a way that is in line with the 
concept of programmatic innovation. Therefore, in the third chapter, I capture programmatic 
profiles of parties by means of two features: nicheness and programmatic concentration. The 
first has been recently introduced by Meyer and Miller (2015) and accounts for programmatic 
                                        
9 Hug (2001: 50–4) also underlines the importance of imperfect information and uncertainty as a precondition for 
the formation of new parties. Franzmann (2011: 329) similarly highlights uncertainty as a precondition for 
innovation.  
10 Franzmann (2011: 329) and Bartolini (1999: 457) use the term contestability in connection with the institutional 
requirements for the possibility of the formation of new parties. Here, I add another dimension of contestability 
which refers directly to conditions prevailing on the issue market, in particular with regard to the relationship 
between programmatic supply and demand.  
12 
 
differences between a given party and its competitors. Therefore, this concept also captures the 
degree of innovation in programmatic profiles of parties as such innovations find expression in 
programmatic differences through issue emphasis. However, the concepts of nicheness and 
programmatic innovation are not fully congruent as nicheness also reflects (long) established 
differences of issue emphasis between (existing) parties. Nevertheless, nicheness represents a 
valid indicator for the degree of programmatic innovation of new parties which present their 
platform for the first time in the context of a general election. 
 
As a second feature of programmatic profiles of parties, I introduce the concept of 
programmatic concentration. It reflects the range of issues addressed by a party and the 
concentration of emphasis the party puts on these issues. Whereas nicheness is a relative 
concept as it refers to programmatic differences between parties, programmatic concentration 
solely relates to the profile of a single party. Taken together, these two concepts represent a 
new approach to capture programmatic profiles of parties from the perspective of salience 
theory. Moreover, as both concepts refer to differences in degree, they are suitable to depict 
gradual differences in programmatic profiles between parties and for the same party over time. 
In the third chapter of the dissertation, I use the concepts of nicheness and programmatic 
concentration in order to investigate programmatic profiles of green and extreme right parties 
from their electoral start onwards. Members of these two party families are treated as typical 
cases of niche parties in the literature (e.g. Meguid 2005; 2008: 16). These parties stand out due 
to two aspects. First, they started as new parties in the sense of Hug’s (2001: 14) definition and, 
secondly, both party families are connected to the promotion of certain issues (Meguid 2008: 
16), indicating programmatic innovation. The investigation of their profiles by means of 
nicheness and programmatic concentration pursues two goals: first, comparing the profiles of 
green and extreme right parties to the ones of their competitors for their initial and all the 
following elections; secondly, tracing the programmatic evolution of these parties from their 
electoral start in order to look for trends in their platforms. Results suggest that green and 
extreme right parties in many cases do not display levels of nicheness and programmatic 
concentration which are significantly higher than those of their competitors. The same holds 
true when one restricts the comparison to long established mainstream parties (Meguid 2008: 
46). Additionally, the findings do not reveal any clear trends in the programmatic evolution of 
green and extreme right parties. Their patterns of programmatic change do not appear to be 
different compared to their competitors. Especially the absence of significant differences in 
nicheness for the first election of these parties usually regarded as typical cases of niche parties 
13 
 
questions the innovative character of their platforms. Yet, two aspects give reason for a careful 
interpretation: on the one hand, the analysis rests on the complete profiles of these parties. A 
party can indeed exhibit programmatic innovation and therefore high nicheness in a certain 
policy area while, taken as a whole, its programmatic profile does not show the same level of 
nicheness. Secondly, because the measurement of nicheness and programmatic concentration 
is linked to election manifestos, it cannot be ruled out that competing parties have already 
reacted to new programmatic ideas between elections. 
 
Starting from the uncovered variance in the programmatic profiles between parties and over 
time in the third chapter, the fourth part of the dissertation studies how this programmatic 
variance of green and extreme right parties affects their electoral performance. Taking into 
account that these parties start as new parties, I argue that nicheness and programmatic 
concentration have different effects on electoral performance over time as parties face different 
challenges over their lifecycle. The main hypothesis is that, at their electoral beginning, these 
parties benefit from high levels of nicheness and programmatic concentration while over time 
these positive effects diminish. By introducing a temporal dimension in the analysis of the 
effects of programmatic profiles on electoral performance I extend the existing literature in 
several ways. First, I show that niche parties take advantage from distinct (high nicheness) and 
clear (high programmatic concentration) programmatic profiles when they are new and enter 
electoral competition. This finding also points to the benefits of programmatic innovation. 
Second, tracing the programmatic evolution of these parties reveals that these positive effects 
diminish over time and that neglecting this aspect leads to biased inferences. Third, the analysis 
uncovers that niche parties’ behavior has an influence on their electoral fate. Altogether, the 
focus on members of the two party families, green and extreme right parties, questions the 
generalizability of inferences with regard to new parties in general. Nevertheless, studying these 
parties exemplifies that programmatic profiles of new parties matter for their electoral 
performance and reveals the importance of the time dimension.  
 
Until now, comparative studies on the electoral performance of new parties have exclusively 
focused on the level of parties. This is also the analytical approach deployed in the previously 
described chapter 4 of this dissertation. While this research provides valuable inferences on the 
level of parties, it offers only indirect insights about voters’ reactions when it comes to elections 
featuring new parties. Additionally, inferences about individual behavior on the basis of 
aggregate data bear the risk of ecological fallacies (King 1997). Therefore, the fifth and final 
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part of the dissertation illuminates electoral prospects of new parties from a different angle by 
switching to the individual level of analysis. In this collaborative study with Ingo Rohlfing, we 
investigate individual voting behavior with respect to new parties. Therefore, we take the 
individual vote choice as the dependent variable and differentiate between voting for a new 
party, voting for an existing party and abstention. Considering the focus of this dissertation on 
the programmatic competition between parties, our main interest centers on the influence of the 
programmatic supply by existing parties on vote choice with regard to new parties. To the best 
of our knowledge, there currently exists no comparative study on individual voting in relation 
to new parties. Furthermore, the study takes on an important role in the dissertation itself. By 
examining voting behavior, it focuses directly on the demand side of the political market and 
complements the preceding parts which concentrate on the supply side and are located on the 
party as well as party system level. While the second part of the dissertation looks at how the 
programmatic diversity of existing parties impacts on the probability of the formation of new 
parties, the fifth part analyzes how the same factor – i.e. diversity – affects voters’ reactions to 
new parties participating in a general parliamentary election for the first time. Moreover, 
another innovation concerns the research design which takes into account that voting for a new 
party and abstention are part of the same choice set. Investigating both phenomena in isolation 
might cause biased inference regarding voting behavior.  
 
As explained above, the study includes the diversity of existing parties as a major determinant 
of the probability of voting for new parties. However, it faces the limitation that, due to lacking 
manifesto data for many minor new parties, it is not possible to also consider the actual 
programmatic profiles of the new parties included in the study. The dilemma for comparative 
research between the aim of including all new parties for a certain group of countries and period 
of time and, at the same time, being able to capture their programmatic profiles is difficult to 
dissolve. Also for this reason, both the theory as well as the findings of this dissertation serve 
as a starting point and pose several avenues for follow-up research. Facing the above mentioned 
dilemma, it seems promising to use additional methodological angles in order to complement 
(Lieberman 2005) the research of this dissertation. Two strategies are of value here. First, case 
study research (Rohlfing 2012) could uncover causal mechanisms behind the formation and 
initial electoral performance of new parties – in particular the interplay between (potential) new 
parties, existing parties and electoral demands in a temporal perspective. Secondly and related 
to this, sequence analysis (Blanchard et al. 2014) can also address this interplay by analyzing 
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different chains of events. Such methodological approaches are also able to illuminate party 
competition between elections as well as the origins and effects of programmatic innovation. 
3. Overview 
Chapter 2 marks the starting point of this dissertation by exploring how on the programmatic 
level of party competition the programmatic diversity of existing parties influences the 
probability of the emergence of new political parties in developed democracies. Apart from 
institutional factors, previous comparative studies on this topic concentrated on the demand 
side of the electoral market (voters) and its interaction with the supply side, i.e. the 
programmatic offerings of existing parties. I choose a different theoretical starting point by 
emphasizing that the emergence of a new political party is a phenomenon taking place on the 
supply side of the political market. Subsequently, I elaborate that programmatic factors linked 
to the supply side in themselves represent a strong determinant of the probability of the 
emergence of new parties. In this context, I extend the concept of programmatic innovation 
(Franzmann 2011) which refers to new programmatic offerings made by parties vis-à-vis the 
electorate. In contrast to other studies, I do not assume that preference shaping between parties 
and voters occurs in only one direction. On the one hand, programmatic innovations can pick 
up already existing unsatisfied demands in the electorate. On the other hand, actors can also 
come up with programmatic innovations for which they first have to induce demand. The core 
argument of the analysis is that the probability of the formation of new parties increases when 
the programmatic diversity of existing parties decreases, as this extends the room for 
programmatic innovations by new (potential) parties. For the differentiation between genuinely 
new parties and splits from existing parties as subtypes of new parties empirical results confirm 
this effect for the former but not for the latter and prove the importance of the structure of the 
programmatic supply in the process of new party formation. 
 
Chapter 3 examines the programmatic profiles of niche parties. It verifies whether green and 
extreme right parties, typically considered as niche parties in the literature, show programmatic 
characteristics linked to the niche party concept. For this purpose, complete programmatic 
profiles of parties are captured by means of two features: The first, nicheness (Meyer and Miller 
2015), refers to programmatic differences between the given party and its competitors. The 
second concept, programmatic concentration, captures the range of a programmatic profile of a 
given party and the varying emphasis it puts on the addressed issues. While the nicheness of a 
party is influenced by both the given party and its competitors, programmatic concentration is 
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only dependent on the programmatic profile of the given party. Ensuing from attributes present 
in definitions of the niche party concept, niche parties are expected to show higher levels of 
nicheness and programmatic concentration compared to their competitors. Contrary to that, 
results show that for more than 50 per cent of all elections of green and extreme right parties in 
the sample, these parties do not show levels of nicheness and programmatic concentration 
significantly higher than those of all competing parties. This is not only true when we compare 
the scores of these parties to all of their competitors but also when we restrict the comparison 
to their mainstream party counterparts. With regard to changes over time, niche parties show 
significant changes for nicheness as well as for programmatic concentration. The fact that 
changes do not only occur in nicheness but also in programmatic concentration indicates that 
niche parties do not statically stick to their initial programmatic profile. Rather, they adapt their 
platforms over time. This also points to the possibility that changes in their nicheness are not 
automatically and solely the result of the behavior of their competitors but also caused by 
actions of niche parties themselves. In sum, results of this study do not support a static 
classification of parties into categories of niche (and mainstream) parties along the lines of party 
family membership. Instead, investigating parties by means of their nicheness and 
programmatic concentration enables us to capture programmatic differences (in degree) 
between parties and over time. In this way, these measures broaden the conceptual toolbox for 
analyzing party competition, enabling us to look on parties’ profiles from a salience theory 
perspective. 
 
Chapter 4 investigates how the variation in the programmatic profiles of niche parties affect 
their long-term electoral performance. Previous comparative studies on the electoral 
performance of niche parties either concentrate on the programmatic behavior of certain 
mainstream parties or solely on core issues of niche parties (Meguid 2005; 2008; Hino 2012). 
However, manifesto data show that the platforms of these parties cover far more than just their 
assumed core issues. Taking complete programmatic profiles into account, there are differences 
in nicheness and programmatic concentration between these parties and also over time (see 
chapter 3) which leads to the question how this variation in profiles affects electoral 
performance. In this context, I argue that the programmatic features of niche parties, nicheness 
and programmatic concentration, have different effects over time. At the beginning, when niche 
parties are new in the electoral arena, they should benefit from high levels of nicheness and 
programmatic concentration. A high nicheness stands for a distinct programmatic profile which 
serves as a unique characteristic for parties entering party competition. Similarly, at the 
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beginning, niche parties should also profit from high levels of programmatic concentration. A 
high programmatic concentration implies a clear programmatic focus and makes it easier to 
transport the core message of the party and attract awareness on the side of voters, especially 
when the given party is new on the scene. However, in the long run, these positive effects of 
nicheness and programmatic concentration should diminish. In order to attract broader 
segments of the electorate, parties have to leave their programmatic niche. Parties which 
maintain high levels of nicheness over time are more likely to attract only a minority of voters 
in the long run. With regard to programmatic concentration, it might be necessary for niche 
parties to broaden their profiles for the long term in order to attract groups of voters who care 
about more issues than the ones the party focused on at the beginning. In addition, the positive 
effect of programmatic concentration on awareness of voters is likely to decrease once the party 
passed its initial phase after entering the electoral arena. Results confirm these hypotheses. At 
the beginning, nicheness and programmatic concentration, both, show positive effects on 
electoral performance of green and extreme right parties. In the long run, these effects vanish. 
All in all, results show that nicheness and programmatic concentration as features of niche 
parties do matter with regard to their electoral fate but their effects vary over time. 
 
Chapter 5, a collaboration with Ingo Rohlfing, focuses on the reactions of voters to new parties. 
Whereas the other chapters concentrate directly on the supply side of the political market by 
investigating the influence of programmatic factors linked to party systems and parties on the 
fate of new political parties, this chapter shifts the focus directly to the voters (demand side). 
The theoretical starting point for this chapter is that the existing literature on new parties 
assumes that new parties’ prospects rise in the face of mismatches between parties’ 
programmatic offerings and demands of the electorate. While the second chapter of the 
dissertation shows that the formation of genuinely new parties becomes more likely in situations 
of a lower programmatic diversity of existing parties, chapter 5 examines how diversity affects 
individual voting behavior with regard to new parties which participate in a national election 
for the first time. Thus, the study takes into account the multi-level structure both in theoretical 
and empirical terms. By applying this research design, it adds to the existing studies on electoral 
performance located on the analytical level of parties. Theoretically, we point out several 
reasons why new parties do not automatically benefit from situations of low programmatic 
diversity. In this context, it is also important that we consider the whole set of choices voters 
have, which apart from voting for an existing or a new party also includes abstention. For 
example, voters’ dissatisfaction with regard to parties might have already reached a point at 
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which they refuse voting at all. Additionally, it is not guaranteed that new parties offer policies 
suitable for dissolving mismatches between supply and demand on the political market, either 
because they misread the situation or because they have other motivations. Among multiple 
hypotheses on the effects of the programmatic supply of existing parties and individual voter-
related determinants on voting behavior, our main expectation is that a decrease in 
programmatic diversity of existing parties, on average, leads to a higher probability of voting 
for a new party. A multilevel analysis of 20 elections in parliamentary democracies offers 
support for this expectation. 
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Table 1: Overview on individual publications. 
Title Aim Status 
The Influence of 
Programmatic Diversity on 
the Formation of New 
Political Parties 
Argues that the programmatic 
diversity of existing parties is a 
crucial factor for the probability 
of new party formation as it 
determines the room for 
programmatic innovation by 
(potential) new parties 
Published in Party 
Politics, 21 (6), 919-929 
Are Niche Parties Really 
Different? The 
Programmatic Profiles of 
Green and Extreme Right 
Parties 
Complements the nicheness 
concept by introducing 
programmatic concentration for 
capturing the programmatic 
profiles of parties from a salience 
theory perspective; analyzes 
programmatic differences of green 
and extreme right parties in 
relation to competing parties on 
the basis of nicheness and 
programmatic concentration 
In 2013 awarded in its 
first version with the 
Party Politics Peter Mair 
Prize as the best paper at 
the 23rd ECPR Summer 
School on “Political 
Parties and Democracy” 
 
How Programmatic 
Profiles of Niche Parties 
Affect Their Electoral 
Performance 
Argues that the effects of 
nicheness and programmatic 
concentration on electoral 
performance of niche parties 
which start as new parties vary 
over time. 
A later, shortened and 
revised version is 
published in West 
European Politics 39 (6), 
1205-1229 
Programmatic and 
Individual Determinants of 
Vote Choices for New 
Parties: A Multilevel 
Analysis of Voting Behavior 
in 20 Parliamentary 
Elections 
(together with Ingo 
Rohlfing) 
Provides an analysis of individual 
voting behavior with respect to 
new parties and takes into account 
that voting for new parties is 
influenced by the programmatic 
supply of existing parties.  
 
 
  
20 
 
References 
Adams, James (2012). ‘Causes and Electoral Consequences of Party Policy Shifts in Multiparty 
Elections: Theoretical Results and Empirical Evidence’, Annual Review of Political Science, 
15:1, 401–19. 
Adams, James, Michael Clark, Lawrence Ezrow, and Garrett Glasgow (2006). ‘Are Niche 
Parties Fundamentally Different from Mainstream Parties? The Causes and the Electoral 
Consequences of Western European Parties' Policy Shifts, 1976-1998’, American Journal of 
Political Science, 50:3, 513–29. 
Bartolini, Stefano (1999). ‘Collusion, Competition and Democracy: Part I’, Journal of 
Theoretical Politics, 11:4, 435–70. 
Bischof, Daniel (2015). ‘Towards a renewal of the niche party concept. Parties, market shares 
and condensed offers’, Party Politics, online first. 
Blanchard, Philippe, Felix Bühlmann, and Jacques-Antoine Gauthier (2014). Advances in 
Sequence Analysis. Theory, Method, Applications. New York: Springer. 
Bolleyer, Nicole (2013). New Parties in Old Systems. Persistence and Decline in Seventeen 
Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bolleyer, Nicole, and Evelyn Bytzek (2013). ‘Origins of Party Formation and New Party 
Success in Advanced Democracies’, European Journal of Political Research, 52:6, 773–96. 
Budge, Ian (2015). ‘Issue Emphases, Saliency Theory and Issue Ownership. A Historical and 
Conceptual Analysis’, West European Politics, 38:4, 761–77. 
Budge, Ian, and Dennis Farlie (1983). Explaining and Predicting Elections. Issue Effects and 
Party Strategies in Twenty-three Democracies. London, Boston: Allen & Unwin. 
Budge, Ian, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara, and Eric Tanenbaum, eds. 
(2001). Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments, 
1945-1998. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Cox, Gary W. (1997). Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral 
Systems. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. 
De Vries, Catharine E., and Sara B. Hobolt (2012). ‘When Dimensions Collide: The Electoral 
Success of Issue Entrepreneurs’, European Union Politics, 13:2, 246–68. 
De Vries, Catherine E., and Gary Marks (2012). ‘The Struggle over Dimensionality: A Note on 
Theory and Empirics’, European Union Politics, 13:2, 185–93. 
Deschouwer, Kris, ed. (2008). New Parties in Government. In Power for the First Time. 
London, New York: Routledge. 
Downs, Anthony (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper. 
21 
 
Duverger, Maurice (1967). Political Parties. Their Organization and Activity in the Modern 
State. London: Methuen. 
Franzmann, Simon T. (2008). Programmatische Heterogenität und ideologische Polarisierung 
in den europäischen Parteiensystemen [mimeo]. Cologne. 
Franzmann, Simon T. (2011). ‘Competition, Contest, and Cooperation: The Analytic 
Framework of the Issue Market’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 23:3, 317–43. 
Geys, Benny (2006). ‘District magnitude, social heterogeneity and local party system 
fragmentation’, Party Politics, 12:2, 281–97. 
Harmel, Robert, and John D. Robertson (1985). ‘Formation and Success of New Parties’, 
International Political Science Review, 6:4, 501–23. 
Harmel, Robert, and Lars Svasand (1997). ‘The Influence of New Parties on Old Parties' 
Platforms - The Cases of the Progress Parties and Conservative Parties of Denmark and 
Norway’, Party Politics, 3:3, 315–40. 
Hauss, Charles, and David Rayside (1978). ‘The Development of New Parties in Western 
Democracies since 1945’, in: Louis S. Maisel and Joseph Cooper (eds.), Political Parties: 
Development and Decay. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 31–57. 
Hindmoor, Andrew (2008). ‘Policy Innovation and the Dynamics of Party Competition: A 
Schumpeterian Account of British Electoral Politics, 1950-2005’, British Journal of Politics 
& International Relations, 10:3, 492–508. 
Hino, Airo (2012). New Challenger Parties in Western Europe. A Comparative Analysis. 
London, New York: Routledge. 
Hug, Simon (2000). ‘Studying the Electoral Success of New Political Parties - A 
Methodological Note’, Party Politics, 6:2, 187–97. 
Hug, Simon (2001). Altering Party Systems: Strategic Behavior and the Emergence of New 
Political Parties in Western Democracies. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Ignazi, Piero (1992). ‘The Silent Counter-Revolution. Hypotheses on the Emergence of 
Extreme Right-wing Parties in Europe’, European Journal of Political Research, 22:1, 3–34. 
Katz, Richard S., and Peter Mair (1995). ‘Changing Models of Party Organization and Party 
Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party’, Party Politics, 1:1, 5–28. 
King, Gary (1997). A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem. Reconstructing Individual 
Behavior from Aggregate Data. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Kirchheimer, Otto (1966). ‘The Transformation of West European Party Systems’, in: Joseph 
LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (eds.), Political Parties and Political Development. 
Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 177–200. 
22 
 
Kitschelt, Herbert (2000). ‘Linkages between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities’, 
Comparative Political Studies, 33:6-7, 845–79. 
Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara, Ian Budge, and Michael D. 
McDonald, eds. (2006). Mapping Policy Preferences II: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and 
Governments in Central and Eastern Europe, European Union and OECD 1990-2003. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Krouwel, André (2006). ‘Party Models’, in: Richard S. Katz and William Crotty (eds.), 
Handbook of Party Politics. London [u.a.]: Sage, 249–69. 
Lago, Ignacio, and Ferran Martinez (2010). ‘Why New Parties?’, Party Politics, 17:1, 3–20. 
Laver, Michael (2001). ‘Position and Salience in the Policies of Political Actors’, in: Michael 
Laver (ed.), Estimating the Policy Positions of Political Actors. London, New York: 
Routledge, 66–75. 
Laver, Michael (2005). ‘Policy and the Dynamics of Political Competition’, American Political 
Science Review, 99:2, 263–81. 
Lieberman, Evan S. (2005). ‘Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative 
Research’, American Political Science Review, 99, 435–52. 
Lijphart, Arend (1994). Electoral Systems and Party Systems. A Study of Twenty-Seven 
Democracies, 1945-1990. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Lipset, Seymour M., and Stein Rokkan (1967). Party systems and voter alignments: cross-
national perspectives. [Contributors: Robert R. Alford and others]. New York: Free Press. 
Mair, Peter (1998). Party system change. Approaches and interpretations. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Mair, Peter (2008). ‘The Challenge to Party Government’, West European Politics, 31:1-2, 
211–34. 
Marks, Gary, and Marco R. Steenbergen, eds. (2004). European Integration and Political 
Conflict. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Meguid, Bonnie M. (2005). ‘Competition between Unequals: The Role of Mainstream Party 
Strategy in Niche Party Success’, American Political Science Review, 99:3, 347–59. 
Meguid, Bonnie M. (2008). Party Competition between Unequals: Strategies and Electoral 
Fortunes in Western Europe. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Meyer, Thomas M., and Bernhard Miller (2015). ‘The Niche Party Concept and its 
Measurement’, Party Politics, 21:2, 259–71. 
Müller-Rommel, Ferdinand (1993). Grüne Parteien in Westeuropa. Opladen: Westdeutscher 
Verlag. 
23 
 
Müller‐Rommel, Ferdinand (1982). ‘Ecology Parties in Western Europe’, West European 
Politics, 5:1, 68–74. 
Neto, Octavio A., and Gary W. Cox (1997). ‘Electoral Institutions, Cleavage Structures, and 
the Number of Parties’, American Journal of Political Science, 41:1, 149. 
Norris, Pippa (2004). Electoral Engineering. Voting Rules and Political Behavior. Cambridge, 
UK, New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Ordeshook, Peter C., and Olga V. Shvetsova (1994). ‘Ethnic Heterogeneity, District Magnitude, 
and the Number of Parties’, American Journal of Political Science, 38:1, 100–23. 
Riker, William H. (1982). ‘The Two-party System and Duverger's Law - An Essay on the 
History of Political Science’, American Political Science Review, 76:4, 753–66. 
Robertson, David (1976). A Theory of Party Competition. London, New York: J. Wiley. 
Robertson, David (2006). ‘On the Dimensionality of Political Space and on its Inhabitants’, in: 
Judith Bara and Albert P. Weale (eds.), Democratic Politics and Party Competition: Essays 
in Honour of Ian Budge. London, New York: Routledge, 159–78. 
Rohlfing, Ingo (2012). Case studies and causal inference. An integrative framework. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Rokkan, Stein (1970). Citizens, Elections, Parties. Approaches to the Comparative Study of the 
Process of Development. New York: McKay. 
Sartori, Giovanni (2005). Parties and Party Systems. A framework for Analysis. Colchester: 
ECPR. 
Strom, Kaare (1990). ‘A Behavioral Theory of Competitive Political Parties’, American 
Journal of Political Science, 34:2, 565–98. 
Tavits, Margit (2006). ‘Party System Change. Testing a Model of New Party Entry’, Party 
Politics, 12:1, 99–119. 
Volkens, A., J. Bara, Ian Budge, M. D. McDonald, and H. D. Klingemann, eds. (2013). 
Mapping Policy Preferences from Texts: Statistical Solutions for Manifesto Analysts. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Wagner, Markus (2012). ‘Defining and Measuring Niche Parties’, Party Politics, 18:6, 845–
64. 
Willey, Joseph (1998). ‘Institutional Arrangements and the Success of New Parties in Old 
Democracies’, Political Studies, 46:3, 651–68. 
  
 
        Chapter 2   
  
  
The Influence of Programmatic Diversity on the Formation of New Political Parties1 
Gregor Zons 
 
 
Abstract 
Quantitative studies aiming at general explanations for the emergence of new political parties 
stress the importance of new issues and the programmatic behaviour of other parties. I 
connect these two aspects by arguing that the programmatic diversity of existing parties is a 
strong influence on the incentives for new party formation, as it determines the scope for 
possible programmatic innovations. I use two measures for programmatic diversity in order to 
capture the programmatic supply by existing parties. It can be shown that the explanatory 
contribution of programmatic factors is as high as or even higher than that of the factors 
usually cited in the literature on new political parties, e.g. electoral institutions. Moreover, the 
results underline the necessity of differentiating between genuinely new parties and splits 
from existing parties as subtypes of new political parties. 
 
KEY WORDS ▪ new parties ▪ conceptual definition ▪ measurement ▪ statistical analysis 
                                                 1 A later version is published in Party Politics 25 (6), 919-929, which was published online before print in 2013. 
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Introduction 
Over recent decades, developed democracies have seen a considerable number of new 
political parties, including green and right-wing parties. The literature on new political parties 
offers explanations for cross-country variation in the emergence of new parties, relying on 
electoral institutions (Willey 1998) and sociological factors (cleavages) which are in general 
persistent over time. In addition, there are qualitative studies emphasizing the influence of 
new programmatic offerings in the context of the formation of new parties (Müller-Rommel 
1993; Ignazi 1992). Similarly, quantitative studies aiming at general explanations for the 
phenomenon of new party formation mention the importance of new issues (Hug 2001; Tavits 
2006). This study aims at contributing to this line of research by investigating the influence of 
the programmatic supply by existing parties on the formation of new political parties over 
time in a cross-country design.  
 
This analysis adds to approaches which tie in with models of strategic entry (Cox 1997; Tavits 
2006). The basic idea of these models is that the formation of a new political party is the 
result of a calculation by rational actors who balance the costs of formation on the one hand 
against, on the other hand, the benefits of office as well as the probability of being elected. As 
the following analysis includes the programmatic supply of the existing parties, which 
determines the possible leeway for programmatic innovations by new competitors, it takes 
account of the fact that the decision to form a new party is dependent on the behaviour of 
other actors in the arena. I argue that the programmatic level of party competition is central to 
the incentives to form a new political party. To capture the programmatic supply, I use two 
measures for programmatic diversity of political parties. The quantitative approach also 
enables a comparison of the explanatory power of the introduced programmatic factors and 
factors usually cited in the literature. In addition, whereas previous quantitative studies treated 
both genuinely new parties and splits from existing parties as new parties, without checking 
for any differences in their formation process, the following empirical analysis differentiates 
between both subtypes.  
 
A better understanding of the formation of new parties is also essential for the understanding 
of their success (Hug 2000), as these phenomena are interlinked but not identical with regard 
to their explanatory factors (Harmel and Robertson 1985: 502). Although many newly formed 
parties never achieve electoral success, the few successful ones represent a subsample of this 
larger group. Assuming that their success is at least partly attributable to the prospect of 
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programmatic innovations, it is necessary to examine how the leeway for such innovations 
affects the formation of new parties in the first place. Even without making electoral inroads, 
newly formed parties are relevant, as existing parties may react to their emergence and their 
policy offerings (Meguid 2005, 2008). The focus on the programmatic level of party 
competition also speaks to the literature on the stability of party systems and the functioning 
of party competition in general. As this study demonstrates that the emergence of new 
political parties is linked to the programmatic level of party competition, it indicates that this 
is an expression of programmatic innovation, which is an important condition for functioning 
competition between parties (Franzmann 2011: 330). 
 
Theory on the Formation of New Parties 
One of the most prominent arguments in the literature on new political parties is ‘that new 
parties are formed primarily to fill representational needs’ (Harmel and Robertson 1985: 502) 
and respond to dissatisfied voters (Hauss and Rayside 1978: 38). Apart from the demand side, 
this quote hints at the importance of the behaviour of political parties on the programmatic 
level of party competition. Studies of single parties and party families have addressed this 
point by looking at the programmatic offerings of existing parties with respect to certain 
issues (Müller-Rommel 1993). Quantitative studies aiming at a general explanation for the 
emergence of new political parties mention the concept of new issues, which also touches on 
the relationship between the programmatic supply and electoral demands. In this article, I 
concentrate on the programmatic supply side of the political market. I argue that diversity of 
the programmatic supply by existing parties determines the leeway for programmatic 
innovations by new challengers and represents an important factor in the process of new party 
formation. The consideration of factors linked to the behaviour of parties on the programmatic 
level of party competition is important as it can account for variation in the number of new 
parties over time.  
 
Theoretical models in quantitative studies on the phenomenon of new party formation have 
addressed the importance of the programmatic supply side to various degrees. Hug (2001), in 
his well-known work on new parties, develops a game-theoretic model to explain their 
formation. The actors in this game are an existing party and a potential new party. The result 
of this model depends on the response of the existing party to demands by potential 
challengers under the condition of uncertainty. Thereby, the formation of a new party follows 
from the programmatic behaviour of existing parties. On the basis of this model, Hug (2001: 
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54ff.) states five hypotheses which influence the probability of new party formation. Among 
them is that the probability of new parties emerging increases with the importance of new 
issues.  
 
Tavits (2006) starts with a general rational choice model which comes from Cox’s (1997) 
illustration of entry models and describes the rational calculus of elites deciding whether to 
form a new party or not. According to this calculus, a formation occurs when the valuation of 
the benefits of holding political office and the (expected) probability of getting elected 
exceeds the costs of forming a new party. As this calculus is very general, it is important 
which factors are connected to these three parameters. 
 
The probability of getting elected has to be assessed by the potential new party before the 
election and before its decision to participate in it. Actors are assumed to look at previous 
elections to estimate their potential electoral success. Beyond this assumption, there is the 
argument that the strength of voters’ commitments to particular parties is increasing in the age 
of a democracy as the viability of parties grows more and more apparent (Tavits 2008: 116f.). 
Taking a line similar to Hug, Tavits also states that ‘if societal conditions are such that the 
probability of new issues emerging is high, then new parties should be more frequent’ (Tavits 
2006: 103). The concept of new issues also points to the importance of the programmatic 
level of party competition as it affects the conditions for connecting to electoral demands in 
the first place. 
 
In order to capture the importance of the programmatic supply side, I tie in with theories 
about party competition which differentiate between the sides of the parties and the voters. 
Robertson (1976; 2006), in contrast to Downs (1957), who assumes that parties and voters are 
part of the same political space, starts from two political spaces: one of parties and one of 
voters. Building on this distinction, one can see that the two spaces differ in their 
dimensionality and their dominant issues, and therefore do not have to be congruent. 
Following this line of thought, Franzmann (2011: 330) uses the concept of the issue market, in 
which issues are the goods traded between parties (supply side) and voters (demand side). In 
an equilibrium on the issue market the programmatic supply of the political parties would 
perfectly cover all voters’ demands, or, in other words, there would be a perfect congruence 
between parties’ programmatic offerings and voters’ demands. However, the existence of 
such an equilibrium over time is highly unlikely. Owing to imperfect information, party actors 
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are not entirely certain about voters’ (future) demands or their electoral consequences (Hug 
2001: 50f.), the more so because of a constantly changing environment. Added to this, parties 
might not be able or willing to adapt their programmatic profiles, for example due to intra-
party reasons (Robertson 1976: 38). These factors lead to the contestability of the issue 
market and the vulnerability of incumbent parties. They give incentives and opportunities for 
political entrepreneurs to offer new programmatic ideas to the electorate. I call these 
‘programmatic innovations’, as ‘innovation’ refers to the actual introduction of a given policy 
idea (Hindmoor 2008: 499).  
 
I differentiate two types of programmatic innovation. The first is the promotion of new issues 
not yet addressed by the existing parties. This includes issues that were covered by parties in 
the past but subsequently lapsed, as the handling of an issue may vary over time due to an 
ever changing environment. The second type of innovation refers to the way parties think 
about politics in general and how they structure their programmatic offerings. According to 
Robertson (2006: 172), political parties are not completely flexible in the political party space. 
They hold certain ‘governing methodologies’, ‘an idea, a methodology, a prime value, which 
tends towards organising a party’s policy offerings across all of what it does’. Here, there 
exists another possible source of innovation. A political entrepreneur can come up with a new 
mode of policymaking in general which could enable a new combination of already existing 
but unconnected issues or a combination of old and new issues. Programmatic innovations 
can connect to unsatisfied demands and in this way respond to representational needs. Lago 
and Martinez (2010) call these situations electoral market failures. However, political 
entrepreneurs may also conceive innovations for which they first have to stimulate demand 
(de Vries and Hobolt 2012). This means that preference shaping between parties and the 
electorate occurs in both directions but, irrespective of the direction of preference shaping, the 
introduction of a new programmatic offering which I call programmatic innovation is the 
precondition to trigger and connect to electoral demands. Additionally, although 
programmatic innovations are not guaranteed to meet the approval of voters, they nevertheless 
offer the opportunity to appeal to them in the first place. The leeway for possible innovations 
is dependent on the range of policies offered by the existing parties. The less diverse the 
existing supply, the more leeway there is for innovations by new contestants. The diversity of 
the programmatic supply by existing parties follows from two factors. The first is the overall 
issue coverage of all parties and comprises all issues which are addressed at least by one party 
and, in this way, are part of the programmatic competition between parties. The second factor 
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refers to the actual programmatic differences between parties. All in all, this leads to the first 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The probability of new party formation increases with a lower diversity of the 
programmatic supply by existing parties. 
 
With regard to the benefits of office, Tavits (2006: 104) argues that the benefits of holding 
political office vary according to the opportunity for influencing policies. This general 
argument is then linked to the type of interest mediation: corporatist arrangements are 
expected to show fewer newly formed parties than pluralist systems, as the former provide 
channels for influencing policies apart from the parliamentary arena. The dispersal of power 
across state institutions should also be relevant to the decision process about party formation. 
A higher number of veto points in a political system increases the possibilities of influencing 
policies. Yet only party actors have access to these veto points1. Consequently, the second 
hypothesis reads as:     
 
Hypothesis 2: The probability of new party formation increases with the number of veto 
points that are accessible for party actors. 
 
Turning to formation costs, the literature emphasizes that higher costs lower the probability of 
new party formation (Tavits 2006; Hug 2001). The costs are determined by the electoral 
system and regulations with regard to party registration. The following analysis controls for 
these factors. 
 
Operationalization 
Previous quantitative studies follow Hug’s (2001: 14) definition of new parties according to 
which a new political party is defined as ‘a genuinely new organization that appoints, for the 
first time, candidates at a general election to the system’s representative assembly’. According 
to this definition, fissions and genuinely new parties are counted as new parties, whereas 
electoral alliances and fusions are excluded. However, studies which follow this classification 
do not verify whether their theoretical expectations hold for both subtypes, genuinely new 
parties and splits from existing parties, in the same way. I have argued that the programmatic 
supply of existing parties determines the possible leeway for policy innovations and in this 
way influence the incentive structure for new party formation. Although it is not impossible 
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for splitting parties to innovate as described above, their formation process is expected to be 
linked to their party of origin rather than to the programmatic behaviour of all existing parties. 
Hence, in order to detect differences in the formation process of genuinely new parties and 
splits, the following empirical analysis differentiates between both of these subtypes. 
 
Data and Measures 
The dataset covers 232 national legislative elections of 21 OECD democracies between 1960 
and 2002. Hence, the units of observation are national elections. With regard to the dependent 
variable, I distinguish between genuinely new parties and splits from existing parties. Table 1 
summarizes how the number of these two types of new parties is distributed over elections in 
each country 2 and Table 2 shows the overall distribution of both variables. 
 
With regard to the independent variables, it is important to find indicators that capture the 
programmatic supply by political parties as closely as possible (Selb and Pituctin 2010: 148). 
Parties’ manifestos provide the opportunity to follow the programmatic offerings made to the 
voters. Because of the time span involved, I use the data of the Comparative Manifestos 
Project (CMP) (Budge 2001; Klingemann 2006). In this project, party manifestos were coded 
on the basis of a number of predefined categories. For example, a number of 4.6 for a given 
party A at election at time-point t with regard to category z means that in terms of content 4.6 
percent of the (quasi-)sentences in that party manifesto can be subsumed under this category. 
 
In order to measure the diversity of the programmatic offerings made by existing parties, I 
rely on two different measures. The first is the number of categories in the CMP scheme 
which show zeros for all given parties at a given election, meaning that the related issues are 
not addressed by any of the existing parties. These issues are not part of the programmatic 
competition between parties. Hence, this number is a measure for the overall issue coverage 
by all existing parties. This approach assumes that not only do positive values in the CMP 
dataset reflect parties’ behaviour but so do the zero values.3 This first measure mainly 
indicates the leeway for the first type of programmatic innovation (new or neglected issues). 
 
The second measure, invented by Franzmann (2008), reflects the differences between parties 
in the number of categories which are actually addressed by at least one party. Thus, in 
contrast to the first measure, this second measure only focuses on issues which are part of the 
programmatic competition between parties. The programmatic heterogeneity for country c at 
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Table 1: Distribution of genuinely new parties across countries over time. 
 Number of genuinely new parties and splits 
Election 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
Country  Australia 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1  0 0 0  1963-2001 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0  0 0 0  Austria 1 1 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0      1962-1999 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0      Belgium 0 4 0 1 2 3 1 0 2 0 1 0 0     1961-1999 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0     Canada 0 1 0 1 1 2 2 4 3  1 1      1963-2000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2  0 0      Denmark 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 1960-2001 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 Finland 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 0       1962-1999 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0       France 0 1 0 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 0       1992-2002 1 1 0 3 4 2 2 0 0 0 0       Germany 2 1 1 2 2 4 1 3 1         1961-1990 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0         Greece 3 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0         1977-2000 2 2 0 2 3 0 1 1 0         Iceland 1 0 1 0 1 1 4 0 0         1971-1999 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 1 2         Ireland 0 0 1 0 1 2 1 2 1 0 0 1 0     1961-2002 1 0 0 2 2 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0     Italy 0 0 0 4 2 2 5 1  0 1       1963-2001 0 1 2 0 0 1 0 0  1 0       Luxembourg 0 0 3 1 2 0 0           1968-1999 0 1 1 0 1 0 0           Netherlands 0 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1      1963-2002 0 0 3 0 1 1 0 2 1 0 0 0      New Zealand 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0   0 1    1963-2002 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0   1 1    Norway 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 2 0 0 0       1961-2002 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0       Portugal 0 0 0 1 0 3 0 1 0         1979-2002 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0         Spain 5 1 9 2 0 0 0           1979-2000 0 3 2 8 0 0 0           Sweden 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0    1960-2002 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0    Switzerland 2 0 2 1 2 2 1 0 0         1967-1999 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0         UK 1 0 0 4 0 3 1 3 0 0 0       1964-2001 0 0 2 2 0 8 2 1 0 0 0       
The first row in each country cell refers to the number of genuinely new parties, the second to the number of splits. 
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 time-point t reads as follows: 
ܪ݁ݐ௖௧ ൌ
1ܭ െ ݖ∑ ݏ௜௖௧ଶ௄ି௭௜ୀଵඥ ௖ܲ௧  
 
In the formula, K stands for the overall number of categories in the CMP dataset and z for the 
number of categories which show zeros for all given parties. ݏ௜௖௧ଶ  is the variance of the 
salience scores of the parties in category i and ௖ܲ௧ represents the number of parties. This 
means that the programmatic heterogeneity is measured as the averaged variance of the 
salience scores over K-z categories, corrected by a factor for the number of parties.4 This 
measure indicates the leeway for the second type of innovation (new combinations of issues). 
In general, there is a high positive correlation (r = 0.55) between both measures. In part, this 
is due to the fact that the number of categories not addressed is included in the formula for 
programmatic heterogeneity. However, the correlation, when the latter is not adjusted by the 
number of zero categories, still amounts to r = 0.40. This means that a higher number of 
nonaddressed categories is associated with greater differences between parties in the 
remaining categories. 
 
Table 2: Overall distribution of the number of genuinely new parties and splits. 
Counts Genuinely new parties Splits 0 127 159 1 63 42 2 22 19 3 10 7 4 6 3 5 3 0 6 0 0 7 0 0 8 0 2 9 1 0 
Total No 185 129 
Mean 0.80 0.56 Std. Dev. 1.22 1.11 N 232 232 
 
Both measures show variation between countries and over time. Table 3 shows that on 
average the number of non-addressed categories decreases over decades. The same can be 
observed for the programmatic heterogeneity. On average, Sweden features the highest 
number of non-addressed categories (Ø = 19) and the lowest number is found for Spain (Ø = 
3). The highest programmatic heterogeneity on average exists in Finland (Ø = 6.78), the 
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lowest in the Netherlands (Ø = 0.80). As the first hypothesis is linked to the homogeneity of 
the programmatic supply by existing parties, the scores for programmatic heterogeneity are 
multiplied by -1. Thus, in the following, I use the term ‘programmatic homogeneity’ with 
regard to this measure. High values then indicate a high degree of homogeneity between the 
programmatic offerings by existing parties.  
 
Table 3: Average of programmatic diversity measures over time. 
 N No of zero-categories Programmatic heterogeneity 
1960-1969 43 14.77 3.77 1970-1979 61 13.28 3.52 1980-1989 63 11.13 2.61 1990-2002 65 9.43 2.35 
Overall 232 11.89 2.99 
 
According to hypothesis 1, the expectation is that the probability of party formation at 
election point t increases with a lower diversity of the election at point t-1. I use the time lag 
because I assume that the decision process of forming a new party takes a certain amount of 
time, which is why the effect of the programmatic diversity at the time of a given election 
should first become visible at the time of the next election. The measures of programmatic 
diversity serve as indicators of the leeway for programmatic innovation. As argued above, 
such leeway is regarded as the main reference point for the expected long-term probability of 
getting elected.  
 
The age of the democracy is included as a control variable. Assuming that voters’ 
commitments to parties become more stable over time, the effect of the age of the democracy 
should be decreasing over time rather than being linear. Thus, its natural log is used in the 
analysis.  
 
As previous studies do, I use three different variables as indicators of the costs of party 
formation: first, the size of the deposit necessary for a party registration; second, the number 
of signatures per million eligible voters which are required for access to the ballot; third, a 
dummy variable indicating whether parties receive state financial support.5 Apart from these 
factors, the electoral rules determine the difficulty of winning seats in parliament. In this 
context, Selb and Pituctin (2010: 148) criticize that ‘effects of electoral institutions that 
primarily operate at the level of electoral districts are usually specified at the national level, 
albeit often with measures originally tailored for the constituency level.’ Owing to the fact 
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that other concepts (first and foremost programmatic diversity) are located at the national 
level, a shift of the analytical level from the national to the district level is not feasible in this 
study. Instead, two measures which are located at the national level depict the influence of the 
electoral system. First, the mean district magnitude captures the disproportionality of the 
transformation of votes into seats.6 Second, the national threshold of representation 
(Taagepera 2002) measures the difficulty for a party to win its first seat in parliament.7 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of the independent variables. 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Registration costs 232 .0321983 .1067622 0 .77 Petition signatures (logged) 232 1.567942 2.066957 -.6931472 7.387919 Party financing 232 .5560345 .4979245 0 1 Mean district magnitude 232 16.93789 34.17475 1 150 Nat. threshold 232 2.141145 .9704201 .4966888 4.651302 Age of democracy (logged) 232 2.301835 .4514625 .6931472 3.135494 Integration 232 3.255927 1.094941 1.625 4.75 Inst. constraints 232 1.88069 1.374393 0 5 GDP 232 2.560129 2.414856 -6.8 12.2 Unemployment 232 5.359483 4.277627 .1 22.4 Population (logged) 232 9.10047 1.325679 5.32301 11.0359 Ethnic fragmentation 232 .7842672 .2061256 .23 .96 Programmatic homogeneity 232 -2.987655 2.512055 -16.98514 -.3784071 Number of ‘zero’ categories 232 11.89224 6.125069 0 33 
 
The model employs two indicators of the benefits of holding office. In order to take into 
account Tavits’s (2006: 111f.) significant findings concerning corporatism, I use Siaroff’s 
(1999) integration index. I additionally include an index of institutional constraints on central 
state government8 as a measure related to veto points in order to capture the spread of power 
over policies in state institutions. 
 
The dataset includes two variables which can be linked to society: the size of the population 
(logged) and ethnic fragmentation.9 Additional variables control for the influence of economic 
factors on voting behaviour. These are the GPD per capita growth and the unemployment 
rate.10 Table 4 gives the descriptive statistics for all independent variables. 
 
Analysis 
The two count variables for the number of genuinely new parties and splits per election differ 
in their distribution (Table 2). In particular, in the case of splits, the count variable shows a 
higher number of zero counts. In order to enable a comparison between both phenomena, in 
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a first step these count variables are transformed into binary variables indicating the 
occurrence of either subtype. This transformation allows the use of a logistic regression in 
both cases. Pooled time-series cross-section data are prone to heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation causing observations to be dependent on each other. In order to account for 
country clustering robust standard errors are used. With regard to the temporal dependence, 
Table 5: Regression results. 
 M1 M2 M3 
 Genuinely New Parties Splits Genuinely New Parties  Occurrence Occurrence Number  (Log. Regression) (Log. Regression) (Neg. Bin. Regr.) 
 b / (se) b / (se) b / (se) std. % Δ 
Registration costs -2.007** -0.000 -1.574* -15.5 (0.590)  (1.594)  (0.634)  Petition signatures (logged) 0.089 0.054 0.168** 41.4 (0.056) (0.174)  (0.038)  Party financing -0.093 -1.316 -0.162  (0.247)  (0.845) (0.243)  Mean district magnitude 0.007* 0.017** 0.003  (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)     Nat. threshold -0.157 -0.057 -0.129   (0.156) (0.220) (0.089)  Age of democracy (logged) -0.326 1.186 -0.432* -17.7 (0.376) (0.707) (0.200)     Integration -0.260* -0.179 -0.241**   -23.2 (0.102)  (0.308)  (0.085)  Inst. constraints 0.270* -0.529* 0.129*  19.3 (0.123)  (0.209) (0.063)  No of previous splits  -0.768**    (0.176)    GDP 0.029 -0.010 -0.016  (0.053) (0.055) (0.028)  Unemployment -0.019 0.144** 0.004  (0.038) (0.053) (0.025)  Population (logged) 0.030 0.222 0.127  (0.134)  (0.316) (0.092)  Ethnic fragmentation -1.453** 6.968** -0.578  (0.545)  (1.353) (0.342)  Prog. homogeneity (lagged) 0.075 -0.020 0.072*   24.1 (0.059) (0.053) (0.032)  No of ‘zero’-categories (lagged) 0.076* -0.069 0.039*  28.2 (0.031) (0.042) (0.018)  Constant 1.247 -7.257 0.307  (1.975)  (4.204) (1.217)  
Wald  320.45 171.91 794.94  Alpha   .505     (0.237)     N 232 232 232  
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01. Country clustered standard errors. 
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two variables are included in a preliminary analysis (Beck et al. 1998). The first counts the 
number of elections since the previous occurrence (of a genuinely new party in the first model 
or a split in the second model). The second captures the number of previous occurrences. 
Only the second variable appears to be significant (at the 1 percent level) in the case of splits 
and is included in model presented below. 
 
The results of the logistic regression (table 5) for both subtypes, genuinely new parties (model 
M1) and splits (model M2), reflect similarities but also important differences with regard to 
the explanatory factors. The high Wald statistics show the overall significance of both models.  
With regard to the variables linked to the probability of electoral support, the results show that 
the lagged programmatic homogeneity does not have any significant effect on the occurrence 
of either subtype. However, the number of categories that are not raised by any party has a 
positive effect on the probability of the occurrence of genuinely new parties. This effect is 
significant at the 5 percent level. The coefficient amounts to 0.076, meaning that the 
nonaddressing of an additional category leads to a 0.076 increase in the log-odds of the 
dependent variable linked to the occurrence of genuinely new parties. A higher number of 
non-addressed categories indicates a less overall issue coverage by the existing parties. 
Hence, this finding supports the first hypothesis, as the probability of the occurrence of 
genuinely new parties is expected to increase with a lower overall issue coverage by the 
existing parties. In contrast, this variable shows no significant effect on the probability of the 
occurrence of splits. This result underlines the proposition that factors reflecting the diversity 
of programmatic offerings by all existing parties influence the incentive structure for the 
formation decision in the case of genuinely new parties, but not splits. 
 
Differences between the subtypes also become apparent in respect of the indicators linked to 
the benefits of office. Integration, the indicator for corporatism, displays a negative effect 
(significant at the 5 percent level) on the dependent variable for the first model (M1), while no 
effect is visible in the case of splits (model M2). The negative effect for genuinely new parties 
is in line with the theoretical expectation that corporatist arrangements feature less new 
political parties than pluralist systems, as the former provide channels for influencing policies 
apart from the parliamentary arena. As actors deciding about a split from an existing party are 
likely to be already part of this arena, channels apart from the electoral arena should be of less 
importance. Institutional constraints on central state government have different effects on 
each subtype. Their significance (5 percent level) underlines the fact that the distribution of 
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power in a political system influences the incentive structure for new party formation. For 
genuinely new parties the effect of institutional constraints on central state government is 
positive. Tighter constraints on central state government mean that there are more veto points 
outside the government, increasing the potential to influence policies. Assuming that actors 
deciding whether to form a completely new party have an out-of-government perspective, 
they benefit from such constraints. In the case of splits, institutional constraints show a 
negative effect. This indicates that for parties originating from splits the government 
perspective is more relevant than it is for genuinely new parties or that they fear losing access 
to veto points occupied by the party of origin. 
 
Considering the variables linked to the formation costs, the registration costs show a 
significant (at the 1 percent level) and negative effect for the first model, M1. This means that 
the probability of the occurrence of genuinely new parties decreases as registration costs rise. 
The direction of this effect fits the expectation that higher costs should reduce the probability 
of new parties. However, this effect is not present in the model for splits, M2, indicating that 
financial obstacles do not prevent the occurrence of splits. This could be explained by 
different levels of financial resources of genuinely new parties and splits. The logged number 
of necessary signatures, as well as the dummy variable indicating party funding by the state, 
do not show any significant effects for either subtype. This does not necessarily mean that 
state financing does not influence the incentives for forming a new party. However, the 
existence of state financing could also work against new parties if the rules favour established 
ones. For example, funding could be related to the achievement of a certain threshold of 
votes. The mean district magnitude has a positive effect on the occurrence of both subtypes, 
significant at the 5 percent (M1) and 1 percent level (M2). This effect is hence in line with the 
theoretical expectation: a higher mean district magnitude implies lower formation costs as it is 
easier to win seats in parliament. As opposed to this effect, the national threshold of 
representation has no significant effect in both models. This result suggests that the overall 
disproportionality between votes and seats matters more than the chance of winning the first 
seat in parliament (Bischoff 2008). The results of models M1 and M2 reveal no significant 
effects of the age of democracy on either subtype. 
 
There are also mixed results from the societal variables. No significant effects on either 
subtype can be found for the (logged) population size. However, ethnic fragmentation shows 
significant (1 percent level) but opposing effects. In the case of splits, the effect has a positive 
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sign. As higher values indicate lower levels of ethnic fragmentation, the probability of the 
occurrence of splits therefore decreases as ethnic fragmentation grows. Genuinely new parties 
experience the opposite effect. The probability of the occurrence of genuinely new parties 
increases with level of ethnic fragmentation. This means that a higher level of ethnic 
fragmentation diminishes the opportunities for splits in existing parties, while at the same 
time improving prospects for genuinely new parties. Although this aspect needs further 
consideration, it may explain why previous studies which did not separate the subtypes found 
no significant effects for this variable as the results cancel each other out. With regard to the 
economic variables, the growth of GDP per capita displays no effect on the occurrence of 
genuinely new parties or splits. The unemployment rate shows a significant and negative 
effect in model M2, indicating that the probability of the occurrence of splits increases when 
unemployment rises.  The negative effect of the number of previous splits in model M2 
suggests that the probability of the occurrence of splits decreases with the number of previous 
splits. In sum, the results of the logistic regressions show that there are important differences 
in the ways the explanatory factors operate on the two subtypes. This underlines the necessity 
of differentiating between genuinely new parties and splits when analysing new political 
parties. 
 
As the focus of this article is on programmatic factors, in the last part of the empirical analysis 
I concentrate on genuinely new parties. So far, I have focused only on their occurrence. The 
distribution of the counts of genuinely new parties, however, also provides the opportunity to 
make use of the whole variance of the number of genuinely new parties per election. The 
dependent variable is then the number of genuinely new parties for each election. Because of 
the distributional parameters, a negative binomial distribution  is assumed. The results of the 
third model M3 are based on a generalized estimating equation (GEE) model, which in this 
case is based on a negative binomial distribution and belongs to the family of population-
averaged panel-data models. In contrast to a simple negative binomial regression, this 
approach allows the temporal dependence of the observations (Hilbe 2011: 450ff.).11 
 
The high Wald statistic shows the overall significance of the model and the estimate of alpha 
justifies the assumption of the negative binomial distribution. Similar to the first model, the 
number of zero categories has a positive effect on the expected number of genuinely new 
parties (dependent variable), which is significant at the 5 percent level. In the third model, the 
lagged programmatic homogeneity also shows a positive effect (significant at the 5 percent 
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level) on the dependent variable. An increase in the lagged programmatic homogeneity leads 
to a higher expected number of genuinely new parties. The significance of both effects 
suggests that not only the overall issue coverage of all existing parties influences the incentive 
structure for the formation of genuinely new parties, but also the differences between the 
parties in the issues which are actually part of the programmatic competition between parties. 
Both of these effects support the first hypothesis. Contrary to the first model, the (logged) age 
of the democracy shows a negative effect (significant at the 5 percent level) in the third 
model, indicating that the probability of the occurrence of genuinely new parties is not 
influenced by the age of the democracy but that the latter diminishes the expected count of 
genuinely new parties. 
 
In line with the first model, the results from the indicators linked to the benefits of office 
reveal that institutional constraints on central state government have a positive effect on the 
expected counts of genuinely new parties, which is significant at the 5 percent level. In the 
third model, the indictor of corporatism, integration, also has a negative effect (significant at 
the 1 percent level), which means that a higher level of corporatism decreases the expected 
counts of genuinely new parties. This resembles Tavits’s findings (2006: 111) for new parties 
in general. Taking both of these effects together, this means that it is necessary to differentiate 
between different kinds of institutions. Corporatist arrangements offer opportunities for 
influencing policies from outside the parliamentary arena. State institutions constraining 
central government provide access to veto points which enable the exercise of influence over 
policies. However, this access is only gained through party channels. 
  
The comparison with the logistic model for the occurrence of genuinely new parties shows 
that registration costs also have a negative effect (significant at the 5 percent level) in this 
model. Higher registration costs reduce the expected counts of genuinely new parties, 
supporting again the expectation about the formation costs. In contrast to the first model, the 
(logged) number of necessary signatures has a positive effect in this model, significant at the 
1 percent level. Contradicting the theoretical expectation, an increase in the necessary number 
of signatures leads to a higher expected number of genuinely new parties. This effect is also 
found by Tavits (2006: 110f.) with regard to all new parties. A possible explanation is that 
these requirements serve as an information shortcut about possible electoral support (Tavits 
2006: 111). Again, no effect is found for the public financing of political parties. Unlike in the 
first model, the mean district magnitude has no significant effect on the expected number of 
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genuinely new parties. This means that this variable explains the occurrence of this subtype 
better than the actual number of new parties per election. In the third model, neither the 
societal nor the economic control variables show any significant effects on the expected 
counts of genuinely new parties. 
 
So far, only the direction and significance of the effects have been considered. To examine the 
magnitude of the different effects, the variables showing significant effects in the third model 
are standardized. The last column of table 5 shows the percentage changes in the expected 
number of genuinely new parties when one of the independent variables increases by one 
standard deviation. These numbers show that the (logged) number of necessary signatures has 
the strongest effect on the dependent variable. An increase of the first by one standard 
deviation leads to an increase in the expected number of genuinely new parties by 41.4 
percent. Apart from that, the programmatic factors also show a high magnitude. The expected 
number of genuinely new parties rises by 28.2 percent when the (lagged) number of zero 
categories goes up by one standard deviation. For the (lagged) programmatic homogeneity 
this effect amounts to 24.1 percent. Comparison with the other significant effects suggests that 
these programmatic factors are not just statistically significant but also significant in terms of 
their magnitude. 
 
Conclusion 
In this study, I first argued that the diversity of the programmatic supply by existing parties 
represents an important factor in the process of the new party formation, as it determines the 
leeway for possible programmatic innovations. In order to capture this leeway, I introduced a 
measure for the overall issue coverage of political parties and a second measure for the 
programmatic differences between parties. Secondly, I pointed out that state institutions in the 
form of veto points are also relevant for the process of new party formation as they influence 
the benefits of office for new (potential) political parties.  
 
Above all, the first part of the empirical analysis of the study showed the necessity of 
differentiating between genuinely new parties and splits from existing parties. Differences 
between the two subtypes were found in respect of factors linked to the diversity of the 
programmatic supply by existing parties. The overall issue coverage has a significant effect, 
but only on the occurrence of genuinely new parties: a lower issue coverage by the existing 
parties increases the probability of their occurrence. However, programmatic differences 
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between parties are not able to account for the occurrence of either subtype. Another 
difference between the subtypes is revealed by the indicators relating to the benefits of office. 
Institutional constraints on central state government increase the probability of the occurrence 
of genuinely new parties but have the opposite effect in the case of splits. The first part of the 
empirical analysis also demonstrates that factors connected with the formation costs have a 
different impact on the occurrence of both genuinely new parties and splits. Registration costs 
hamper the occurrence of genuinely new parties but not the occurrence of splits, while the 
mean district magnitude has a positive impact for both subtypes. Moreover, the different 
effect of ethnic fragmentation on both subtypes underlines the need for differentiation 
between them, although this effect needs further investigation. These varying results represent 
a starting point for future research, investigating the causal mechanisms behind these 
differences.   
 
The results of the second part of the empirical analysis, which focused on the number of 
genuinely new parties, confirm and strengthen the importance of programmatic factors for the 
incentive structure for their formation. Fewer differences between parties as well as lower 
overall issue coverage are associated with a higher expected number of genuinely new parties. 
The independent effects of factors linked to the programmatic supply raise the question of 
what role electoral demands play in the emergence of programmatic innovations and the 
formation of genuinely new parties in general. On the one hand, it is possible that 
programmatic innovations pick up so far unsatisfied electoral demands but, on the other hand, 
political actors can come up with innovations and try to stimulate electoral demand for them 
in the future. To detect such interactions, future research using quantitative methods should 
include finer measures of electoral demands.  
 
Although the effects of the programmatic factors indicate the importance of the scope for 
programmatic innovations in the formation of genuinely new parties, this analysis, due to the 
lack of available data, could not examine the actual programmatic offerings of genuinely new 
parties. However, it offers a basis for additional research for a more detailed examination of 
programmatic innovations, for example by investigating their origins and how they are 
connected to electoral demands and influence them. This could also illuminate why and when 
actors choose certain types of programmatic innovations. These aspects are relevant with 
regard to the electoral success of genuinely new parties and their programmatic offerings. 
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 Notes 
1 Franzmann (2011: 333ff.) points out how different types of veto points affect the diversity of 
the programmatic supply. However, there does not exist an unequivocal relationship between 
the number of veto points in a political system and the diversity of the programmatic supply 
by political parties. 
2 For elections until 1990, I rely on Hug’s (2001) data retracing his original coding of both 
subtypes for his list of new parties. For the following elections, I followed Tavits’s sources 
and counted the parties myself. A complete list of all parties counted is available on request. 
No reliable data on the number of new parties exist for the elections in 1993 in Australia, for 
the election in 1993 in Canada and for the elections in 1993 and 1996 in New Zealand. The 
election in 1994 in Italy is not included due to the significant transformation of the electoral 
system and party system before this election (Bartolini and D’Alimonte 1996). In the German 
case, only elections for West Germany until 1990 are included.  
3 It has to be noted that the CMP coding scheme is the same for all countries. It is possible 
that there exist issues which are not captured by this coding scheme. (Quasi-)Sentences of 
manifestos that address such issues are subsumed into a single category for uncoded sentences 
which in general does not reach high values. Nevertheless, a category in the CMP coding 
scheme, which is not addressed by any party, shows at least that there is potential scope for 
innovation. 
4 Quantitative measures with respect to parties often use vote-shares as weights (see, e.g., 
Dalton 2008). As the measures for programmatic diversity in this paper should solely capture 
the programmatic diversity of political parties, I deliberately do not introduce vote-shares as 
weights to these measures as this would reverse the conceptual separation between the side of 
parties and the electorate and in this way undermine the conceptual validity of the measures. 
5 As there exists no time series which cover the whole period for these variables, I rely on the 
data of Hug (2001: 178ff.) and Tavits (2006). Hug mainly took his numbers from the 
Interparliamentary Union (1976) as well as Sternberger and Vogel (1969). Tavits used 
information from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Deposits 
are measured in the local currency. Hug weighted these numbers by dividing them by GNP 
per capita. The values of this variable are present in his data set, but could not be checked on 
the basis of the sources he cites. For observations after 1990 only the weighted values exist. 
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 With regard to GNP per capita, Tavits (2006: 166) refers to the Global Development Network 
Growth Database. However, this only features values for GDP; still, considering the relation 
between deposits and GDP/GNP per capita, the bias thus caused is marginal. The number of 
signatures necessary for registration is weighted by the number of registered voters. For the 
latter, data are available at http://www.idea.int/vt/index.cfm (29.10.12). Furthermore, a 
dummy variable indicates the presence of party funding by the state. For this, Hug relied on 
Paltiel (1981) and Tavits consulted http://www.idea.net. On the basis of IDEA 
(http://www.idea.int/political-finance, Question 19, 29.10.12), I corrected values for Belgium 
for the years after 1989 and for France after 1988. 
6 For the mean district magnitude, I rely on the dataset ‘Democratic Electoral Systems (DES)’ 
(Golder 2005; Bormann and Golder 2013). In the case of Germany, I calculated the mean 
district magnitude on the basis of the second vote. Similarly, for elections after 1993 in New 
Zealand the mean district magnitude refers to the list vote. 
7 The calculation is based on data of the DES dataset (Golder 2005; Bormann and Golder 
2013). In multi-tier systems the threshold refers to the first tier, as this determines the access 
to seat allocations in the upper tiers. In case there is a threshold for the participation in the 
allocation of seats in an upper tier which is lower than the national threshold of representation 
for the first tier, the latter is replaced by the former. This is the case for Denmark. If there 
exists a legal threshold for the first tier which exceeds the national threshold of representation, 
the legal threshold is used (e.g. in Spain). For Germany, the calculation refers to the first vote. 
8 The data come from the Comparative Political Data Set I (Armingeon et al. 2012) and are 
based on the work of Schmidt (1996). The index ranges from 0 to 6. High values are a sign of 
strong constraints. The additive index is composed of six dummy variables: EU membership, 
degree of centralization of state structure, difficulty of amending constitutions, strong 
bicameralism, central bank autonomy and frequent referendums.  
9 The data rest on a Herfindahl–Hirschman index of concentration for ethnicity (Tavits 2006: 
117). Data on ethnicity come from the CIA World Factbook 
(https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html, 29.10.12). The 
World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL, 29.10.12) provides data on 
population size. 
10 The data on the economic control variables come from the OECD Historical Statistics 
(1982; 1991; 2002) and for elections after 2000 from the OECD 
(http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=559# (20.06.13); DOI: 10.1787/lfs-data-en). 
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 11 An autoregressive correlation structure is assumed (Hilbe 2011: 462ff.). 
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Abstract 
The debate about how to best define the niche party concept is still on-going. At the same time, 
empirical studies test causal claims linked to these parties and their programmatic features. 
However, there is a lack of systematically investigating their programmatic profiles as a whole 
and how these profiles change over time. Therefore, this study captures complete programmatic 
profiles of parties by two characteristics: (1) nicheness refers to programmatic differences to 
other parties while (2) programmatic concentration is linked to the range of issues a party 
addresses and the degree of emphasis it puts on these issues. Based on data of the Manifesto 
Research Group/Comparative Manifestos Project (MRG/CMP), I operationalize both 
programmatic features by two continuous measures and compare green and extreme right 
parties, as typical cases of niche parties in the literature, with their competitors and over time. 
While controlling for statistical uncertainty due to the stochastic process of text generation, 
results first show that these parties in the majority of cases do not exhibit significant differences 
in nicheness and programmatic concentration. Secondly, nicheness and programmatic 
concentration of these parties change in different directions over time. Overall, results of this 
study question the static classification of niche parties along the lines of party family 
membership and call for a closer look on programmatic profiles of parties and their changes in 
general. 
 
Keywords: nicheness; programmatic concentration; programmatic evolution; statistical 
uncertainty 
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1. Introduction 
The focus on niche parties in the literature on political parties has led to many arguments about 
their behaviour, electoral success, reactions of competitors and party competition in general 
(Meguid 2005, Adams et al. 2006, Ezrow 2008, Meguid 2008, Hino 2012, Meyer and Wagner 
2013). At the same time, the debate about how to best define the niche party concept is far from 
being over (Adams et al. 2006, Meguid 2008, Wagner 2012, Meyer and Miller 2013, Bischof 
2015). Similarly, while empirical analyses have so far tested many causal claims made in the 
context of niche parties, there is a lack of systematically examining the complete programmatic 
profiles of these parties. Most definitions of the niche party concept are tied to the emphasis of 
certain policy fields and treat the niche party label as a static attribution to certain groups of 
parties. Therefore, changes in programmatic profiles of these parties are masked and 
programmatic variation beyond pre-defined core issues is neglected. Hino (2012), for example, 
shows for his sample of green parties in Western Democracies that the Finnish Green Union 
features on average over time the highest salience of issues typical ascribed for green parties in 
party manifestos. This share amounts to 60 per cent. What about the other 40 per cent of 
programmatic statements? Are they more or less evenly distributed across issues, or are there 
additional topics beyond environmental policy heavily emphasized, and to what degree do these 
parties show differences in these other topics compared to their competitors? Other members 
of the green party family reach considerable lower values for the emphasis of green core issues, 
which makes these questions above even more relevant. Apart from that, parties change their 
platforms over time. Niche parties might broaden their profiles over time in order to appeal to 
more potential voters. For these reasons, this study aims at uncovering the programmatic 
variation between these parties and over time by examining complete programmatic profiles of 
members of the green and extreme-right party family, typically considered as niche parties in 
the literature (Meguid 2005, Adams et al. 2006, Meguid 2008). 
 
Therefore, this study sorts these parties on the basis of two programmatic features which also 
connect to criteria mentioned in the niche party literature in order to systematically examine 
programmatic profiles. The first feature, nicheness (Meyer and Miller 2013), refers to the niche 
status and captures the programmatic differences of a party in relation to its competitors. The 
second feature, programmatic concentration, covers the concentration in the programmatic 
profile of a party itself and the varying emphasis of issues in its complete profile. Based on data 
of the Manifesto Data Collection/Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR, henceforth CMP) 
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(Budge et al. 2001, Klingemann et al. 2006, Volkens et al. 2013), I adapt an existing approach 
(Meyer and Miller 2013) with regard to the first feature in order to obtain a continuous measure 
of nicheness. For the second feature, programmatic concentration of a party, the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index (HHI) as a concentration index is applied to salience scores of 
each party. This index is sensitive to the number of categories addressed by a party but also to 
the distribution of its salience scores across these issues. Concerning these measures, I take 
statistical uncertainty (Benoit et al. 2009) into account which makes it possible to distinguish 
between significant and non-significant differences. 
  
Using the described measures on basis of manifesto data means that no issues are pre-selected, 
for example based on party family membership. Instead, I take complete programmatic profiles 
of parties into account. Moreover, by using this approach, it is not only possible to draw 
comparisons between parties but also to follow the programmatic evolution of parties taking 
place gradually over time. Capturing programmatic profiles in this way is not only relevant for 
the literature on niche parties but also speaks to the literature on party competition in general 
as party strategies on the programmatic level of party competition and their consequences 
should be reflected in the measures presented in this paper. The same is true for the literature 
on new political parties inasmuch as the latter makes arguments based on the programmatic 
otherness (e.g. new issues or programmatic innovations) of new compared to existing parties 
(Harmel and Robertson 1985, Hug 2001, Tavits 2006, Lago and Martinez 2010, Hino 2012, 
Zons 2013). 
2. Theory 
As this paper focuses on programmatic profiles of niche parties, it is necessary to consider what 
is meant when we speak about the niche party concept. The niche party concept rests on 
programmatic criteria and was introduced by Meguid (2005, 2008, pp. 3f.) who defines niche 
parties through three properties. First, niche parties focus “on sets of issues which were 
previously outside the dimensions of party competition” and are non-economic in their nature. 
Secondly, these issues “do not coincide with existing, ‘left-right’ lines of political division” 
and, thirdly, niche parties concentrate on “a restricted set of issues”. The first two criteria refer 
to differences in certain policy fields compared to other parties in the arena whereas the last 
criterion solely connects to the range of the programmatic profile of a party itself. Adams et al. 
(2006, p. 513) refer to members of certain party families “who present either an extreme 
ideology […] or a noncentrist ‘niche’ ideology”. In this way, their criteria resemble Meguid’s 
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first two criteria. Wagner (2012, p. 846) relates to all of Meguid’s criteria and defines niche 
parties “as parties that de-emphasize economic concerns and stress a small range of 
non-economic issues”. Meyer and Miller (2013, p. 3) take a more general approach. Aiming at 
a minimal definition, they state that “a niche party emphasizes policy areas neglected by its 
competitors.” Contrarily to the previous definitions, it entails no reference to a certain policy 
field but also no qualification with regard to the range of issues addressed by a party. Table 1 
summarizes the criteria of these varying definitions of the niche party concept. 
 
Table 1: Criteria of the niche party concept. 
 Programmatic differences 
Reference to 
policy field 
Small range of 
issues 
Meguid (2005, pp. 
347–348, 2008, pp. 
3–4) 
x x x 
Adams et al. (2006, 
p. 513) 
x   
Wagner (2012, p. 
847) x x x 
Meyer / Miller 
(2013, p. 3) 
x   
 
 
Confronted with these varying definitions of the niche party concept, it is equally important to 
reflect on its negative concept, which is not always defined explicitly in these studies. The niche 
party concept is relational in its nature and, thus, one has to clarify which parties serve as a 
reference point for judging niche parties. As the above-mentioned concepts rest on mandatory 
criteria, the negative concept covers all parties which do not fulfil at least one of the defining 
attributes. The key question is whether the negative concept for niche parties equals the concept 
of mainstream parties commonly used in the niche party literature. This question does not only 
bear theoretical relevance but also affects operationalization and measurement issues. Studies 
on niche parties provide different answers to this question. For Meguid (2006, p. 46) the 
negative concept of niche parties and the concept of mainstream parties are not identical as she 
refers to mainstream parties as “a subset of political actors” which are “defined by both their 
location on the Left-Right political dimension and their electoral dominance of that left or right 
ideological bloc […].” Although Adams et al. (2006, p. 517) do not explicitly define the 
mainstream party concept, their operationalization shows a perfect congruence with the 
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negative concept of niche parties as they use a dummy variable indicating a niche party for 
capturing differences between niche and mainstream parties. Congruence between the 
mainstream party and the negative concept of niche parties refers to a dichotomy which stands 
for a clear classification of all cases into one of these two categories. Alternatively, instead of 
fixed categories and differences of kind, we could think of a party’s otherness in terms of 
differences in degree according to which parties are more or less equal to one another. Meyer 
and Miller (2013) take this approach by introducing nicheness as a general quality of all parties. 
This differences-in-degree approach allows for detecting gradual variation in programmatic 
profiles between parties and also over time. 
 
The nicheness of a party is influenced by the party under consideration as well as all other 
parties which are chosen as a reference point. Thus, merely looking at nicheness, we cannot 
know whether changes in nicheness are due to actions of the party under consideration, its 
competitors or both. Additionally, nicheness as defined by Meyer and Miller (2013) does not 
reveal any information about the range of programmatic profiles of parties. For these reasons, 
I expand the approach of Meyer and Miller (2013) by introducing another concept which I call 
programmatic concentration of a party. It connects to the range of issues addressed by a party 
and the degree of emphasis it puts on these issues. Thus, it refers to criteria which are present 
in definitions of the niche party concept mentioned above.1 In contrast to nicheness, 
programmatic concentration only captures features of the programmatic profile of a party itself 
and is not directly influenced by profiles of other parties. Capturing programmatic 
concentration of parties is relevant for party competition in general because it informs us about 
the number of issues in which a party competes and about how evenly the party emphasizes 
these issues. Programmatic concentration has also effects on voters. On the one hand, a high 
programmatic concentration implies a sharp profile which might help getting attention and 
transmitting a clear message. On the other hand, in order to attract broader segments of the 
electorate, it might be necessary to have a broader programmatic profile meaning a lower 
programmatic concentration. Moreover, facing changes in nicheness, programmatic 
concentration can at least indicate whether changes in nicheness can be attributed to a party 
itself or its competitors. If we see a change in nicheness for a party while there is no change in 
                                                                
1 Recently, Bischof (2015, p. 1) introduced a similar idea in the context of the niche party concept when presenting 
the concept of ‘narrowness of niche parties’ issue offers’. However, in contrast to my approach of programmatic 
concentration, narrowness according to Bischof does not refer to a party’s complete programmatic profile. Rather, 
it is linked to several a-priori defined ‘niche segments’ which do not cover the full possible programmatic range 
of parties’ profiles (Bischof 2015, p. 6). 
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programmatic concentration for the same party, it is very likely that nicheness changed due to 
actions of competing parties.2 
 
Although these two features capture different characteristics of parties’ platforms they are not 
fully independent of each other. In general, party systems in which parties show high 
programmatic concentration opens up more room for nicheness to occur than party systems in 
which parties show less programmatic concentration. For individual parties, different 
combinations of programmatic concentration and nicheness are possible. A party with a high 
programmatic concentration features a high nicheness when it focuses on different issues than 
its competitors. The nicheness of the same party is lower when it concentrates on issues which 
are also addressed by other parties to a similar degree. A party with a broad and balanced 
platform should feature a lower nicheness except for the unlikely case that other parties only 
strongly concentrate on few other issues. 
 
In this article, based on the programmatic features of nicheness and programmatic 
concentration, I will analyse the programmatic profiles of parties which are considered as niche 
parties in the literature in order verify to what extent these parties meet features present in most 
definitions of the niche party concept. The second goal is to illustrate the programmatic 
evolution of these parties by depicting their nicheness and programmatic concentration over 
time. Following the programmatic evolution of parties can inform us about how stable 
programmatic profiles of parties are over time or if their platforms show any trends in nicheness 
or programmatic concentration. Based on the above mentioned definitions of the niche party 
concept, one would expect that niche parties show a high degree of nicheness compared to their 
rivals. Apart from that, Meguid (2005, 2008) and Wagner (2012) mention that niche parties 
only address a small number of issues which implies a higher programmatic concentration 
compared to their competitors. In addition, Meguid (2008, p. 15) argues that niche parties are 
vulnerable to strategies of their mainstream rivals because they are committed to their core 
issues and cannot easily adapt their platforms. If so, niche parties should show constant levels 
of programmatic concentration while, at the same time, changes in nicheness then are caused 
by strategies taken by competing parties. 
 
Expectation 1: Niche parties should show higher levels nicheness than their competitors. 
                                                                
2 Except for the unlikely case that a party substitutes its profile by switching topics while, at the same time, 
preserving the distribution of emphasis of its addressed issues. 
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Expectation 2: Niche parties should show higher levels of programmatic concentration than 
their competitors.3 
Expectation 3: Niche parties should show more changes in nicheness than in programmatic 
concentration. 
 
As both features, nicheness and programmatic concentration, capture complete programmatic 
profiles of parties and, thus, solely refer to the supply side of the political market, it is also 
possible to compare their levels of nicheness and programmatic concentration with the 
perception of voters (although this is behind the scope of this article). For example, further 
analysis might show that a so-called niche party addresses many issues but is only known by 
voters for its niche status on one particular issue. Capturing programmatic profiles of parties on 
the basis of these two programmatic features also offers a new way to investigate the 
relationship between programmatic offerings and electoral success. This link has so far been 
investigated for spatial models following Downs (Downs 1957, Adams et al. 2006, Adams 
2012) and on the basis of certain issues (Meguid 2005, 2008, Hino 2012). The measures 
presented in this paper offer a way to examine the relationship between programmatic profiles 
and electoral success from a salience theory (Robertson 1976, Budge and Farlie 1983) based 
perspective, without pre-selecting any particular issues.  
3. Data & Measurement 
The aim of this paper is to verify whether niche parties show programmatic characteristics 
typically ascribed to them when we take their complete profiles into account. For this purpose, 
I investigate the programmatic profiles of green parties and extreme right parties in Western 
Europe. Looking at the various definitions of the niche party concept presented above, green 
and extreme right parties represent typical cases for this party type as we would expect them to 
feature all mentioned criteria of the niche party concept.4 Green parties are selected based on 
CMP party family code5. For the sample of extreme right parties, I make use of the list presented 
by Spies and Franzmann (2011, p. 1052) and include all of these parties for which CMP data 
                                                                
3 Expectations 1 and 2 do not claim any causal statement but refer to features of the niche party concept itself. 
4 In the following, I will treat the terms ‘green and extreme right parties’ and ‘niche parties’ as synonymical 
whereas I am aware that niche parties are not restricted to these party families. 
5 The CMP parfam-variable codes ecology parties with 10. 
 8 
are available.6 Altogether, the sample of this study consists of 15 green parties and 12 extreme 
right parties spread across 15 West European countries. 
 
The CMP provides the opportunity to examine programmatic profiles of many parties across 
countries and over time. The general approach of the CMP is the coding of party manifestos by 
means of a fixed coding scheme consisting of 57 categories (see Table 7 in the appendix) while 
the last category is a residual category covering all (quasi-)sentences which cannot be subsumed 
under the first 56 categories. In the context of CMP data, Gemenis (2012) points to a general 
source of bias caused by the use of different document types. In the context of this study, special 
attention has to be paid to cases for which scores have been estimated. For CMP data, this 
means either taking over scores of later elections or mean imputation using preceding and 
following elections. The use of these estimated data is problematic as, in fact, one compares 
manifestos of different points in time which ignores the strategic context in which party 
manifestos represent crucial reference points for each other. Therefore, CMP data handling in 
this study is guided by Meyer and Miller (2013, p. 6): elections are dropped from the dataset 
when they cover at least one party with estimated data which has a vote or seat share equal or 
higher than 5 per cent. Otherwise, only the party observation is dropped. 
 
While CMP data do not provide any measures of uncertainty for the point estimates of salience 
scores, Benoit at al. (2009) point to different sources of error in the process of “positions to text 
to coded data”. A full outline of this process is beyond the scope of this article but I follow their 
approach which addresses the uncertainty introduced by the “stochastic process of text 
generation” (Benoit et al. 2009, p. 498). Its core assumption (Benoit et al. 2009, p. 500) reads 
as: 
ܧ൫݌௜௝൯ = ߨ௜௝ 
ߨ௜௝ denotes the manifesto authors’ true policy position in category j for country-party-date unit 
i. According to the assumption, the expected value of the observed frequency score represents 
an estimator for ߨ௜௝, whereby ݌௜௝ would be the CMP score in this particular category. Benoit et 
al. (Benoit et al. 2009, p. 500) explain the source of uncertainty in the following way: 
“The realization of ߨ௜௝ in any given manifesto […] reflects the 
stochastic process of text authorship, yielding the observed 
                                                                
6 Additionally, I include the Sweden Democrats (Rydgren 2002), the Dutch Party for Freedom and the Alliance 
for the Future of Austria (van der Brug, Wouter et al. 2013, p. 58). 
 9 
proportions ݌௜௝. Every time a manifesto is written with the intention 
of expressing the same underlying positions ߨ௜௝, we expect to observe 
slightly different values ݌௜௝.” 
Estimating the error variance can be accomplished analytically or by simulations, both based 
on the assumption of a multinomial distribution (Benoit et al. 2009, pp. 500ff.). As the measures 
executed in this study rest on all CMP categories, the second approach is applied because it 
does not require any assumptions about the correlation between counts in different categories 
(Benoit et al. 2009, p. 502). For the simulation, each manifesto is bootstrapped on the basis of 
a multinomial distribution taking pij as parameters (Benoit et al. 2009, p. 503). In order to 
receive a quantification of uncertainty for any measure based on CMP data, the given measure 
has to be calculated for every bootstrapping draw whereupon mean and standard deviation can 
be calculated for all draws. Consequently, it is possible to differentiate between significant and 
non-significant differences for all measures based on CMP data.7 This procedure depends on 
complete information on party manifestos, including manifesto length. Regarding missing 
information, I proceed in the same way as for estimated data (see above). 
 
In order to operationalize nicheness, I adapt the continuous indicator invented by Meyer and 
Miller (2013) which measures the average of (squared) differences in the emphasis of a number 
of dimensions or issues between the party under consideration and the mean of all other parties. 
The formula reads as follows: 
ߪ௜ = ඩ
1
ܰ
෍൫ݔ௜௝ − ఫܺ,ିపതതതതതത൯
ଶ
ே
௝ୀଵ
 
N stands for the number of dimensions or issues. xij denotes the score of the party i under 
consideration on dimension/issue j whereas ఫܺ,ିపതതതതതത is the mean value of all other parties on the 
same dimension or issue. Meyer and Miller (2013) base their calculations on dimensions linked 
to original CMP data which are oriented to minister portfolios (Bäck et al. 2011, p. 454). 
According this approach, some categories are assigned to more than one dimension. Thus, 
nicheness in these categories is given more weight. One peculiar aspect of the CMP coding 
scheme is that it consists of positional (positive and negative categories) and non-positional 
                                                                
7 Note that this does not capture other sources of error like for example measurement error due to coding. For a 
comparison with the CMP approach towards non-systematic error, see Meyer and Jenny (2013). As the CMP 
approach rests on time series (Meyer and Jenny 2013, pp. 177–178) and many niche parties do not feature a long 
history, the approach of Benoit et al. (2009) is more suitable for this study. 
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categories (McDonald and Mendez 2001). All pairs of positive and negative categories are 
assigned to the same dimension. For example, the CMP categories “European Community: 
Positive” (per108) and “European Community: Negative” (per109) are both attached to the 
“foreign”-dimension. In the context of the nicheness measure, this implies that it does not make 
any difference to the nicheness of a party whether it has a positive or negative stance towards 
the European Community. Only focusing on this topic, facing for example three parties which 
share a positive stance on EU matters, an EU-sceptical fourth party would have no higher 
nicheness than the others. In this way, this approach could lead to underestimating nicheness.8 
For this reason, I use the original CMP values as the basis for calculating nicheness.9 The 
downside of this approach is that not all topics are differentiated along positive and negative 
mentions. In order to check whether empirical findings are sensitive to the handling of the CMP 
categories respective their aggregation, I provide replications of the results for two different 
handlings of original CMP values: (1) summation of positive and negative categories and (2) 
summation of categories along the 7 policy domains provided by CMP (see Table A1 in the 
appendix). Bischof (2015, p. 6) suggests another aggregation following niche segments which, 
however, do not cover all CMP categories. As my focus is on complete profiles of parties, I 
exploit the full coding of manifestos by CMP.  Because of the content validity of the concept, 
the measure of nicheness should purely reflect programmatic differences. Therefore, in contrast 
to Meyer and Miller (2013), I deliberately do not introduce vote shares as weights to this 
formula. In the context of this study, the formula then changes to: 
ߪ௜ = ඩ
1
57
෍൫݌௜௝ − ݌ఫ,ିపതതതതതത൯
ଶ
ହ଻
௝ୀଵ
 
In the formula ݌௜௝ stands for the salience score of party i in the CMP category j, while ݌ఫ,ିపതതതതതത 
denotes the mean salience score of all remaining parties in the same category. The salience 
score of a party indicates the share of (quasi-)sentences in its manifesto which can be subsumed 
under the given category. Note the fact that the non-covering of a category by party i which is 
emphasized by other parties also contributes to the nicheness of the party under consideration, 
meaning, according to this measure, that the nicheness of a party is not only the result of 
                                                                
8 Additionally, assigning categories to multiple dimensions does not allow the implementation of the approach of 
Benoit et al. (2009) regarding uncertainty because it relies on the real manifesto length as a central parameter. 
9 There is also a debate about the coding reliability in the context of CMP data which also suffers from the complex 
coding scheme (Mikhaylov et al. 2012). Although Mikhaylov et al. (2012, p. 90) argue in favour of simpler 
schemes for future research, at the same time, they conclude that summing up original CMP data into more coarser 
categories does not solve the problem of measurement error which is due to coding. 
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addressing issues which other parties do not emphasize strongly but also of neglecting issues 
mentioned by other parties. The measure is calculated on the basis of all 57 CMP categories10 
although it is known that the number of categories which show zeroes for all parties varies 
across countries and over time (Hans and Hönnige 2008). However, in this way, comparability 
is ensured as the measure is based on the same categories for each election in every country. 
The minimum value of ߪ௜ amounts to 0 while its maximum is reached when all parties are 
single-issue parties and emphasize different issues. In the latter scenario, all parties share the 
same value for ߪ௜11. In order to account for uncertainty generated by the stochastic process of 
text generation, I follow the approach described above. Party manifestos are bootstrapped for 
each election thousand times. For each draw, ߪ௜ is computed. Afterwards, mean and standard 
deviation are calculated. 
 
The number of categories addressed by a party gives a first hint about its programmatic 
concentration. The shortcoming is that this approach ignores the fact that parties do not usually 
put the same degree of emphasis on each issue they address. This becomes visible in CMP data 
which show varying salience scores over categories for each party. For this reason, 
concentration indices are suitable as they are able to capture the distribution of salience scores 
over categories.12 In this study, I use the Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index (HHI)13 which in this 
context reads as: 
ܪܪܫ௜ =෍݌௜௝ଶ
ହ଻
௝ୀଵ
 
                                                                
10 This includes the peruncod-category which captures the amount of (quasi-)sentences that could not be subsumed 
under the other categories. Although this category can cover several issues per party and varying issues between 
parties, I include this category as an approximation for topics not covered by the MRG/CMP coding scheme. To 
subtract out this category would introduce a bias by ignoring these issues completely. 
11 For this reason, Meyer and Miller (2013, p. 5) propose to standardize the measure by subtracting the mean 
nicheness score of the remaining parties from the nicheness score of the party under consideration. This is not 
necessary for this study as single comparisons between the given party and each of its competitors will be 
considered. 
12 Franzmann (2013, pp. 227–228) points out the applicability of concentration indices for CMP data. 
13 Bischof (2015, p. 8) applies an alternative concentration index to parts of the original CMP data. While he also 
presents two attributes of the niche party concept linked to programmatic differences and focus, he then merges 
both to an additive index called nicheness (Bischof 2015, 8). My approach is to uphold the conceptual distinction 
between programmatic differences to other parties (here: nicheness) and programmatic concentration in their 
measurement because they refer to different aspects of parties’ programmatic profiles. Besides, this distinction is 
justified as concentration is only influenced by the given party while nicheness also depends on actions of other 
parties – a point Bischof (2015, p. 9) acknowledges in a similar fashion.  
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In the context of this study, the HHI adds up the squared shares of (quasi-)sentences for each 
category j for each party i. It is suitable for measuring the programmatic concentration of a 
party as it is sensitive to the number of addressed issues14 but also to the distribution of salience 
scores in these issues15. As for nicheness, the CMP coding scheme also affects the HHI scores 
as it determines the number of categories and the distribution of salience scores over these 
categories. The issue here is that some policy fields are divided into more categories than others. 
For example, there exist 16 categories which are linked to the ‘Economy’ domain but only one 
addresses environmental policy. Assuming that green parties mostly concentrate on the latter 
they should show higher HHI scores compared to parties which mention a broad range of 
economic issues. This has to be acknowledged when comparing niche parties to other parties. 
The replicated results based on different aggregations of original CMP categories offer a way 
to assess this effect.  Based on all 57 categories16, the HHI can take values between 1/57 and 1. 
Bootstrapping as described above uncovers uncertainty caused by the stochastic process of text 
generation. 
4. Results 
Before investigating the green and extreme right parties in the sample, I want to give a brief 
descriptive overview about the two programmatic features, nicheness and programmatic 
concentration. Table 2 displays the mean, standard deviation and correlation coefficient 
according to the CMP party family code. Included are all elections and all parties in 18 West 
European countries (CMP country code: 11-51; 53) for which CMP data exist (see also p. 8f 
for data handling). This leads to 1711 party observations. Numbers show differences between 
these groups of parties. In particular, the differences in the correlation between both features 
illustrate the usefulness and relevance of the general distinction between nicheness and 
programmatic concentration. In general, the operationalization of both concepts suggests a 
positive relationship between both measures. Broadly speaking, a higher HHI score implies 
higher salience scores in fewer categories which makes it more likely that the same party shows 
significant differences in these categories compared to its competitors, causing higher 
nicheness. 
 
 
                                                                
14 Assuming equal emphasis on each issue, addressing more issues leads a lower HHI score. 
15 Assuming an equal number of issues, a more unequal distribution of salience scores leads to a higher HHI score. 
16 Similar to the nicheness index, I also include the peruncod-category for the HHI. 
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Table 2: Programmatic concentration and nicheness according to party family. 
  HHI Nicheness  
Party family N mean std. dev. mean std. dev. Corr 
10 – ECO 83 0.106 0.062 0.030 0.013 0.92 
20 – COM 234 0.124 0.103 0.031 0.013 0.70 
30 – SOC 367 0.097 0.067 0.027 0.011 0.58 
40 – LIB 272 0.112 0.094 0.029 0.011 0.58 
50 – CHR 265 0.087 0.049 0.028 0.011 0.70 
60 – CON 183 0.109 0.092 0.030 0.014 0.74 
70 – NAT 64 0.143 0.152 0.035 0.015 0.82 
80 – AGR 85 0.108 0.089 0.032 0.016 0.89 
90 – ETH 91 0.105 0.072 0.028 0.015 0.93 
95 – SIP 67 0.141 0.098 0.033 0.011 0.43 
ALL 1711 0. 108 0.086 0.029 0.013 0.68 
 
Excluding elections for which data of either green and right parties in the sample or relevant 
(vote or seat share above 5 per cent) competing parties are estimated or missing, the dataset 
comprises 134 elections of these niche parties whereas some observations refer to the same 
election when more than one party in the sample participated in the same election. Table 3 
shows how green and right parties in the sample score on the measures of programmatic 
concentration and nicheness for each election compared to their respective competitors at the 
same election. The first two columns of Table 3 state country name and party label whereby the 
third column displays the number of elections in which the given party has participated and for 
which non-estimated CMP data are available. The number of addressed issues provides a first 
indication about the concentration of the programmatic profiles of parties. As mentioned above, 
in part definitions of the niche party concept entail that parties concentrate on a limited number 
of issues. The fourth column of Table 3 states in how many of its elections the given party 
addresses the lowest number of categories. Numbers do not show that green and extreme right 
parties only confine themselves to a small number of issues. Compared to their competitors, 
green and extreme right parties in the sample only address the lowest number of categories in 
31 out of the considered 134 elections (23.13 per cent). Out of the 27 parties in the sample, 10 
parties do not cover the smallest number of categories in any of their elections. Apart from the 
Portuguese Ecologist Party, no other party in the sample displays the lowest number of 
mentioned categories in all of its elections. 
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Table 3: Green and extreme right parties compared to all competitors (based on original CMP scheme). 
    Programmatic concentration Nicheness 
Country Party Name (CMP party code) 
No of 
elections 
Lowest No 
of issues highest sign. highest 
not sign. 
lower highest sign. highest 
not sign. 
lower 
Sweden Green Ecology Party (11110) 7 6 6 2 7 5 0 7  
Sweden Democrats (11710) 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1  
New Democracy (11951) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Norway Progress Party (12951) 9 1 4 1 7 9 8 9 
Denmark Danish People's Party (13720) 5 1 1 0 4 2 0 5  
Progress Party (13951) 11 2 4 0 8 3 0 8 
Finland Green Union (14110) 6 0 1 0 4 1 0 5  
True Fins (14820) 7 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 
Iceland Left Green Movement (15111) 5 1 2 0 5 1 0 5 
Belgium Ecologists (21111) 4 1 1 0 2 1 0 2  
Green! (21112) 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Flemish Bloc (21914) 4 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 
Netherlands Green Left (22110) 7 2 2 1 4 3 2 5  
List Pim Fortuyn (22720) 2 1 1 0 1 1 0 1  
Party of Freedom (22722) 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Luxembourg The Greens (23112/23113) 6 1 2 1 5 4 1 4 
France The Greens (31110) 4 2 2 0 4 0 0 2  
Ecology Generation (31111) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
National Front (31720) 4 0 0 0 1 3 1 3 
Italy Green Federation (32110) 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 2  
Northern League (32720) 6 1 1 0 3 1 1 2 
Portugal Ecologist Party "The Greens" (35110) 5 5 4 3 5 5 3 5 
Germany Alliance '90 / Greens (41111/41112/41113) 9 1 3 0 6 0 0 5 
Austria The Greens (42110) 8 2 3 2 6 3 1 5  
Alliance for the Future of Austria (42710) 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Switzerland Green Party of Switzerland (43110) 6 1 1 1 5 1 1 4 
Ireland Green Party (53110) 5 2 1 0 2 2 1 3  
SUM 134 31 39 11 84 46 19 91  
Share in % 
 
23.13 29.10 8.21 62.69 34.33 14.18 67.91 
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However, the pure number of addressed categories ignores the fact that parties do not emphasize 
each topic to the same degree. The HHI as a measure for programmatic concentration takes this 
varying distribution of emphasis into account. The fifth column of Table 3 shows the number 
of elections in which the given party reaches the highest level of programmatic concentration 
(measured through HHI) compared to all of its competitors. Numbers do not offer strong 
support for the expectation that niche parties show high levels of programmatic concentration. 
Only in 39 out of 134 elections (29.1 per cent) green and extreme right parties show the highest 
level of programmatic concentration compared to their rivals.17 Ten parties never reach the 
highest level of programmatic concentration for any of their elections. This rank order is based 
on point estimates which do not account for the uncertainty due to the stochastic process of text 
generation. Therefore, the sixth column states the number of elections in which the party’s 
programmatic concentration is significantly higher than that of all other parties at the same 
election. Only for 11 out of 134 elections (8.21 per cent), programmatic concentration of the 
given party lies significantly above the scores of all other parties at the same election. 20 of the 
green and extreme right parties do not show the significantly highest level of programmatic 
concentration in any of their elections. A weaker criterion is the number of elections in which 
the given party does not feature a score of programmatic concentration which is significantly 
lower than that of any other party for the same election (column 7 in Table 3). According to the 
expectation formulated above, at least there should be no competing party with a significantly 
higher score of programmatic concentration. For 84 elections (62.69 per cent), we find that 
there is no other party at the same election which reaches a significantly higher score of 
programmatic concentration than the given green or extreme right party in the sample. Five 
parties show levels of programmatic concentration which are exceeded by at least one party in 
each of their elections. All in all, in most cases green and right parties do not feature levels of 
programmatic concentration which are significantly higher than that of all of their competitors. 
In fact, in many cases their level of programmatic concentration is significantly exceeded by at 
least one competing party. This means that the data do not offer strong support for the 
expectation that niche parties show higher levels of programmatic concentration compared to 
their competitors. 
 
                                                                
17 Especially for green parties, this means, although the coding scheme of MRG/CMP/MARPOR should lead to 
an upward bias in programmatic concentration for green parties due to a non-existing subdivision of the 
environmental issue compared to other policy areas, they generally do not feature higher levels of programmatic 
concentration than their competitors. 
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The eighth column of Table 3 displays the number of elections for which parties in the sample 
reach the highest score of nicheness compared to their competitors. According the expectation 
formulated above, green and extreme right parties should show higher levels of nicheness 
compared to their rivals. In 46 out of the 134 considered elections (34.33 per cent), parties in 
the sample feature the highest score of nicheness. At the same time, ten parties do not display 
the highest level of nicheness in any of their elections. As for programmatic concentration, these 
comparisons are based on point estimates without consideration of uncertainty. Therefore, the 
ninth column of Table 3 states the number of elections for which the level of nicheness of the 
given party in sample lies significantly above the nicheness scores of all other parties at the 
same election. This is the case for only 19 elections (14.18 per cent). 18 parties do not reach 
levels of nicheness significantly higher than all competing parties in any of their elections. This 
last criterion can be relaxed by looking at the number of elections for which at least no other 
competing party has a significantly higher score of nicheness (column 10). We find that this is 
the case for 91 elections (67.91 per cent). When applying this weaker criterion, only for three 
parties there is at least one party in every election which features a significantly higher 
nicheness than the given party in the sample. As for programmatic concentration, parties do not 
clearly fulfil the expectation that niche parties show levels of nicheness higher than that of 
competing parties. 
 
While the numbers in Table 3 refer to calculations based on the original CMP category scheme, 
Table A2a in the appendix show the results based on the modified category scheme (addition 
of positive and negative categories). The aggregated numbers for the whole sample do not 
reveal any substantial differences compared to Table 3. This could be interpreted mainly in two 
ways: parties might originally emphasize topics coded in non-positional categories to a higher 
degree or they avoid each other on topics, for which positive and negative mentions are coded 
which would be in line with the non-confrontational aspect of salience theory. The overall 
results based on the aggregation of categories according to seven CMP policy domains show 
that parties meet the expectations formulated above even to a lesser degree (Table A2b). That 
green and extreme right parties exhibit fewer significant differences for this approach can be 
explained by this broad aggregation (from 56 to 7 categories) which masks differences found 
for the more nuanced category schemes.  
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Table 4: Green and extreme right parties compared to mainstream party rivals. 
    Progr. conc. Nicheness Progr. conc. & nich. 
Country Niche party CMP code Mainstream party (CMP party code) 
No of 
elections 
sign. 
higher 
sign. 
lower 
sign. 
higher 
sign. 
lower 
sign. 
higher 
sign. 
lower 
Sweden 11110 Social Democratic Labour Party (11320) 7 5 0 3 0 3 0  
11710 Moderate Coalition Party (11620) 1 1 0 1 0 1 0  
11951 Moderate Coalition Party (11620) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Norway 12951 Conservative Party (12620) 9 8 1 8 0 7 0 
Denmark 13720 Conservative People's Party (13620) 5 2 0 2 0 2 0  
13951 Conservative People's Party (13620) 11 3 0 2 0 1 0 
Finland 14110 Social Democrats (14320) 6 2 0 1 1 1 0  
14820 National Coalition (14620) 7 0 3 0 0 0 0 
Iceland 15111 The Alliance (15328) 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Belgium 21111 Francophone Socialist Party (21322) 4 2 2 2 0 2 0  
21112 Socialist Party Different (21321) 4 0 2 2 0 0 0  
21914 Christian People's Party (21521) 4 3 0 3 0 3 0 
Netherlands 22110 Labour Party (22320) 7 5 1 4 0 3 0  
22720 People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (22420) 2 0 0 0 1 0 0  
22722 People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (22420) 2 2 0 2 0 2 0  
23112/23113 Socialist Worker's Party (23320) 6 2 0 4 0 2 0 
France 31110 Socialist Party (31320) 4 2 0 2 0 2 0  
31111 Socialist Party (31320) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0  
31720 UDF (31624) 4 0 0 4 0 0 0 
Italy 32110 Democrats of the Left (32220) / Olive Tree (32329) 3 2 0 2 0 2 0  
32720 Go Italy (32610) / People of Freedom (32061) 6 1 1 1 0 1 0 
Portugal 35110 Socialist Party (35311) 5 5 0 4 0 4 0 
Germany 41111/41112/41113 Social Democratic Party (41320) 9 1 0 3 0 1 0 
Austria 42110 Austrian Social Democratic Party (42320) 8 5 0 5 0 4 0  
42710 Austrian People's Party (42520) 2 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Switzerland 43110 Social Democratic Party of Switzerland (43320) 6 4 0 3 0 3 0 
Ireland 53110 Labour Party (53320) 5 3 0 4 0 3 0   
SUM 134 59 10 63 2 48 0   
Share in % 
 
44.03 7.46 47.01 1.49 35.82 0.00 
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So far, I have compared green and extreme right parties according to their nicheness and 
programmatic concentration with regard to all of their respective competitors. Applying the 
narrower definition of mainstream parties of Meguid (2008, p. 46), it is possible to compare 
green and extreme right parties (as niche parties) with these long established mainstream parties 
for both programmatic features.18 This represents an even stronger test of the expectations 
formulated above, as under all competing parties one expect the programmatic otherness of 
niche parties to be most pronounced when compared to these major parties. 
 
Table 4 shows the results for the comparison between green and extreme right parties (as niche 
parties) on the one hand and their mainstream rivals on the other hand. The listing of green and 
extreme right parties is equal to Table 3. Additionally, the third column displays the name of 
the mainstream party to which the given niche party is compared.19 The fifth column states the 
number of elections for which the niche party reaches significantly higher programmatic 
concentration compared to its mainstream competitor. For 59 out of 134 elections (44.03 per 
cent), this is the case. This means, even if we compare programmatic concentration of the niche 
parties in the sample only with the values of their mainstream rivals, in the majority of elections 
the former do not feature significantly higher levels of programmatic concentration. Seven 
parties in the sample do not significantly exceed the programmatic concentration of their 
mainstream party rival for any of their elections. Thus, similar to the comparison with all 
competitors, expectation 2 cannot be approved for the majority of cases. Moreover, in 10 
elections (7.46 per cent) the mainstream parties even show significantly greater programmatic 
concentration than the given green or extreme right party in the sample (column 6). The picture 
looks similar when we look at nicheness (column 7). In 63 out of 134 elections (47.01 per cent), 
green and extreme right parties display significantly higher scores of nicheness compared to 
their mainstream competitors. Thus, the majority of elections do not confirm expectation 1. 
Five parties in the sample never reach a significantly higher level of nicheness than the 
corresponding mainstream party for any of their elections. We also observe two elections (1.49 
per cent), for which the given mainstream party has a higher nicheness than the niche party 
(column 8). Looking at nicheness and programmatic concentration at the same time, green and 
extreme right parties feature significantly higher scores for both measures in 48 elections (35.82  
                                                                
18 However, still all competing parties serve as reference point for calculating nicheness of both niche and 
mainstream parties. 
19 For the selection of mainstream parties, I make use of the list provided by Meguid (2008, p. 47). In cases for 
which there is no match in Meguid’s list, I selected parties myself, according to party family membership and 
electoral history. 
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Figure 1: Relationship between nicheness and programmatic concentration for niche and 
mainstream parties. 
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per cent) whereas there is no case for which the mainstream party rival shows significantly 
higher values for both, programmatic concentration and nicheness. All in all, for more than fifty 
per cent of all elections, niche parties do not fulfil the stated expectations as niche and 
mainstream parties cannot significantly be distinguished from each other for both programmatic 
features. The alternative handlings of CMP category scheme (Tables A3a & A3b) support this 
finding as they show the same effects as for the comparison to all competitors. 
 
So far, nicheness and programmatic concentration have been investigated separately for the 
parties in the sample. In order to examine their relationship, they are plotted against each other. 
Figure 1 shows scatter plots for all elections of niche and mainstream parties, differentiated 
according to the three different handlings of the CMP category scheme.20 In general, there exists 
a positive relationship between nicheness and programmatic concentration, for both niche and 
mainstream parties and regardless of the calculation basis. The significantly positive 
coefficients of a linear regression of nicheness on programmatic concentration also underline 
this positive relationship. The aggregation of positive and negative CMP categories does not 
cause any major differences in the relationship between nicheness and programmatic 
concentration compared to the use of the original CMP scheme. For the aggregation of the 
original categories according to the seven CMP policy domains, the scatter plots for niche and 
mainstream parties show a less strong relationship between both programmatic features, also 
illustrated by the lower R²-scores. 
 
The third expectation addresses the temporal dimension, stating that over time niche parties 
feature more changes in nicheness than in programmatic concentration. Table 5 summarizes 
how green and extreme right parties change on programmatic concentration and nicheness over 
time.21 As a reference point, Table 6 describes the same for the mainstream parties mentioned 
above. Each table differentiates between both features and between the direction of change. 
Additionally, they also entail the number of elections for which the given party features 
significant differences between elections for both features at the same time. Regarding green  
                                                                
20 Considering the plots for niche parties, the upper two plots show an outlier on the right side, which is Danish 
Progress Party in the 1977 election. Its high score for programmatic concentration is due to the high percentage of 
uncoded quasi-sentences (peruncod = 65.4). The outlier in the upper right corner of the two upper right plots for 
mainstream parties is the Finnish National Coalition in the 1979 election. For this election, it features a relatively 
high score (58.33) in the per504-category (welfare state expansion). 
21 The reduced number of elections is explained by the focus on consecutive elections and the exclusion of parties 
with only one (observed) election. 
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Table 5: Green and extreme right parties: changes in programmatic concentration and nicheness over time. 
   
Programmatic concentration Nicheness Both 
Country Party name (CMP party code) 
No of 
elections sign. lower sign. higher sign. lower sign. higher sign. lower sign. higher 
Sweden Green Ecology Party (11110) 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Norway Progress Party (12951) 7 4 2 3 1 1 0 
Denmark Danish People’s Party (13720) 4 0 1 0 1 0 1  
Progress Party (13951) 10 2 1 0 0 0 0 
Finland Green Union (14110) 5 0 0 1 0 0 0  
True Finns (14820) 5 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Iceland Left Green Movement (15111) 4 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Belgium Ecologists (21111) 2 0 1 0 2 0 1  
Green! (21112) 2 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Flemish Bloc (21914) 2 0 2 0 2 0 1 
Netherlands Green Left (22110) 6 1 3 2 3 0 0  
List Pim Fortuyn (22720) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Party of Freedom (22722) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Luxemberg Green Alternative (23112/23113) 4 1 0 2 0 1 0 
France The Greens (31110) 3 1 0 1 0 0 0  
National Front (31720) 3 1 1 1 0 1 0 
Italy Northern League (32720) 5 1 3 2 3 0 1 
Portugal Ecologist Party ‘The Greens' (35110) 3 2 0 2 0 1 0 
Germany The Greens (41111/41112/41113) 8 1 2 1 0 0 0 
Austria The Greens (42110) 7 2 2 2 2 0 0  
Alliance for the Future of Austria (42710) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Switzerland Federation of Green Parties (43110) 4 0 2 1 2 0 0 
Ireland Green Party (53110) 4 1 0 2 1 1 0  
SUM 97 18 20 22 17 6 4  
Share in %  
 
18.56 20.62 22.68 17.53 6.19 4.12 
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Table 6: Mainstream parties: changes over time. 
   
Programmatic concentration Nicheness Both 
Country Party name (CMP party code) 
No of 
elections sign. lower sign. higher sign. lower sign. higher sign. lower sign. higher 
Sweden Social Democratic Labour Party (11320) 6 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Norway Conservative Party (12620) 7 0 2 1 2 0 0 
Denmark Conservative People’s Party (13620) 14 2 1 0 1 0 0 
Finland Finnish Social Democrats (14320) 5 1 0 0 1 0 0  
National Coalition (14620) 5 2 0 1 1 0 0 
Iceland The Alliance - Social Democratic Party of Iceland (15328) 4 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Belgium Socialist Party Different (21321) 2 1 1 1 1 0 1  
Francophone Socialist Party (21322) 2 0 1 0 1 0 1  
Christian Democratic and Flemish (23521) 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 
Netherlands Labour Party (22320) 6 1 0 1 0 0 0  
People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (22420) 3 1 1 0 1 0 1 
Luxembourg Socialist Workers’ Party of Luxembourg (23320) 4 1 0 1 0 0 0 
France Socialist Party (31320) 3 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Democratic Mouvement (21624) 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Italy People of Freedom (32061) 1 1 0 0 0 0 0  
Go Italy (32610) 3 0 1 1 2 0 1 
Portugal Socialist Party (35311) 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Germany Social Democratic Party of Germany (41320) 8 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Austria Austrian Social Democratic Party (42320) 7 2 2 2 1 0 0  
Austrian People’s Party (42520) 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Switzerland Social Democratic Party of Switzerland (43320) 4 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Ireland Labour Party (53320) 4 1 0 2 1 0 0  
SUM 97 17 15 13 15 1 4  
Share in %  
 
17.53 15.46 13.40 15.46 1.03 4.12 
 
 23 
and extreme right parties, we see that significant changes in programmatic concentration take 
place in both directions with similar frequency. For 18 out of 97 elections (18.56 per cent) 
parties feature a significant lower programmatic concentration in comparison with the previous 
election, meaning a broader policy profile. Significant increases in programmatic concentration 
appear for 20 elections (20.62 per cent). The fact that changes occur in both directions argues 
against a general trend for these niche parties to a lower or higher programmatic concentration.  
 
Considering nicheness, we also find a number of significant changes in both directions for 
consecutive elections. For 22 elections (22.68 per cent), there is a significant shift towards lower 
nicheness whereas in 17 elections (17.53 per cent), parties feature a significant increase in 
nicheness. Thus, similar to programmatic concentration, there is also no universal trend for 
these parties to become more or less niche. Moreover, Table 5 shows that in 10 elections (10.31 
per cent) significant shifts appear for both features at the same time in the same direction. This 
also means that there are a number of cases in which changes are restricted to only one of both 
features which underlines the relevance of the distinction between programmatic concentration 
and nicheness. Overall, these findings do not support the third expectation as changes occur for 
both features with similar frequency. The alternative handlings of the CMP category scheme 
also call the third expectation into question (Tables A4a & A4b). 
 
Considering the patterns of mainstream competitors in Table 6, the picture looks similar to the 
one for green and extreme right parties. Mainstream parties show significant changes in 
programmatic concentration in both directions. For 17 out of 97 elections (17.53 per cent), 
mainstream parties display a significant lower programmatic concentration than in the previous 
election while in 15 elections (15.46 per cent) their programmatic concentration appears to be 
significantly higher. With regard to nicheness, we observe a significantly lower value for 13 
elections (13.4 per cent). A significant increase in nicheness appears for 15 elections (15.46 per 
cent). Simultaneous significant changes in the same direction for both features appear for 5 
elections (5.15 per cent). Similar to green and extreme right parties, also mainstream parties 
display a number of elections for which they only significantly change on one characteristic 
which again underlines the relevance of the distinction between programmatic concentration 
and nicheness as related but different facets of programmatic profiles of parties. Overall, 
compared to their mainstream rivals, niche parties show slightly higher shares of elections with 
significant changes, however numbers do not indicate a general different pattern of 
programmatic changes over time for these parties. 
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5. Conclusion 
In this study, I have presented a new approach for capturing complete programmatic profiles of 
parties based on two features. The first feature, nicheness, is linked to the niche status of a party 
determined by the amount of programmatic differences compared to rival parties. The second 
feature refers to the concentration of a party’s programmatic profile. Since these concepts refer 
to differences-in-degree in complete programmatic profiles of parties, they enable uncovering 
variance in programmatic profiles between parties and over time. The characteristic of 
programmatic concentration is a useful complement to nicheness as nicheness is not only 
determined by the programmatic behaviour of other parties but also by the behaviour of a party 
itself. The latter is directly linked to the programmatic concentration. Starting from an overview 
about the different definitions of the niche party concept, I formulated expectations for niche 
parties linked to their programmatic profiles. According to them, niche parties should show 
higher levels of nicheness and programmatic concentration when compared to competing 
parties. Concerning changes over time, more changes for nicheness than for programmatic 
concentration were expected. I tested these expectations for green and extreme right parties 
which, according to the literature, are typical cases of niche parties. In order to operationalize 
the two features, two continuous measures were presented. The nicheness measure originating 
from Meyer and Miller (2013) and the Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index used for CMP data enable 
the mapping of programmatic profiles of parties. Comparisons between parties can inform 
about the distinctiveness of parties while comparisons over time for single parties show their 
programmatic evolution. For both measures, I applied simulations in order to uncover statistical 
uncertainty caused by the stochastic process of text generation (Benoit et al. 2009). By doing 
so, it is possible to differentiate between significant and non-significant differences in all 
measures used in this study. The empirical results do not offer strong support for the above 
mentioned expectations. For many green and extreme right parties, we observe that they do not 
reach significantly higher scores for programmatic concentration and nicheness, both when 
compared to all given competitors or just one mainstream rival. Results also show significant 
changes over time for these parties. That these changes do not only occur for nicheness but also 
for programmatic concentration shows that niche parties modify their platforms from the 
beginning. Although findings suggest that green and extreme right parties display slightly 
higher numbers of significant changes over time, they show a similar pattern compared to their 
given mainstream party rivals. The fact that we also find cases in which only one of the two 
features exhibits a significant shift underlines the relevance of the distinction between 
programmatic concentration and nicheness capturing two different features of parties’ policy 
profiles. All in all, findings question the dichotomous and static classification of parties into 
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niche and mainstream parties according to party family membership. Instead, the continuous 
approach of this study enables us to take a more nuanced perspective on programmatic profiles 
of political parties and differences between them. The results of this study can serve as a starting 
point to test and modify existing arguments made with respect to niche parties but also to 
develop new theories. In particular, future research might examine how electoral success is 
influenced by the features of programmatic profiles presented in this study or/and whether 
parties adapt their profiles due to electoral results (Meyer and Wagner 2013). The measures 
used in this study are applicable to all types of parties and therefore relevant for general 
arguments about the programmatic level of party competition. They are solely based on the 
party side of the electoral market. Future research might investigate the relationship with the 
voters’ side and, for example, compare voters’ perceptions of parties with their actual 
programmatic profiles. This is only possible through a clear distinction of both sides. This study 
offers a way for a clear coverage of the supply side of the electoral market which can serve as 
starting point for such research. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: CMP coding scheme. 
Domain 1: External Relations 409 Keynesian Demand Management 
101 Foreign Special Relationships: Positive 410 Economic Growth: Positive 
102 Foreign Special Relationships: Negative 411 Technology and Infrastructure 
103 Anti-Imperialism 412 Controlled Economy 
104 Military: Positive 413 Nationalisation 
105 Military: Negative 414 Economic Orthodoxy 
106 Peace 415 Marxist Analysis: Positive 
107 Internationalism: Positive 416 Anti-Growth Economy: Positive 
108 European Community/Union: Positive Domain 5: Welfare and Quality of Life 
109 Internationalism: Negative 501 Environmental Protection: Positive 
110 European Community/Union: Negative 502 Culture: Positive 
Domain 2: Freedom and Human Rights 503 Equality: Positive 
201 Freedom and Human Rights 504 Welfare State Expansion 
202 Democracy 505 Welfare State Limitation 
203 Constitutionalism: Positive 506 Education Expansion 
204 Constitutionalism: Positive 507 Education Limitation 
Domain 3: Decentralisation Domain 6: Fabric of Society 
301 Federalism 601 National Way of Life: Positive 
302 Centralisation 602 National Way of Life: Negative 
303 Governmental and Administrative  603 Traditional Morality: Positive 
 Efficiency 604 Traditional Morality: Negative 
304 Political Corruption 605 Law and Order: Positive 
305 Political Authority 606 Civic Mindedness: Positive 
Domain 4: Economy 607 Multiculturalism: Positive 
401 Free Market Economy 608 Multiculturalism: Negative 
402 Incentives Domain 7: Social Groups 
403 Market Regulation 701 Labour Groups: Positive 
404 Economic Planning 702 Labour Groups: Negative 
405 Corporatism/ Mixed Economy 703 Agriculture and Farmers: Positive 
406 Protectionism: Positive 704 Middle Class and Professional Groups 
407 Protectionism: Negative 705 Underprivileged Minority Groups 
408 Economic Goals 706 Non-economic Demographic Groups 
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Table A2a: Green and extreme right parties compared to all competitors (replication of table 3; positive and negative categories aggregated). 
    Programmatic concentration Nicheness 
Country Party Name (CMP party code) 
No of 
elections 
Lowest No 
of issues highest sign. highest 
not sign. 
lower highest sign. highest 
not sign. 
lower 
Sweden Green Ecology Party (11110) 7 5 6 2 7 5 0 7  
Sweden Democrats (11710) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1  
New Democracy (11951) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Norway Progress Party (12951) 9 3 5 2 8 9 8 9 
Denmark Danish People's Party (13720) 5 1 1 0 4 2 0 4  
Progress Party (13951) 11 2 4 0 7 3 0 8 
Finland Green Union (14110) 6 0 1 0 4 1 0 5  
True Fins (14820) 7 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 
Iceland Left Green Movement (15111) 5 1 1 0 5 2 0 4 
Belgium Ecologists (21111) 4 0 1 0 2 1 0 2  
Green! (21112) 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Flemish Bloc (21914) 4 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 
Netherlands Green Left (22110) 7 2 2 1 4 3 2 5  
List Pim Fortuyn (22720) 2 0 1 0 1 1 0 1  
Party of Freedom (22722) 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Luxembourg The Greens (23112/23113) 6 2 2 1 5 4 1 4 
France The Greens (31110) 4 2 2 0 4 1 0 2  
Ecology Generation (31111) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
National Front (31720) 4 0 0 0 2 2 1 3 
Italy Green Federation (32110) 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 2  
Northern League (32720) 6 0 2 0 3 1 1 2 
Portugal Ecologist Party "The Greens" (35110) 5 5 3 3 5 5 3 5 
Germany Alliance '90 / Greens (41111/41112/41113) 9 1 3 0 6 1 0 5 
Austria The Greens (42110) 8 1 3 2 5 3 1 5  
Alliance for the Future of Austria (42710) 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Switzerland Green Party of Switzerland (43110) 6 1 1 1 5 1 1 4 
Ireland Green Party (53110) 5 2 1 1 2 2 1 3  
SUM 134 29 39 13 84 47 19 88  
Share in % 
 
21.64 29.10 9.70 62.69 35.07 14.18 65.67 
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Table A2b: Green and extreme right parties compared to all competitors (replication of table 3; aggregation based on CMP policy domains). 
    
Programmatic concentration Nicheness 
Country Party Name (CMP party code) 
No of 
elections 
Lowest No 
of issues highest sign. highest 
not sign. 
lower highest sign. highest 
not sign. 
lower 
Sweden Green Ecology Party (11110) 7 2 5 1 7 2 0 5  
Sweden Democrats (11710) 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1  
New Democracy (11951) 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Norway Progress Party (12951) 9 1 2 1 5 9 7 9 
Denmark Danish People's Party (13720) 5 1 1 0 2 3 0 5  
Progress Party (13951) 11 1 2 0 8 1 0 7 
Finland Green Union (14110) 6 0 2 0 5 0 0 4  
True Fins (14820) 7 0 0 0 4 3 0 4 
Iceland Left Green Movement (15111) 5 1 2 0 5 2 0 5 
Belgium Ecologists (21111) 4 1 1 1 2 1 0 2  
Green! (21112) 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1  
Flemish Bloc (21914) 4 0 0 0 2 1 0 2 
Netherlands Green Left (22110) 7 0 0 0 3 1 0 5  
List Pim Fortuyn (22720) 2 0 1 0 1 1 0 1  
Party of Freedom (22722) 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Luxembourg The Greens (23112/23113) 6 0 2 0 5 0 0 4 
France The Greens (31110) 4 1 3 0 3 0 0 2  
Ecology Generation (31111) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
National Front (31720) 4 0 0 0 2 3 1 3 
Italy Green Federation (32110) 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 2  
Northern League (32720) 6 1 1 0 3 2 0 2 
Portugal Ecologist Party "The Greens" (35110) 5 3 5 3 5 4 2 5 
Germany Alliance '90 / Greens (41111/41112/41113) 9 0 1 1 8 0 0 5 
Austria The Greens (42110) 8 0 2 0 6 1 0 6  
Alliance for the Future of Austria (42710) 2 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 
Switzerland Green Party of Switzerland (43110) 6 1 1 0 5 2 0 3 
Ireland Green Party (53110) 5 0 1 0 2 0 0 4  
SUM 134 13 32 7 84 39 11 91  
Share in % 
 
9.70 23.88 5.22 62.69 29.10 8.21 67.91 
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Table A3a: Green and extreme right parties compared to mainstream party rivals (replication of table 4; positive and negative categories 
aggregated). 
    
Progr. conc. Nicheness Progr. conc. & nich. 
Country Niche CMP code Mainstream party (CMP party code) 
No of 
elections 
sign. 
higher 
sign. 
lower 
sign. 
higher 
sign. 
lower 
sign. 
higher 
sign. 
lower 
Sweden 11110 Social Democratic Labour Party (11320) 7 5 0 2 0 2 0  
11710 Moderate Coalition Party (11620) 1 1 0 1 0 1 0  
11951 Moderate Coalition Party (11620) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Norway 12951 Conservative Party (12620) 9 8 1 8 0 7 0 
Denmark 13720 Conservative People's Party (13620) 5 2 0 2 0 2 0  
13951 Conservative People's Party (13620) 11 3 0 2 0 1 0 
Finland 14110 Social Democrats (14320) 6 2 0 1 1 1 0  
14820 National Coalition (14620) 7 0 3 0 1 0 1 
Iceland 15111 The Alliance (15328) 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Belgium 21111 Francophone Socialist Party (21322) 4 2 2 2 0 2 0  
21112 Socialist Party Different (21321) 4 0 2 2 0 0 0  
21914 Christian People's Party (21521) 4 3 0 3 0 3 0 
Netherlands 22110 Labour Party (22320) 7 5 1 4 0 3 0  
22720 People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (22420) 2 1 0 0 1 0 0  
22722 People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (22420) 2 2 0 2 0 2 0  
23112/23113 Socialist Worker's Party (23320) 6 2 0 4 0 2 0 
France 31110 Socialist Party (31320) 4 2 0 2 0 2 0  
31111 Socialist Party (31320) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0  
31720 UDF (31624) 4 0 0 4 0 0 0 
Italy 32110 Democrats of the Left (32220) / Olive Tree (32329) 3 2 0 2 0 2 0  
32720 Go Italy (32610) / People of Freedom (32061) 6 1 1 1 0 1 0 
Portugal 35110 Socialist Party (35311) 5 5 0 4 0 4 0 
Germany 41111/41112/41113 Social Democratic Party (41320) 9 1 0 2 0 1 0 
Austria 42110 Austrian Social Democratic Party (42320) 8 5 0 5 0 4 0  
42710 Austrian People's Party (42520) 2 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Switzerland 43110 Social Democratic Party of Switzerland (43320) 6 4 0 4 0 4 0 
Ireland 53110 Labour Party (53320) 5 3 0 4 0 3 0   
SUM 134 60 10 62 3 48 1   
Share in % 
 
44.78 7.46 46.27 2.24 35.82 0.75 
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Table A3b: Green and extreme right parties compared to mainstream party rivals (replication of table 4; aggregation based on CMP policy 
domains). 
    
Progr. conc. Nicheness Progr. conc. & nich. 
Country Niche CMP code Mainstream party (CMP party code) 
No of 
elections 
sign. 
higher 
sign. 
lower 
sign. 
higher 
sign. 
lower 
sign. 
higher 
sign. 
lower 
Sweden 11110 Social Democratic Labour Party (11320) 7 2 0 2 0 2 0  
11710 Moderate Coalition Party (11620) 1 0 0 1 0 0 0  
11951 Moderate Coalition Party (11620) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Norway 12951 Conservative Party (12620) 9 5 1 8 0 4 0 
Denmark 13720 Conservative People's Party (13620) 5 1 0 3 0 1 0  
13951 Conservative People's Party (13620) 11 3 1 2 1 2 0 
Finland 14110 Social Democrats (14320) 6 2 1 1 1 1 1  
14820 National Coalition (14620) 7 0 2 0 1 0 0 
Iceland 15111 The Alliance (15328) 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Belgium 21111 Francophone Socialist Party (21322) 4 2 1 2 0 2 0  
21112 Socialist Party Different (21321) 4 0 3 1 1 0 1  
21914 Christian People's Party (21521) 4 3 0 2 0 2 0 
Netherlands 22110 Labour Party (22320) 7 2 0 4 0 1 0  
22720 People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (22420) 2 0 0 0 1 0 0  
22722 People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (22420) 2 2 0 2 0 2 0  
23112/23113 Socialist Worker's Party (23320) 6 1 1 1 0 1 0 
France 31110 Socialist Party (31320) 4 1 0 2 0 1 0  
31111 Socialist Party (31320) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0  
31720 UDF (31624) 4 0 0 4 0 0 0 
Italy 32110 Democrats of the Left (32220) / Olive Tree (32329) 3 1 0 1 0 1 0  
32720 Go Italy (32610) / People of Freedom (32061) 6 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Portugal 35110 Socialist Party (35311) 5 4 0 3 0 3 0 
Germany 41111/41112/41113 Social Democratic Party (41320) 9 1 0 2 0 1 0 
Austria 42110 Austrian Social Democratic Party (42320) 8 0 0 1 0 0 0  
42710 Austrian People's Party (42520) 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Switzerland 43110 Social Democratic Party of Switzerland (43320) 6 2 0 2 0 1 0 
Ireland 53110 Labour Party (53320) 5 1 0 1 0 0 0   
SUM 134 35 11 46 5 25 2   
Share in % 
 
26.12 8.21 34.33 3.73 18.66 1.49 
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Table 4a: Green and extreme right parties: changes in programmatic concentration and nicheness over time (replication of table 5; positive and 
negative categories aggregated). 
   
Programmatic concentration Nicheness Both 
Country Party name (CMP party code) 
No of 
elections sign. lower sign. higher sign. lower sign. higher sign. lower sign. higher 
Sweden Green Ecology Party (11110) 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Norway Progress Party (12951) 7 4 2 3 1 0 0 
Denmark Danish People’s Party (13720) 4 1 1 0 1 0 1  
Progress Party (13951) 10 2 1 0 0 0 0 
Finland Green Union (14110) 5 0 0 0 0 0 0  
True Finns (14820) 5 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Iceland Left Green Movement (15111) 4 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Belgium Ecologists (21111) 2 0 1 0 1 0 1  
Green! (21112) 2 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Flemish Bloc (21914) 2 0 2 0 2 0 1 
Netherlands Green Left (22110) 6 1 3 2 3 0 0  
List Pim Fortuyn (22720) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Party of Freedom (22722) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Luxemberg Green Alternative (23112/23113) 4 1 1 2 0 0 0 
France The Greens (31110) 3 1 0 1 0 0 0  
National Front (31720) 3 1 0 2 0 0 0 
Italy Northern League (32720) 5 1 3 2 3 0 1 
Portugal Ecologist Party ‘The Greens' (35110) 3 2 0 2 0 0 0 
Germany The Greens (41111/41112/41113) 8 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Austria The Greens (42110) 7 2 2 2 1 0 0  
Alliance for the Future of Austria (42710) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Switzerland Federation of Green Parties (43110) 4 0 2 1 2 0 0 
Ireland Green Party (53110) 4 1 0 2 1 0 0  
SUM 97 19 19 22 15 0 4  
Share in %  
 
19.59 19.59 22.68 15.46 0.00 4.12 
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Table 4b: Green and extreme right parties: changes in programmatic concentration and nicheness over time (replication of table 5; aggregation 
based on CMP policy domains). 
   
Programmatic concentration Nicheness Both 
Country Party name (CMP party code) 
No of 
elections sign. lower sign. higher sign. lower sign. higher sign. lower sign. higher 
Sweden Green Ecology Party (11110) 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Norway Progress Party (12951) 7 3 1 3 1 0 0 
Denmark Danish People’s Party (13720) 4 1 1 0 1 0 1  
Progress Party (13951) 10 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Finland Green Union (14110) 5 0 0 1 0 0 0  
True Finns (14820) 5 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Iceland Left Green Movement (15111) 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Belgium Ecologists (21111) 2 1 1 0 2 0 1  
Green! (21112) 2 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Flemish Bloc (21914) 2 0 2 0 1 0 1 
Netherlands Green Left (22110) 6 2 3 1 1 0 0  
List Pim Fortuyn (22720) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Party of Freedom (22722) 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Luxemberg Green Alternative (23112/23113) 4 1 1 0 0 0 0 
France The Greens (31110) 3 0 0 0 0 0 0  
National Front (31720) 3 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Italy Northern League (32720) 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Portugal Ecologist Party ‘The Greens' (35110) 3 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Germany The Greens (41111/41112/41113) 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Austria The Greens (42110) 7 0 0 1 0 0 0  
Alliance for the Future of Austria (42710) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Switzerland Federation of Green Parties (43110) 4 0 2 1 1 0 0 
Ireland Green Party (53110) 4 2 1 0 1 0 0  
SUM 97 13 15 11 8 0 3  
Share in %  
 
13.40 15.46 11.34 8.25 0.00 3.09 
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Table 5a: Mainstream parties: changes in programmatic concentration and nicheness over time (replication of table 6; positive and negative 
categories aggregated). 
   
Programmatic concentration Nicheness Both 
Country Party name (CMP party code) 
No of 
elections sign. lower sign. higher sign. lower sign. higher sign. lower sign. higher 
Sweden Social Democratic Labour Party (11320) 6 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Norway Conservative Party (12620) 7 0 2 1 1 0 0 
Denmark Conservative People’s Party (13620) 14 2 1 0 1 0 0 
Finland Finnish Social Democrats (14320) 5 1 0 0 1 0 0  
National Coalition (14620) 5 1 0 1 1 0 0 
Iceland The Alliance - Social Democratic Party of Iceland (15328) 4 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Belgium Socialist Party Different (21321) 2 1 1 1 1 0 1  
Francophone Socialist Party (21322) 2 0 1 0 1 0 1  
Christian Democratic and Flemish (23521) 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 
Netherlands Labour Party (22320) 6 0 0 1 1 0 0  
People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (22420) 3 1 1 0 1 0 1 
Luxembourg Socialist Workers’ Party of Luxembourg (23320) 4 1 0 1 0 0 0 
France Socialist Party (31320) 3 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Democratic Mouvement (21624) 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Italy People of Freedom (32061) 1 1 0 0 0 0 0  
Go Italy (32610) 3 0 1 1 2 0 1 
Portugal Socialist Party (35311) 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Germany Social Democratic Party of Germany (41320) 8 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Austria Austrian Social Democratic Party (42320) 7 2 2 2 1 0 0  
Austrian People’s Party (42520) 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Switzerland Social Democratic Party of Switzerland (43320) 4 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Ireland Labour Party (53320) 4 1 0 2 1 0 0  
SUM 97 15 15 12 15 0 4  
Share in %  
 
15.46 15.46 12.37 15.46 0.00 4.12 
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Table 5b: Mainstream parties: changes in programmatic concentration and nicheness over time (replication of table 6; aggregation according to 
CMP policy domains). 
   
Programmatic concentration Nicheness Both 
Country Party name (CMP party code) 
No of 
elections sign. lower sign. higher sign. lower sign. higher sign. lower sign. higher 
Sweden Social Democratic Labour Party (11320) 6 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Norway Conservative Party (12620) 7 1 2 0 0 0 0 
Denmark Conservative People’s Party (13620) 14 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Finland Finnish Social Democrats (14320) 5 1 2 0 1 0 0  
National Coalition (14620) 5 2 0 1 0 0 0 
Iceland The Alliance - Social Democratic Party of Iceland (15328) 4 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Belgium Socialist Party Different (21321) 2 1 0 1 0 0 0  
Francophone Socialist Party (21322) 2 0 0 0 1 0 0  
Christian Democratic and Flemish (23521) 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Netherlands Labour Party (22320) 6 2 1 0 0 0 0  
People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (22420) 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Luxembourg Socialist Workers’ Party of Luxembourg (23320) 4 2 1 1 0 0 0 
France Socialist Party (31320) 3 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Democratic Mouvement (21624) 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Italy People of Freedom (32061) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Go Italy (32610) 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Portugal Socialist Party (35311) 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Germany Social Democratic Party of Germany (41320) 8 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Austria Austrian Social Democratic Party (42320) 7 0 0 1 0 0 0  
Austrian People’s Party (42520) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Switzerland Social Democratic Party of Switzerland (43320) 4 0 2 1 1 0 0 
Ireland Labour Party (53320) 4 1 0 0 0 0 0  
SUM 97 15 15 9 5 0 0  
Share in % 
 
15.46 15.46 9.28 5.15 0.00 0.00 
 
  
        Chapter 4   
  
  
How Programmatic Profiles of Niche Parties 
affect their Electoral Performance1 
 
Gregor Zons+, Düsseldorf Party Research Institute, Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf. 
 
 
Abstract 
Previous studies on the electoral performance of niche parties have not fully taken into 
account the evolutionary aspect of the programmatic profiles of these parties, in that the 
majority of these parties were analysed from their start of existence, when they were new 
parties. Acknowledging the variation in programmatic profiles between niche parties and over 
time, I argue that the electoral effects of nicheness and programmatic concentration as 
programmatic features of niche parties vary over their lifecycle. When entering the electoral 
arena, niche parties benefit from high levels of nicheness and programmatic concentration. 
However, these positive effects decrease as parties grow older and face different challenges 
compared to their beginning. The empirical analysis of green and extreme right parties in this 
article supports the corresponding hypotheses. Results show that the positive effects of 
nicheness and programmatic concentration vanish over time and indicate niche parties’ 
influence on their own electoral destiny.  
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the prominent topics in the field of party research in the last decade has been the work 
on niche parties. On the one hand, studies have dealt with the definition of the niche party 
concept itself (Meguid 2005; 2008; Adams et al. 2006; Wagner 2012; Meyer and Miller 2015; 
Bischof 2015). On the other hand, research has made and tested causal arguments about niche 
parties. Here, the main focus is either on the relationship between certain aspects of their 
programmatic profiles and their electoral performance or their influence on mainstream party 
behaviour (Abou-Chadi 2014; Meguid 2005; 2008; Adams et al. 2006; Ezrow 2008). 
Although some of these studies also investigate the electoral performance of niche parties1, 
we do not know much about how electoral performance of niche parties is influenced by their 
programmatic profiles, when taken as a whole. This is due to the following reasons: first, 
parts of the literature do not fully elaborate on the influence of niche parties’ programmatic 
profiles for their own electoral performance. For example, Meguid (2005; 2008) argues that, 
on the programmatic level of party competition, it is the strategies of mainstream parties 
which determine the electoral performance of niche parties. Secondly, while the existing 
literature on niche parties acknowledges that niche parties may change their status and 
platforms over time (Wagner 2012; Meyer and Miller 2015; Bischof 2015), this aspect has not 
been taken into account for the analysis of the electoral performance of these parties. Third, 
studies on niche parties often concentrate on core issues of these parties rather than taking 
their complete profiles into account (Meguid 2005; 2008; Hino 2012; Bischof 2015). Finally, 
to the best of my knowledge, there is no study on the electoral performance of niche parties 
which considers the temporal dimension in theoretical and empirical terms. Comparative 
studies on niche parties usually follow them from their start (first election) up to the present or 
the point of electoral death. However, neglecting the programmatic evolution of niche parties, 
implies that programmatic features of these parties have the exact same effect over their entire 
lifecycle. Therefore, in this study, I focus on the electoral performance of green and extreme 
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right parties in Western Europe, typically considered as niche parties in the literature, and 
analyse the electoral effects of their programmatic profiles over time. For this purpose, I 
capture parties’ profiles based on two features: nicheness and programmatic concentration. 
Nicheness (Meyer and Miller 2015) refers to the degree of programmatic differences between 
a given party and its competitors. In contrast to nicheness, programmatic concentration is only 
linked to the profile of the given party and takes account of the narrowness of the whole 
programmatic profile. Focusing on these two programmatic features enables to depict 
differences in complete programmatic profiles, between parties but also over time. 
Additionally, as nicheness and programmatic concentration both depend on the programmatic 
profile of a given party, this study acknowledges that the electoral performance of niche 
parties, apart from institutional factors, might not only be influenced by the programmatic 
behaviour of other parties in the arena but also by their own actions. Furthermore, I will argue 
that programmatic features of niche parties have different effects on their electoral 
performance over time – an aspect previously not considered in the literature. The empirical 
results support this argument. This study also speaks to the literature on new political parties, 
as all examined parties started as new parties when they first participated at a national 
election. It is also relevant for the literature on party competition in general as the approach 
used in this study can be applied to all parties and captures party strategies on the 
programmatic level of party competition. The study precedes as follows: on the basis of the 
existing literature, the second part will outline the theoretical arguments. In the third part, I 
will deal with data and methodological issues. The fourth part will present the empirical 
results. I will end this study by addressing open questions and offering conclusions. 
 
THEORY 
Before theorizing about the electoral performance of niche parties, it is necessary to deal with 
the niche party concept itself as there exist different definitions of this concept. The first 
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studies on niche parties originate from Meguid (2005; 2008) and Adams et al. (2006). Meguid 
(2008: 3f.; Meguid 2005: 347–8) defines niche parties along three criteria: (1) niche parties 
address issues which, so far, are not part of party competition; (2) these issues do not fit the 
classical left-right dimension and (3) niche parties only concentrate on a limited number of 
issues. Wagner (2012: 847) ties in with this conception by defining that niche parties 
‘de-emphasize economic concerns and stress a small range of non-economic issues’. Adams 
et al. (2006: 513) start from a spatial logic and focus on differences on the 
left-right-dimension for the identification niche parties. Meyer and Miller (2015: 260) aim for 
a minimal definition by stating that ‘a niche party emphasizes policy areas neglected by its 
competitors’ and present a continuous approach, called nicheness, which refers to complete 
programmatic profiles of parties. These varying approaches share that they start from the 
premise that niche parties emphasize different issues in comparison to other parties in the 
arena and, in this way, connect to salience theory (Robertson 1976; Budge and Farlie 1983).2 
While, in the end, the definitions of Meguid, Adams et al. and Wagner lead to a dichotomous 
classification of parties (partly along party family membership), nicheness according to 
Meyer and Miller (2015) expresses a general characteristic of parties, referring to the degree 
of programmatic differences between a given party and its competitors. Because of not 
pre-selecting any issues and its continuous nature, the nicheness approach is suitable for 
detecting variance in complete programmatic profiles of parties. Meyer and Miller (2015: 
263–4) capture the differences between parties solely on the basis of the pure emphasis of 
overall topics. I extend the understanding of nicheness by acknowledging that parties might 
also emphasize confronting issues3 in order to distinguish themselves from each other. For 
example, this aspect also plays an important role in Meguid’s (2008: 26–9) description of 
mainstream party strategies. I also take up this aspect in the section on the operationalization 
of nicheness. 
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Furthermore, I complement the concept of Meyer and Miller (2015) by introducing another 
programmatic feature, called programmatic concentration, which is also rooted in salience 
theory. It captures the broadness of the entire programmatic profile of a party and focuses on 
the number of issues a party addresses and the varying emphasis it puts on these issues. 
Recently, Bischof (2015: 1) presented a similar idea in his approach to define and 
operationalize the niche party concept which he terms narrowness. Similar to the concept of 
programmatic concentration, it is also related to the broadness of parties’ policy offerings but, 
in contrast to the first, Bischof (2015: 6, 8) links narrowness only to a-priori defined niche 
segments and not to complete programmatic profiles of parties. In this article, programmatic 
concentration refers to entire profiles of parties in order to capture their full programmatic 
offerings towards voters. Programmatic concentration also connects to criteria present in 
niche party definitions which deal with the broadness of programmatic profiles of niche 
parties (Meguid 2005: 348; 2008: 4; Wagner 2012: 847). Whereas the niche status of a party 
is influenced by the party itself and its competitors (Wagner 2012: 849), programmatic 
concentration solely depends on the programmatic profile of the given party. Thus, these two 
features capture different features of parties’ programmatic profiles, both of which can impact 
electoral performance. 
 
So far, only few studies (Meguid 2005; 2008; Adams et al. 2006; Ezrow 2008) have taken the 
electoral performance of niche parties as a dependent variable. Apart from institutional 
factors, these studies include programmatic factors as their key independent variables. 
Meguid (2005; 2008) argues that the electoral performance of niche parties is mainly 
dependent on strategies of mainstream parties with regard to niche parties’ core issues as 
mainstream parties are expected to use these strategies to hurt their mainstream party rivals. 
Accommodative strategies mean that mainstream parties take over positions of the niche party 
which harms the latter electorally and ceteris paribus leads to a lower nicheness for the niche 
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party. Mainstream parties use dismissive strategies when they ignore issues addressed by 
niche parties. Following adversarial strategies implies that mainstream parties take opposing 
positions on core issues of the niche party. Although both dismissive and adversarial 
strategies increase the nicheness of a niche party, according Meguid’s logic they have 
opposing effects on its electoral performance. Based on the assumption that mainstream 
parties control the agenda, dismissive strategies decrease electoral prospects of niche parties 
as they reduce the voters’ awareness of the respective issues. Contrarily, adversarial strategies 
increase awareness while, at the same time, preserving the unique characteristic of the niche 
party. A regression analysis of the vote shares of green and extreme right parties demonstrates 
the effectiveness of these strategies (Meguid 2008: 57–60).While Meguid’s focus is mainly 
on mainstream party strategies, Hino (2012) concentrates more on programmatic differences 
(in terms of emphasis) between niche parties4 and their competitors in their respective niche 
areas. Niche parties are expected to achieve higher vote shares when rival parties disregard 
the topics put forward by the niche parties (Hino 2012: 95, 149). Empirically, a positive effect 
of the policy gap variable only exists for the emergence of such parties, while there are 
negative or no effects for the subsequent electoral performance of these niche parties (Hino 
2012: 103, 259). Starting from a spatial approach, Adams et al. (2006) argue that niche parties 
are punished by voters for moderating their position on the left-right dimension. However, 
these insights cannot be generalized to general features of programmatic profiles as the 
respective arguments refer to changes in nicheness rather than levels of nicheness. Also 
arguing spatially, Ezrow (2008) explicates that, in terms of votes, niche parties benefit from 
occupying extreme positions on the left-right dimension in the eyes of voters. These studies 
share a theoretical and/or empirical focus on segments of parties’ profiles. More importantly, 
they have in common that they do not incorporate the temporal dimension as they implicitly 
assume that the effects of programmatic factors are the same irrespective of the point in time 
in the lifecycle of a niche party. 
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I will argue that the electoral effects of programmatic features of niche parties vary over time. 
In general, niche parties considered in the literature (e.g. green parties) started as new parties. 
When entering the electoral arena, having a distinct programmatic profile, implying high 
nicheness, should be beneficial for these new parties as it serves as a unique characteristic 
vis-à-vis voters compared to existing parties. In the case of new parties, a high nicheness is 
the result of programmatic innovations (Zons 2013: 3; Franzmann 2011) which are new 
policy offerings towards the electorate (Hindmoor 2008: 499). Such innovations can connect 
to unsatisfied demands or ‘representational needs’ (Harmel and Robertson 1985: 502) of 
voters. Lago and Martinez (2010: 7) call these situations in which existing parties fail to 
address present electoral demands ‘electoral market failure’. Apart from this, Zons (2013: 3) 
presents another form of programmatic innovation which aims for generating demand, first. 
This links to De Vries’s and Hobolt’s (2012: 247) concept of issue entrepreneurship  defined 
as ‘mobilizing conflict on a new issue dimension to change the basis on which voters make 
political choices and thereby potentially improving their electoral fortunes.’ In general, 
programmatic innovations of both types offer the opportunity for new parties to attract voters 
by offering a distinct policy profile compared to existing parties. Thus, high levels of 
nicheness should be electorally beneficial when new parties enter the arena.5 The underlying 
assumption beyond the positive effect of nicheness through programmatic innovations is that 
niche parties can influence their own electoral destiny by forming their programmatic profile. 
Programmatic innovations are designed for changing the agenda (De Vries and Hobolt 2012: 
247). As innovators, these parties can hope to gain a first mover advantage, especially in 
situations of electoral market failure (Lago and Martinez 2010) when existing parties are 
proved to have, at least partly, the “wrong” agenda. 
 
While nicheness, as argued above, exhibits a positive impact on electoral performance of 
niche parties when they enter the electoral arena, it is not guaranteed that this effect will 
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persist over time. Rather, I argue that this effect diminishes over time. If former new niche 
parties keep maintaining high levels of nicheness over time after they have entered party 
competition, this indicates, first, that they might have failed to integrate other topics beyond 
their original niche profile which are important to larger parts of the electorate. These could 
include, for example, valence issues (Stokes 1963). Integrating such issues into their 
platforms does not mean that these parties abandon their original niche issues or that they 
refrain from other delimiting issues. Yet, taking up issues also addressed by other parties is a 
means for such a party to present itself more compatible to larger parts of the electorate. 
Persistent high levels of nicheness for a niche party over time might also be a sign that the 
programmatic innovation has not succeeded. If it were attractive to large parts of the 
electorate, other parties would have had a strong incentive to adapt their platform in this 
direction which would result in a lower nicheness. On the side of niche parties, upholding a 
high level of nicheness, despite potential negative electoral effects in the long run, may 
suggest that these parties favour policy seeking over vote seeking (Strom 1990) or are not 
able to adapt their platforms for internal reasons (Robertson 1976: 39–44). Summing up, I 
expect that the positive effect of nicheness at beginning of the lifecycle of a niche party 
decreases over time. In sum, this leads to the following hypotheses: 
 
H1a: When entering the electoral arena, niche parties benefit electorally from high levels of 
nicheness. 
H1b: Over time, the positive effect of nicheness on electoral performance decreases. 
 
So far, I have only dealt with nicheness. However, as indicated above, programmatic profiles 
of parties can not only be characterized in terms of differences in comparison to their 
competitors. As I will argue, the programmatic concentration of a profile itself is another 
feature which is relevant in the context of the electoral performance of niche parties. When 
 9 
parties enter the electoral arena and present new programmatic offerings to voters, they 
extract advantages from promoting a clear and focused platform, implying a high 
programmatic concentration. First, by concentrating on one or few core issues, new parties are 
able to generate a clear programmatic identity. Secondly, such a clear identity is useful to gain 
attention and increase awareness in the media and on the side of voters. This is especially 
important in the context of programmatic innovations as ‘voters must be aware of the 
differences in the position of the parties on the new issue’ (De Vries and Hobolt 2012: 249).  
 
However, after the entering stage, the positive electoral effect of programmatic concentration 
should diminish. Once awareness through high programmatic concentration is achieved and 
parties have introduced themselves, challenges change as niche parties might face incentives 
or pressures to broaden their profiles. Niche parties might suffer from competitors adopting 
their innovations. In the words of Meguid (2005; 2008), these are accommodative strategies 
which harm niche parties electorally. In such situations, broadening its programmatic profile 
is one strategy for a niche party in order to connect to other topics beyond their initial core 
issues. Failing to do so and adhering to high levels of programmatic concentration, for 
example, due to intra party reasons, might lead to diminishing vote shares. Even if parties 
maintain their original niche profile over time, keeping up high levels of programmatic 
concentration might be electorally harmful as it is likely that voters, over time, do not care 
about only one set of issues initially promoted by the new niche party. In order to be 
compatible for these voters over time, parties have to address other issues as well. Such 
strategies would result in lower levels of programmatic concentration. Similar to nicheness, 
maintaining high levels of programmatic concentration is likely to be associated with gaining 
less votes over time. All in all, these arguments lead to the following hypotheses with regard 
to programmatic concentration: 
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H2a: When entering the electoral arena, niche parties benefit from high levels of 
programmatic concentration. 
H2b: Over time, the positive effect of programmatic concentration on electoral performance 
decreases. 
 
The hypotheses about the effects of nicheness and programmatic concentration are not 
competing as, theoretically, both, nicheness and programmatic concentration, can affect 
electoral performance at the same time. However, contrary to nicheness, programmatic 
concentration refers to features influenced by the given party only. In this way, checking for 
effects of programmatic concentration illuminates to what extent niche parties determine their 
own destiny. 
 
DATA & METHODS 
I test the above mentioned hypotheses for members of the green and extreme right party 
families in Western Europe for which manifesto data are provided by the Manifesto Data 
Collection/Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR) (Volkens et al. 2013; Klingemann et al. 
2006; Budge et al. 2001)6. Although the niche party concept extends beyond these two party 
families, according to the literature, green and extreme right parties are typical cases of niche 
parties (Meguid 2005; 2008) and started as new parties in party systems which consolidated 
after World War II. Thus, theoretical expectations with regard to niche parties should hold for 
these parties in particular. Green parties are selected according to the CMP party family 
coding. Based on this coding, I was able to identify 16 parties in 13 countries. As the CMP 
party family coding does not offer a separate category for extreme right parties, I mainly draw 
on a list of extreme right parties provided by Spies and Franzmann (2011: 1052) which 
includes 31 extreme right parties in 16 countries. However, only nine7 of these parties are 
included in the CMP dataset as it generally contains only parties that won at least one
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Table 1: Party sample. 
Country CMPa Party name Typeb nc Electionsd 
Sweden 11110 Green Ecology Party 0 7 1982(1e), 1985(2e), 1988(3), 1991(4), 1994(5), 1998(6), 2002(7), 2006(8), 2010(9), 2014(10i) 
 11710 Sweden Democrats 1 1 1988(1e), 1991(2e), 1994(3e), 1998(4e), 2002(5e), 2006(6e), 2010(7), 2014(10i) 
 11951 New Democracy 1 1 1991(1), 1994(2e), 1998(2e) 
Norway 12951 Progress Party 1 9 1973(1), 1977(2), 1981(3), 1985(4), 1989(5g), 1993(6), 1997(7), 2001(8), 2005(9), 2009(10), 
2013(11i) 
Denmark 13720 Danish People's Party 1 5 1998(1), 2001(2), 2005(3), 2007(4), 2011(5), 2015(i) 
 13951 Progress Party 1 11 1973(1), 1975(2), 1977(3), 1979(4), 1981(5), 1984(6), 1987(7), 1988(8), 1990(9), 1994(10), 1998(11), 
2001(12e) 
Finland 14110 Green Union 0 6 1983(1f), 1987(2f), 1991(3), 1995(4), 1999(5), 2003(6), 2007(7), 2011(8), 2015(i) 
 14820 True Fins 1 7 1962(1e), 1966(2f), 1970(3h), 1972(4h), 1975(5h), 1979(6), 1983(7), 1987(8), 1991(9), 1995(10f), 
1999(11f), 2003(12), 2007(13), 2011(14), 2015(15i) 
Iceland 15111 Left Green Movement 0 5 1999(1), 2003(2), 2007(3), 2009(4), 2013(5) 
Belgium 21111 Ecologists 0 4 1981(1f), 1985(2f), 1987(3f), 1991(4), 1995(5), 1999(6h), 2003(7h), 2007(8), 2010(9), 2014(10i) 
 21112 Green! 0 4 1981(1f), 1985(2f), 1987(3f), 1991(4), 1995(5), 1999(6h), 2003(7h), 2007(8), 2010(9), 2014(10i) 
 21914 & 21917 Flemish Bloc / Flemish Interest 1 4 1978(1f), 1981(2f), 1985(3f), 1987(4f), 1991(5), 1995(6), 1999(7f), 2003(8f), 2007(9), 2010(10), 
2014(11i) 
Netherlands 22110 Green Left 0 7 1989(1), 1994(2), 1998(3), 2002(4), 2003(5), 2006(6), 2010(7), 2012(8i) 
 22720 List Pim Fortuyn 1 2 2002(1), 2003(2), 2006(3e) 
 22722 Party of Freedom 1 2 2006(1), 2010(2), 2012(3i) 
Luxembourg 23111 Green Left Ecological Initiative 0 0 1989(1h) 
 23112 & 23113 Green Alternative / The Greens 0 6 1984(1), 1989(2h), 1994(3), 1999(4), 2004(5), 2009(6), 2013(7) 
France 31110 The Greens 0 4 1986(1e) 1988(2e), 1993(3h), 1997(4), 2002(5), 2007(6), 2012(7) 
 31111 Ecology Generation 0 1 1993(1e), 1997(2) 
 31720 National Front 1 4 1973(1e), 1978(2e), 1981(3e), 1986(4h), 1988(5f), 1993(6f), 1997(7), 2002(8), 2007(9), 2012(10) 
Italy 32110 Green Federation 0 3 1987(1), 1992(2h), 1994(3f), 1996(4), 2001(e), 2006(6) 
 32720 Northern League 1 6 1987(1e), 1992(2f), 1994(3), 1996(4), 2001(5), 2006(6), 2008(7), 2013(8) 
Portugal 35110 Ecologist Party "The Greens" 0 5 1983(1), 1985(2f), 1987(3h), 1991(4e), 1995(5e), 1999(6e), 2002(7), 2005(8), 2009(9), 2011(10) 
Germany 41111 & 41112 & 
41113 
Alliance '90 / Greens 0 9 1980(1e), 1983(2), 1987(3), 1990(4), 1994(5), 1998(6), 2002(7), 2005(8), 2009(9), 2013(10) 
Austria 42110 The Greens 0 8 1986(1), 1990(2), 1994(3), 1995(4), 1999(5), 2002(6), 2006(7), 2008(8), 2013(9i) 
 42710 Alliance for the Future of 
Austria 
1 2 2006(1), 2008(2), 2013(3i) 
Switzerland 43110 Green Party of Switzerland 0 6 1979(1f), 1983(2f), 1987(3), 1991(4h), 1995(5), 1999(6), 2003(7), 2007(8), 2011(9) 
Ireland 53110 Green Party 0 5 1987(1e), 1989(2f), 1992(3), 1997(4), 2002(5), 2007(6), 2011(7) 
    134  
a CMP party code; b niche party type: 0 – green party, 1 – extreme right party; c number of elections/observations used for the empirical analysis; d elections for single parties. Number in brackets 
corresponds to election number variable; e missing in CMP; f estimate in CMP; g missing information in CMP; h election dropped due to estimate for relevant party; i election missing in CMP 
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parliamentary seat.8 In addition, I also include the Sweden Democrats, the Dutch Party of 
Freedom and the Alliance for the Future of Austria, also mentioned as extreme right parties, 
for example by van der Brug et al. (2013: 58). Due to the CMP criterion extreme unsuccessful 
green and extreme right parties are excluded from the analysis. This introduces a bias for the 
results with regard to hypotheses H1 and H2. However, the electoral performance of parties in 
the sample still shows a high level of variation between parties and also over time. All in all, 
the sample for the empirical analysis includes 28 parties, 16 green and 12 extreme right 
parties (see Table 1). 
 
The dependent variable is the vote share of each niche party.9 The main independent variables 
are linked to programmatic profiles of parties. Party manifestos provide a valuable source for 
investigating programmatic profiles of political parties (Laver 2001: 72; Gemenis 2012: 594) 
and are widely used in comparative research on parties because they offer comparable data 
across countries and over time. I draw on the CMP as the most comprehensive dataset on 
manifestos with regard the number of countries and time span being covered. The CMP codes 
party manifestos on the basis of a coding scheme which, for Western Europe, consists of 56 
categories which are linked to certain topics, and one additional category subsuming 
remaining parts of manifestos. Scores in single categories state the percentage shares of 
(quasi-)sentences in a manifesto which refer to the respective topics. In the context of CMP 
data, Gemenis (2012) points at the consequences of different document types being used as 
the data basis by the CMP. These also include estimates resting on following or preceding 
elections. Such estimates are problematic as they fail to capture the strategic element of party 
competition according to which parties interact on the programmatic level. Thus, data 
handling is guided by Meyer and Miller (2015: 264). Excluded from the dataset are complete 
elections when the given party in the sample or a relevant (vote or seat share above five per 
cent) party feature estimated or missing data. Non-relevant parties with estimated or missing 
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data are dropped individually. Taken together, 134 elections in which green and extreme right 
parties in sample participated are used for the following analysis (indicated by bold numbers 
in Table 1). The last column of Table 1 lists all observations per party. The numbers in 
brackets stand for the election count of each party. For example, (3) means that, in this 
election year, the given party participated for the third time in a national election. This 
election count variable also enters the empirical analysis as an independent variable 
addressing the temporal dimension. 
 
In order to capture the nicheness of parties, I start from an existing approach, developed by 
Meyer and Miller (2015: 262): 
ߪ௜ = ඩ
1
ܰ
෍൫ݔ௜௝ − ఫܺ,ିపതതതതതത൯
ଶ
ே
௝ୀଵ
 
In the formula, N stands for the number of issues or dimensions, in which parties compete and 
for which the nicheness ߪ௜ of party i is calculated. ݔ௜௝ stands for the score of the given party i 
in issue or dimension j. ఫܺ,ିపതതതതതത denotes the mean score of the remaining parties in the same issue 
or dimension. In other words, nicheness ߪ௜ is calculated as the square root of the mean 
squared distance between the score of the given party and the average score of all remaining 
parties over all issues or dimensions. In their original version, Meyer and Miller (2015: 263–
4) calculate nicheness on basis of several dimensions, which comprise different CMP 
categories and refer to typical ministry portfolios (Bäck et al. 2011: 454–5). In general, there 
is no single right level of aggregation regarding the original CMP category scheme. On the 
one hand, the aggregation according to ministry portfolios is highly relevant as they represent 
an important reference point for parties. On the other hand, the high level of aggregation also 
masks important differences between programmatic profiles of parties and, thus, also in 
nicheness. For example, the interior-dimension covers such diverse topics as democracy and 
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law and order. The aggregation in this case means that it does not make any difference for the 
nicheness of a party which of these issues is addressed. Furthermore, the merging also 
pertains to pairs of positive and negative CMP categories. This form of aggregation fits a pure 
salience theory point of view which focuses on non-confrontational modes of party 
competition. However, research indicates the relevance of confrontational strategies, also in 
the context of niche parties (Meguid 2005; 2008).10 Moreover, according to the aggregation of 
Bäck et al. (2011: 454–5), several CMP categories are assigned to more than one dimension. 
Therefore, nicheness in these categories is overemphasized. For these reasons, I calculate 
nicheness on basis of the original CMP data.11 In order to check the sensitivity of the results 
regarding the approach to the CMP category scheme, I replicate the results by handling the 
CMP categories in two different ways. First, I only aggregate positive and negative categories 
in order to arrive at a coherent, pure salience based scheme. Secondly, I aggregate all 
categories according to the seven CMP policy domains12 which resembles the original 
approach of Meyer and Miller (2015) without multiple assignment of the original categories. 
Besides, in contrast to Meyer and Miller (2015: 262), I do not use vote shares as weights 
because, in the context of this study, the nicheness measure should purely reflect 
programmatic differences between parties, irrespective of their size in terms of votes or seats. 
Following these remarks, the above mentioned formula for nicheness changes to:  
ߪ௜ = ඩ
1
57
෍൫݌௜௝ − ݌ఫ,ିపതതതതതത൯
ଶ
ହ଻
௝ୀଵ
 
As outlined, I calculate nicheness based on all 57 CMP categories, relevant for Western 
Europe.13 ݌௜௝ stands for the salience score of party i in category j while ݌ఫ,ିపതതതതതത is the average 
score of the remaining parties in the same category. 
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For measuring programmatic concentration, I apply the Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index (hhi) to 
the manifesto data of the CMP (Franzmann 2013: 227–8). As a standard measure of 
concentration it is sensitive to both, the number of issues addressed by a party and the 
distribution of emphasis put on these issues.14 The according formula reads as: 
݄݄݅௜ =  ෍ ݌௜௝ଶ
ହ଻
௝ୀ௜
 
݄݄݅௜ is then the sum of the squared salience scores of party i over all 57 CMP categories 
whereby low values indicate low programmatic concentration. ݄݄݅௜ reaches its minimum 
when all CMP categories are emphasized to the same degree and its maximum of 1 when a 
party only addresses one category. Similar to nicheness, this index is also affected by the 
structure of the CMP coding scheme. At this point, the replication of the results on the basis 
of the two different aggregations of the original CMP categories again serve as sensitivity 
analysis. 
 
Before I precede, I want to give a brief descriptive overview about nicheness and 
programmatic concentration (based on original CMP categories). Table 2 shows mean, 
standard deviation and correlation coefficient for both measures. The numbers in the upper 
half of the table refer to all available observations for 18 West European countries in the CMP 
dataset (CMP country code: 11-51; 53) and are broken down according to the CMP party 
family code. The mean values for both measures display differences between party families 
and exhibit face validity. Special issue and nationalist parties feature on average the highest 
levels of nicheness and programmatic concentration which seems plausible as they are 
expected to concentrate on few issues not covered by other parties. In contrast, social 
democratic and Christian parties feature low levels of programmatic concentration and 
nicheness. Many members of this party family pursue catch-all strategies and resemble 
Meguid’s (2008: 46) definition of mainstream parties which should be associated with broad 
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programmatic profiles and low values of nicheness. Considering the operationalization of 
nicheness and programmatic concentration, a positive relationship between both measures is 
expected. A high score for programmatic concentration results from high salience scores in 
few categories which, at the same time, makes it likely that the same party show differences 
in these categories compared to its competitors, implying high nicheness. Although, we 
observe positive correlations for all party families, there exists nevertheless variation among 
correlation coefficients. Party families which are labelled as niche in the literature such as 
green, nationalist and ethnic parties show a relatively high correlation between nicheness and 
programmatic concentration although special issue parties appear to be an outlier in this case. 
All in all, these differences illustrate the relevance of the distinction between programmatic 
concentration and nicheness as two distinct characteristics of programmatic profiles of parties. 
The lower half of Table 2 displays descriptive statistics for the parties in the sample, ordered 
by the election count variable. Numbers do not reveal any trends for neither nicheness nor 
programmatic concentration but show variation over time which will be exploited in the 
regression analysis. In the distribution of nicheness and programmatic concentration for the 
parties in the sample, one observation appears as an outlier due to its high value of 
programmatic concentration. This is the Danish Progress Party in the 1977 election. Its high 
value of programmatic concentration is attributed to the large share of uncoded sentences 
(65.4%). I will later check the influence of this observation in the regression analysis. 
 
With regard to manifesto data and the associated coding process, Benoit et al. (2009) point at 
different sources of error and present an approach addressing the uncertainty due to the 
stochastic process of text generation. This procedure relies on bootstrapped samples for each 
manifesto in order to obtain standard errors for each salience score in every CMP category. 
The same can be applied to every measure based on these data. For this, the given measure is 
calculated for every bootstrapped sample. Regarding uncertainty caused by the stochastic 
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process of text generation, it is then possible to distinguish between significant and non-
significant differences by using confidence intervals.15 I follow this procedure for the 
measures of nicheness and programmatic concentration. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for programmatic concentration and nicheness (based on 57 CMP categories). 
  Programmatic concentration Nicheness  
CMP party family 
code N mean std. dev. mean std. dev. corr 
10 – ECO 83 0.106 0.062 0.030 0.013 0.92 
20 – COM 234 0.124 0.103 0.031 0.013 0.70 
30 – SOC 367 0.097 0.067 0.027 0.011 0.58 
40 – LIB 272 0.112 0.094 0.029 0.011 0.58 
50 – CHR 265 0.087 0.049 0.028 0.011 0.70 
60 – CON 183 0.109 0.092 0.030 0.014 0.74 
70 – NAT 64 0.143 0.152 0.035 0.015 0.82 
80 – AGR 85 0.108 0.089 0.032 0.016 0.89 
90 – ETH 91 0.105 0.072 0.028 0.015 0.93 
95 – SIP 67 0.141 0.098 0.033 0.011 0.43 
ALL 1711 0.108 0.086 0.029 0.013 0.68 
       
Election count       
1 13 0.130 0.081 0.037 0.016  
2 11 0.092 0.061 0.028 0.013  
3 13 0.152 0.109 0.035 0.010  
4 16 0.108 0.055 0.032 0.012  
5 16 0.099 0.043 0.028 0.009  
6 15 0.097 0.050 0.028 0.013  
7 16 0.118 0.078 0.034 0.017  
8 13 0.099 0.046 0.028 0.010  
9 11 0.103 0.055 0.030 0.011  
10 6 0.077 0.021 0.027 0.008  
11 1 0.087 - 0.028 -  
12 1 0.084 - 0.039 -  
13 1 0.064 - 0.026 -  
14 1 0.058 - 0.028 -  
SAMPLE 134 0.108 0.065 0.031 0.012 0.77 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for dependent and independent variables. 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Vote share 134 7.30 4.45 0.42 22.91 
Nicheness 134 0.031 0.012 0.012 0.074 
Prog. concentration 134 0.108 0.065 0.045 0.442 
Election No 134 5 2.87 1 14 
Mean distr. magn. (log) 134 2.109 1.263 0 5.011 
Federalism 134 0.25 0.44 0 1 
GDP per capita 134 31374.3 8770.839 12508 66857 
Unemployment rate 134 6.50 3.08 0.7 15.3 
Type 134 0.41 0.49 0 1 
 
Apart from the programmatic variables presented above and the election count variable, the 
following analysis includes several other variables which account for factors which might also 
influence the electoral performance of niche parties and have been considered in the literature 
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before. District magnitude16 captures the impact of the electoral system. In systems featuring 
low district magnitudes, niche parties may appear less viable and, therefore might suffer from 
strategic voting. A dummy variable indicates whether the party competes in a federal 
system.17 The latter offers the chance for niche parties to establish themselves on the 
subnational level first and to present themselves as a viable option. Thus, niche parties should 
perform better in federalist systems. In order to control for potential general differences 
between green and extreme right parties I include a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for 
right niche parties. GDP per capita and unemployment rate18 serve as economic control 
variables. Last, the following model also incorporates the electoral performance of the 
previous election as a lagged dependent variable in order to take account of the fact that 
electoral performance is also time dependent in that past performance offers a clue to voters 
about the viability of parties. Table 3 displays descriptive statistics for the variables used in 
the empirical analysis. 
 
I start testing my hypotheses by using the following model: 
 
M1: VSi,t   = b0 + b1 * nichenessi,t + b2 * prog. conc.i,t + b3 * elec. counti,t + b4 * 
nichenessi,t * elec. counti,t + b5 * prog. conc.i,t * elec. counti,t + b6 * 
nichenessi,t * prog. conc.i,t + b7 * nichenessi,t * prog. conc.i,t * elec. counti,t 
+ b8 * party typei + b9 * mean district magnitudei,t + b10 * federalismi,t + 
b11 * GDPi,t + b12 * unempl.i,t + b13 * VSi,t-1 + country dummies 
 
Subscript i refers to parties and t denotes the election count of party i. My hypotheses 
emphasize interactions of both, nicheness and programmatic concentration, with the election 
count variable. However, this common moderating variable then also establishes a statistical 
relationship between nicheness and programmatic concentration which has to be accounted 
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for. Therefore, model M1 features all possible combinations of all three variables, including a 
threefold interaction term. Omitting any of these terms would lead to biased results for the 
coefficients in the model (Braumoeller 2004: 810–1)19. For interpreting interaction effects, it 
is not sufficient to look on single coefficients and their statistical significance (Brambor et al. 
2006). In order to test the above mentioned hypotheses, I calculate the marginal effects of 
nicheness and programmatic concentration, depending on the election count variable. Due to 
the threefold interaction term, the respective third variable has also to be taken into account 
when calculating these marginal effects. According to the hypotheses, I expect the marginal 
effects of nicheness and programmatic concentration to be positive when election count is 
low. As election count increases the marginal effects should diminish. 
 
Table 4: Regression results (based on 57 CMP categories). 
 M1 M2a M2b 
 OLS 
b (rob. SE) 
OLS 
b (rob. SE) 
SIMEX 
b (SE) 
OLS 
b (rob. SE) 
SIMEX 
b (SE) 
Nicheness 487.4039** 209.9535*** 297.1655***   
 (187.3268) (76.5699) (104.2125)   
Progr. conc. 124.3111***   35.4665*** 42.0780*** 
 (38.9329)   (9.9927) (13.6622) 
Election count 2.3889** 0.7343 1.1442** 0.2917 0.4063 
 (1.0651) (0.4937) (0.5452) (0.3821) (0.3061) 
Nich. * progr. conc. -2790.5807***     
 (978.6111)     
Nich. * elec. count -73.0789** -32.1956** -45.5050***   
 (33.3612) (13.5192) (17.0200)   
Progr. conc. * elec. count -20.5219**   -5.2007** -6.2859** 
 (10.0308)   (2.4403) (2.6105) 
Nich. * conc. * elec. count 461.5907**     
 (214.3274)     
Party type 3.8328*** 3.5883*** 3.8734*** 3.2587*** 3.3152*** 
 (1.0468) (1.0891) (1.0176) (1.0845) (0.9535) 
district magn. (log) -0.6341 -0.2437 -0.2377 -0.2438 -0.2368 
 (0.5875) (0.5989) (0.6983) (0.6068) (0.6860) 
Federalism -3.1641*** -2.4840** -2.8586 -2.2767** -2.3945 
 (1.1098) (1.0195) (2.1916) (0.8733) (2.1161) 
GDP per capita 0.0004*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Unempl. rate 0.1718 0.1413 0.1561 0.1726 0.1850 
 (0.1406) (0.1359) (0.1506) (0.1411) (0.1504) 
Lagged DV 0.2559** 0.3202** 0.3210*** 0.2921** 0.2878*** 
 (0.1252) (0.1255) (0.0897) (0.1272) (0.0896) 
Intercept -23.4989*** -11.3668*** -14.1635*** -9.5531*** -10.3626*** 
 (6.4094) (4.2529) (4.5099) (3.6016) (3.5619) 
Country dummies  included included included included included 
Adj. R2 0.54 0.51  0.53  
Num. obs. 119 119 119 119 119 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
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To begin with, I estimate the first model M1, using an OLS regression as a starting point 
(Table 4). Due to signs of heteroscedasticity, I use robust standard errors. Faced with a model 
including a lagged dependent variable, I apply the test for AR(1) serial correlation in models 
including a lagged dependent variable suggested by Wooldridge (2006: 420f.). Regressing the 
residuals on their lag and the independent variables does not reveal strong signs of serial 
correlation (p-value of the lagged residual is 0.098). The adjusted R-squared amounts to 54 
per cent, indicating the explanatory power of the model. First of all, results show that all three 
core variables (nicheness, programmatic concentration, election count) and their interactions 
are strongly significant, either on the 5%- or 1%-level. Despite its panel structure, the dataset 
does not correspond to the typical application scenario for panel corrected standard errors 
(PCSE, Beck and Katz 1995) as it is highly unbalanced and N (parties) exceeds T (time unit: 
election count). Nevertheless, the significance of the effects also persists in the case of PCSE. 
This finding suggests that nicheness and programmatic concentration have time-dependent 
effects on electoral performance of green and extreme right parties. 
 
Among the control variables, the dummy variable for extreme right parties shows a positive 
effect (b8 = 3.83), significant on 1%-level. According to this finding, extreme right parties, on 
average, reach higher vote shares than green parties. Niche parties perform worse in federal 
systems (b10 = -3.16, significant on the 1%-level). Moreover, GDP features a positive effect 
(b11 = 0.0004), significant on the 1%-level. The lagged dependent variable also features a 
positive effect (b13 = 0.256). It is significant on the 1%-level and illustrates that past electoral 
performance has a formative and positive influence on future elections. 
 
Figures 1 and 2 help verifying the hypotheses related to nicheness and programmatic 
concentration by illustrating their marginal effects. Figure 1 shows the marginal effect of 
nicheness in dependence of election count for three different levels of programmatic 
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concentration (hhi: mean-sd, mean, mean+sd). The distribution of the election count variable 
is displayed in the in Table 2. When first looking on the low level of programmatic 
concentration (plot on the left), we see a positive marginal effect of nicheness on electoral 
performance for the first four participations in elections as confidence intervals lie above the 
zero line. This fact offers confirmation of hypothesis H1a. The positive effect of nicheness 
also appears to be substantial in its magnitude. For the first election, a rise in nicheness of one 
standard deviation brings about an increase of 3.86 percentage points. Yet, the plot also 
reveals that this positive effect of nicheness decreases with the number of participations in 
elections. From the fifth election onwards, the confidence intervals cannot be significantly 
distinguished from 0. This trend over time is in line with hypothesis H1b. The plots for the 
medium and high level of programmatic concentration show a different picture. While the 
marginal effect of nicheness in the case of the medium level of programmatic concentration 
seems to follow a similar trend as before, it only reaches statistical significance (5%-level) for 
the third and fourth election participation. For the high level of programmatic concentration, 
there is no significant marginal effect of nicheness on electoral performance.  
 
Figure 1: Marginal effect of nicheness on vote share dependent on election count for three different levels of 
programmatic concentration (hhi). 
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Figure 2: Marginal effect of programmatic concentration dependent on election count for three different levels of 
nicheness. 
 
 
Figure 2 displays the marginal effect of programmatic concentration in dependence of the 
election count variable for three different levels of nicheness (mean-sd, mean, mean+sd). The 
left plot (low nicheness) reveals a similar pattern like in Figure 1. There is a positive marginal 
effect of programmatic concentration for the first four elections which supports hypothesis 
H2a. The magnitude of the effect for a one standard deviation increase amounts to 3.91 
percentage points. At the same time, the plot also illustrates a decreasing trend for the 
marginal effect of programmatic concentration which goes along with its insignificance from 
the fifth participation in an election onwards. This trend confirms hypothesis H2b. The same 
pattern becomes visible for the medium level of nicheness although the magnitude of the 
marginal effect of programmatic concentration appears to be slightly lower. Against this, the 
plot on the right side (high level of nicheness) does not reveal any significant effects of 
concentration. Earlier, I pointed at the high value of programmatic concentration for the 
Danish Progress Party in the 1977 election. While this observation does not represent an 
outlier with regard to its residual, dropping it leads to the general insignificance of the 
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marginal effect of programmatic concentration in the model with robust standard errors (not 
with PCSE). With regard to the handling of CMP data, the aggregation of positive and 
negative categories only leads to marginal changes in the results (see Table A1 in the 
appendix). Although it matters theoretically whether we consider nicheness to be affected by 
parties taking different positions with regard to certain topics, the empirical results are not 
influenced by this aspect. Applying the broader aggregation based on the CMP policy 
domains (see Table A2), only reveals positive but, over time, diminishing effects for 
programmatic concentration. However, this finding can be tied to the high level of 
aggregation that levels differences between parties to which the nicheness measure reacts. So 
far, results offer partial support for the hypotheses stating time-dependent effects of nicheness 
and programmatic concentration. In general, the precision of the estimation is affected by the 
high correlation between nicheness and programmatic concentration in the sample. Thus, in a 
second step, I estimate two separate models for both variables: 
 
M2a: VSi,t   = b0 + b1 * nichenessi,t + b3 * elec. counti,t + b4 * nichenessi,t * elec. counti,t + 
b8 * party typei + b9 * mean district magnitudei,t + b10 * federalismi,t + b11 * 
GDPi,t + b12 * unempl.i,t + b13 * VSi,t-1 + country dummies 
 
M2b: VSi,t   = b0 + b2 * prog. conc.i,t + b3 * elec. counti,t + b5 * prog. conc.i,t * elec. 
counti,t + b8 * party typei + b9 * mean district magnitudei,t + b10 * 
federalismi,t + b11 * GDPi,t + b12 * unempl.i,t + b13 * VSi,t-1 + country 
dummies 
 
For these separate models, it is then also possible to take into account the measurement error 
of these programmatic variables caused by stochastic process of text generation. Ignoring 
measurement error in explanatory variables can cause bias and inefficiency of the respective 
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coefficients (Hausman 2001: 58; Benoit et al. 2009: 505), in particular for OLS regressions 
(Benoit et al. 2009: 506). In this context, Benoit et al. (2009: 506) recommend the application 
of simulation-extrapolation (Raymond J. Carroll et al. 2006; Stefanski and Cook 1995), 
SIMEX, as an error correction model. The basic idea behind this approach is to identify a 
trend in the bias by adding increasing levels of measurement error in a simulation procedure. 
After this, it is then possible to infer to the absence of measurement error by extrapolation 
(Benoit et al. 2009: 506). I later apply SIMEX for models M2a and M2b, in which 
measurement error exists for nicheness and programmatic concentration. Note that the 
SIMEX procedure cannot be applied to the first model M1 because it includes an interaction 
between the two variables which contain measurement error20 and starts from an OLS 
regression with normal standard errors.  
 
Table 4 also displays the results for model M2a from an OLS regression, using robust 
standard errors. The test for AR(1) serial correlation does not indicate serial correlation (p-
value of the lagged residual amounts to 0.19). Like in the first model, results point to a 
time-dependent effect of nicheness. Nicheness (b1 = 209.954) as well as its interaction with 
election count (b4 = -32.196) show significant effects (on the 1%- and 5%-level), also present 
when using panel corrected standard errors. Besides, the remaining variables reveal the same 
pattern as in model M1. The fourth column of Table 4 displays the results for the SIMEX 
estimation for model M2A.  We see that, compared to the OLS regression, the coefficients of 
nicheness (b1 = 297.166), election count (b3 = 1.144) and their interaction increase (b4 = -
45.505) in their magnitude. At the same time, election count and the interaction variable reach 
higher significance levels. Among the remaining variables, federalism stops to appear 
significant. While the aggregation of positive and negative categories leads to overall similar 
results (Table A1), nicheness shows no significant results for the broader aggregation of the 
original CMP categories (Table A2), as it was the case for model M1. 
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Figure 3: Marginal effect of nicheness on vote share dependent on election count. 
 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the marginal effect of nicheness in dependence of election count, based on 
the SIMEX estimation. In this model without programmatic concentration, nicheness has a 
positive effect on electoral performance for the first four elections which is in line with 
hypothesis H1a. Yet, the magnitude of this effect decreases with the number of elections in 
which a party participates. Thus, hypothesis H1b can also be confirmed. Between the fifth and 
tenth election, the effect of nicheness is insignificant but, for the elections afterwards, it 
becomes significantly negative. At this period in time, nicheness features a negative impact. 
The pattern for the marginal effect does not change when positive and negative CMP 
categories are aggregated. In the case of the aggregation according to the CMP policy 
domains, the marginal effect of nicheness is always insignificant which can again be 
explained by the loss of information caused by this broad aggregation. 
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The OLS (robust standard errors) results for model M2b are displayed in the fifth column of 
Table 4. As for nicheness, they indicate a time-dependent effect of programmatic 
concentration on electoral performance. The effects of programmatic concentration (b2 = 
35.467) and its interaction with the election count variable (b5 = -5.201) both appear 
significant on the 1%- and 5%-level, also when using panel corrected standard errors. The 
other variables in the model show no different effects than in the previous models. Also in this 
case, the SIMEX estimation (sixth column) leads to a higher magnitude for the main variables 
of interest (b2 = 42.078 and b5 = -6.286). The two different handlings of the original CMP 
category scheme confirm the time-dependent effect of programmatic concentration (Table A1 
& A2). 
 
Figure 4: Marginal effect of programmatic concentration dependent on election count. 
 
 
Based on the SIMEX estimation, Figure 4 depicts the marginal effect of programmatic 
concentration on electoral performance for the values of the election count variable. For the 
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first four elections, programmatic concentration exhibits a significant and positive influence 
which offers evidence for hypothesis H2a. The plot also illustrates that this positive effect 
decreases over time. From the fifth election onwards, programmatic concentration does not 
contribute significantly to the explanation of electoral performance. Thus, hypothesis H2b 
finds support as well. The pattern of this marginal effect also endures when excluding Danish 
Progress Party in the 1977 election as an outlier for its high programmatic concentration 
score. The same is true for both alternative aggregations of the original CMP categories. 
 
Summing up, results of models M2a and M2b illustrate that programmatic profiles of niche 
parties matter for their electoral performance. Another important finding is that programmatic 
features of these parties exhibit different effects over time. At the beginning of their electoral 
lifecycle, when niche parties are new on the scene, they profit from high levels of nicheness 
and programmatic concentration. The longer they exist the more these positive effects vanish. 
These results are consistent for different statistical estimations. The results of the separated 
models substantiate the significant effects found in the first model M1. In the latter, the high 
correlation between nicheness and programmatic concentration hampers the precision of 
estimates but also in this model the significance of the interaction terms signals that time 
plays a role for the way programmatic features impact electoral performance. Additionally, 
what has to be kept in mind is that both, nicheness and programmatic concentration, relate 
directly to the behavior of the given niche party. Nicheness results from the programmatic 
actions of both, the niche party and its competitors, as programmatic concentration solely 
refers to the given party. With that said, the significant results for both features indicate that 
niche parties exert influence on their electoral destiny by their own programmatic actions and 
are not simply at the mercy of rival parties’ strategies. 
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CONCLUSION 
In this article, I investigated the influence of niche parties’ programmatic profiles on their 
electoral performance. Previous research has focused on selected core issues, actions of 
mainstream competitors or concentrated on the relationship between changes in parties’ 
left-right-positions and their performance. This study adds to this research by analysing how 
nicheness and programmatic concentration take different effects on electoral performance 
over time. Both programmatic features refer to complete programmatic profiles of niche 
parties and account for the fact that these profiles might not be always just tailored to one 
issue and that parties might change their platforms over time. I complemented the concept of 
nicheness already present in the literature by introducing programmatic concentration as a 
second feature of parties’ programmatic offerings. Nicheness captures the degree of 
differences between the given party and its competitors and is therefore influenced by both 
sides. Against this, programmatic concentrations refers to the range of programmatic profiles, 
also to what degree parties just concentrate on few issues. Both features also connect to 
attributes present in niche party definitions.   
 
As the main theoretical contribution of the article, I connect the effects of programmatic 
features of niche parties on electoral performance to their electoral lifecycle. The core 
argument, here, is that effects of programmatic features of niche parties have different effects 
over time – a point not yet addressed in the literature on niche parties. Niche parties benefit 
from high levels of nicheness and programmatic concentration when they enter the electoral 
arena. A high nicheness contributes to a unique programmatic characteristic by which parties 
can present themselves as a clear alternative to platforms of existing parties. This effect 
should be most important when niche parties are new. Over time, this effect is expected to 
diminish once voters are familiar with the niche profile and might expect the party to deal 
with other issues as well. Additionally, persistent high levels of nicheness might also indicate 
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that competing parties do not evaluate the niche topics as promising and therefore stick to a 
dismissive strategy while the niche party itself is unable or unwilling to adapt its profile. 
Similar to nicheness, I argued that niche parties profit from high levels of programmatic 
concentration when they enter the electoral arena. High levels of programmatic concentration 
indicate that parties hold a clear message which is helpful to get the attention of (new) voters. 
However, this effect should diminish over time. The attention effect weakens once parties 
have established themselves in the electoral arena. Moreover, over time voters might expect a 
party to broaden its policy mix and integrate further issues into its program like, for example, 
valence issues.  
 
I tested these hypotheses for green and extreme right parties as these two party families are 
considered as typical cases of niche parties in the literature and started as new parties in 
established party systems. I used CMP data as a source for parties’ programmatic profiles. For 
capturing nicheness and programmatic concentration, two continuous measures were used, 
also for different handlings of original CMP data. In order to address statistical issues and to 
validate the results, I applied different statistical estimation techniques. Particularly, the 
SIMEX approach addressed the issue of measurement error in the programmatic variables. 
Despite the high correlation between nicheness and programmatic concentration, the first 
model including both variables indicated time-dependent effects. These effects found 
confirmation in the separate models in which nicheness as well as programmatic 
concentration also showed positive but diminishing effects on electoral performance. These 
results are consistent over different statistical estimations and confirm the hypotheses 
presented above. While it matters theoretically whether we think of nicheness only in terms of 
emphasis of overall topics or take into account that parties in some cases hold opposing 
positions regarding the same overall topic, this difference did not become visible in the results 
of this study (see aggregation of positive and negative CMP categories). The broad 
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aggregation according to CMP policy domains only revealed significant results for 
programmatic concentration as it levels differences between parties which matter for 
detaching nicheness.  
 
Overall, results of this study show that one cannot assume programmatic features of niche 
parties to have constant effects over time. Rather, the analysis of this study suggests to take 
account of the electoral lifecycle of parties when investigating effects of their programmatic 
features. This becomes particular important in the view of the fact that most niche parties 
considered in the literature start off as new parties. This study offers several avenues for 
further research. First of all, nicheness and programmatic concentration can be examined for 
all political parties in general. In addition to spatial models, they therefore represent an 
alternative conceptual toolbox to capture dynamics of party competition from a salience 
theoretical perspective. Secondly, as highlighted above, niche parties examined in this study 
began as new parties. In this context, it would be interesting to expand this kind of analysis to 
other types of new parties, especially to new parties which explicitly do not promote 
programmatic innovations but rather emulate existing parties and attack them on their 
programmatic ground (Lucardie 2000; Sikk 2011). Last and foremost, this study reminds us to 
consider the temporal dimension explicitly, when investigating the dynamics of party 
competition and the programmatic evolution of parties. 
 
 
NOTES
 
1 The causal direction between electoral performance and programmatic profiles of niche 
parties can go both ways. Taking the former as an independent variable, we can ask how 
electoral performance leads to changes in programmatic profiles (Meyer and Wagner 2013; 
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Somer-Topcu 2009). However, in this study, I take electoral performance as the dependent 
variable as I am interested in the question how it is affected by differences in programmatic 
profiles between parties and also over time. 
2 With certain qualifications, this is also true for Adams et al. (2006). Although their analysis 
rests on a spatial logic, they categorize niche parties according to party family membership 
(Adams et al. 2006: 513) which itself is linked to the emphasis of specific issues.  
3 Robertson (2006: 168) provides a useful description of how issues can relate to each other. 
4 Hino (2012: 24, 45) uses the term challenger parties instead of niche parties but his selection 
of parties follows programmatic emphases which are line with the niche party literature. Thus, 
his sample mainly consists of green and extreme right parties. 
5 Nevertheless, new parties can also promote issues and policies already addressed by existing 
parties. Purifiers (Lucardie 2000) and ‘Project-of-Newness’-parties (Sikk 2011) are examples 
for this kind of strategies which can be linked to competition over valence issues (Stokes 
1963).  
6 In the following, I use the initial abbreviation CMP. The empirical analysis is based on the 
2014b version of the dataset. 
7 I exclude the Austrian Freedom Party as it is not regarded as an extreme right party 
throughout its entire existence. Ignoring this mixed history would introduce a bias with regard 
to the arguments linked to the temporal dimension as the Austrian Freedom Party was not a 
new party when it started to be considered as an extreme right party by the literature. 
8 see: https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/questions. 
9 Data for this variable are also taken from the CMP dataset. 
10 In her theory, Meguid (2008: 26–7) makes a connection between salience theory and spatial 
approaches on party competition. Furthermore, Robertson (2006: 168) elaborates on the 
relationship of the concepts of issues and dimensions. 
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11 Coding reliability is another issue debated for CMP data. Very detailed coding schemes 
with many categories carry the danger of coding error. Although this concern speaks for 
broader and simpler schemes, aggregating categories in existing datasets does not solve this 
problem (Mikhaylov et al. 2012). 
12 These CMP policy domains consist of: external relations, freedom & democracy, political 
system, economy, welfare & quality of life, fabric of society and social groups (see CMP 
codebook,  
https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/down/documentation/codebook_MPDataset_MPDS2015a.pdf
, last accessed: 14 October 2015). 
13 This includes the category for uncoded (quasi-)sentences although this category can capture 
different issues between parties. However, excluding this category would mean to ignore 
these topics completely. 
14 Bischof (2015: 8) applies a different concentration index to certain parts of manifestos. I 
focus on concentration in complete programmatic profiles as a distinct feature and different 
from nicheness. 
15 For a comparison with the CMP approach towards error treatment see Meyer and Jenny 
(2013). As the CMP approach builds on time series which can be rather short in the case of 
niche parties, the approach of Benoit et al. seems appropriate in the context of this study. 
16 Numbers come from Democratic Electoral Systems (DES) dataset (Bormann and Golder 
2013). 
17 The dummy variable is based on the coding of federalism in the Comparative Political Data 
Set I 1960-2010 (Armingeon et al. 2012) which inter alia goes back to the Comparative 
Welfare Data Set (Huber et al. 2004).  
18 Economic variables, GDP per capita and unemployment rate, originate from the OECD 
(http://stats.oecd.org; Annual National Accounts; Labor Force Statistics). GDP is specified as 
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per capita, constant prices, constant PPPs with reference year 2005. Earlier unemployment 
figures for Denmark, France and Switzerland come from OECD Historical Statistics (1982; 
1991; 2002). 
19 Note that Braumoeller (2004: 811) in footnote 6 explicitly deals with the scenario of two 
interactions featuring a common moderating variable. 
20 See R help file for the SIMEX package. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Table A1: Regression results (positive and negative CMP categories aggregated). 
 
 M1 M2a M2b 
 OLS 
b (rob. SE) 
OLS 
b (rob. SE) 
SIMEX 
b (SE) 
OLS 
b (rob. SE) 
SIMEX 
b (SE) 
Nicheness 423.3713** 186.0350*** 238.6277***   
 (171.2312) (68.0962) (85.5125)   
Progr. conc. 119.5835***   35.4688*** 42.6904*** 
 (37.2706)   (9.8438) (13.8746) 
Election count 2.2792** 0.7278 1.0036** 0.2991 0.4254 
 (1.0657) (0.4990) (0.5017) (0.3804) (0.3136) 
Nich. * progr. conc. -2356.9019***     
 (851.1423)     
Nich. * elec. count -62.3108** -28.5067** -36.3597***   
 (30.6096) (12.2709) (13.8208)   
Progr. conc. * elec. count -18.8322**   -5.1840** -6.3723** 
 (9.1086)   (2.3706) (2.6516) 
Nich. * conc. * elec. count 373.7417**     
 (177.3480)     
Party type 3.8593*** 3.6060*** 3.8049*** 3.2639*** 3.3166*** 
 (1.1038) (1.1048) (1.0079) (1.0848) (0.9538) 
district magn. (log) -0.6340 -0.2301 -0.2196 -0.2523 -0.2455 
 (0.5998) (0.6012) (0.7026) (0.6068) (0.6874) 
Federalism -3.1646*** -2.4416** -2.7259 -2.2932** -2.4254 
 (1.1178) (1.0075) (2.1946) (0.8809) (2.1190) 
GDP per capita 0.0004*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Unempl. rate 0.1675 0.1417 0.1522 0.1716 0.1821 
 (0.1410) (0.1352) (0.1506) (0.1414) (0.1505) 
Lagged DV 0.2589** 0.3221** 0.3231*** 0.2918** 0.2862*** 
 (0.1267) (0.1252) (0.0898) (0.1274) (0.0896) 
Intercept -23.2765*** -11.3682*** -13.3059*** -9.6194*** -10.5016*** 
 (6.6153) (4.2459) (4.3501) (3.6181) (3.5842) 
Country dummies  included included included included included 
Adj. R2 0.54 0.52  0.53  
Num. obs. 119 119 119 119 119 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
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Table A2: Regression results (CMP categories aggregated according to 7 CMP policy domains). 
 
 M1 M2a M2b 
 OLS 
b (rob. SE) 
OLS 
b (rob. SE) 
SIMEX 
b (SE) 
OLS 
b (rob. SE) 
SIMEX 
b (SE) 
Nicheness 140.8612 28.3287 30.0881   
 (87.0682) (26.1598) (30.1974)   
Progr. conc. 85.4024***   29.7982** 45.2493*** 
 (29.2773)   (12.9814) (16.8045) 
Election count 2.9266** 0.2418 0.2632 0.7520 1.2730** 
 (1.4175) (0.4459) (0.4351) (0.6875) (0.6243) 
Nich. * progr. conc. -571.0368**     
 (284.6690)     
Nich. * elec. count -25.0748* -6.1160 -6.3691   
 (13.6090) (4.2581) (4.7329)   
Progr. conc. * elec. count -13.0099**   -4.2596* -6.4474** 
 (5.5295)   (2.5086) (2.5846) 
Nich. * conc. * elec. count 93.5555*     
 (48.9369)     
Party type 3.7995*** 3.5723*** 3.5901*** 3.0121*** 3.0683*** 
 (1.0967) (1.1937) (1.0761) (1.0252) (0.9726) 
district magn. (log) -0.3843 -0.3333 -0.3390 -0.2282 -0.1989 
 (0.6824) (0.6055) (0.7140) (0.5969) (0.6982) 
Federalism -2.6756** -1.5393 -1.5547 -2.3964*** -2.8712 
 (1.1049) (0.9721) (2.2067) (0.8938) (2.1872) 
GDP per capita 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Unempl. rate 0.1897 0.1423 0.1440 0.1417 0.1596 
 (0.1466) (0.1412) (0.1557) (0.1408) (0.1521) 
Lagged DV 0.3268*** 0.3220** 0.3221*** 0.3489*** 0.3611*** 
 (0.1241) (0.1277) (0.0919) (0.1260) (0.0950) 
Intercept -25.8941*** -6.3641* -6.4917* -12.1666** -16.1347*** 
 (8.6144) (3.6140) (3.7685) (4.7212) (5.2109) 
Country dummies  included included included included included 
Adj. R2 0.52 0.49  0.51  
Num. obs. 119 119 119 119 119 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
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Abstract 
New parties play an important role in democracies as they provide unrepresented and 
unsatisfied voters with an alternative. The literature on new parties assumes that they can 
benefit from the poor representation of parts of the electorate by existing parties. This strand 
of research provides plausible results, but it operates on the macro level, which is problematic 
for theoretical and methodological reasons. We overcome these problems by performing a 
multilevel analysis of the vote choice between new parties, existing parties and abstention. 
We formulate multiple hypotheses on the effects of the programmatic supply of existing 
parties and voter-related determinants on voting behavior. A multilevel analysis of 20 
elections in parliamentary democracies confirms our main expectation that a declining 
programmatic diversity of existing parties increases the probability of voting for a new party. 
This finding indicates that new parties can at least partially accommodate non-represented 
voters and ensure their electoral participation. 
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1. Introduction 
In developed democracies, parties compete for votes by offering policies to the voters during 
elections. When the electoral market is working, voters find an attractive policy offer for 
which they are prepared to vote. In a functioning electoral market, the emergence of new 
parties addressing the unfulfilled demands of voters plays an important role. They represent 
the capacity of democracies for programmatic innovation and prevent the long-term  
dissatisfaction of voters who feel poorly represented by the existing parties (Bartolini 1999: 
452/457; Bartolini 2000: 58–9; Hindmoor 2008; Franzmann 2011: 330; Zons 2013). If parties 
continuously fail to meet the programmatic demand of voters, the latter might turn completely 
away from elections and undermine the legitimacy of the parties and democracy more 
broadly. The literature about the formation and success of new political parties assumes that 
they can benefit from the poor representation of parts of the electorate by existing parties 
(Hauss and Rayside 1978: 38; Harmel and Robertson 1985: 502; Lago and Martinez 2010).  
 
Thus far, research on new parties has operated on the macro level by focusing on institutional 
effects (Willey 1998), the consequences of the programmatic supply of existing and new 
parties (Hug 2001; Hino 2012; Zons 2013), and by using aggregated macro variables to 
measure voter preferences and behavior (Hug 2001: 88–99; Tavits 2006). This strand of 
research provides valuable insights, but there are multiple reasons for a multilevel analysis of 
individual vote choices on new parties that enter party competition. Regarding the effects of 
institutions, we observe substantial variation in the emergence and success of new parties 
within countries (Tavits 2006: 107; Zons 2013: 4). Institutions are largely invariant over time 
and cannot explain longitudinal within-country variance. With respect to the programmatic 
supply of existing parties, it is plausible that this is a major determinant in explaining the 
emergence and success of new parties. The latter are likely to be founded when political 
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actors perceive that existing parties fail to address salient issues in the electorate (Hauss and 
Rayside 1978: 46; Harmel and Robertson 1985: 502). The emergence of Green parties in the 
1980s and Extreme Right Parties are the prime examples of this line of reasoning (Müller‐
Rommel 1982; Ignazi 1992; Hino 2012: 153).  
 
However, macro-level studies that link the programmatic supply of existing parties to the 
emergence of new parties put the voters in a black box and do not empirically examine 
whether a new party can attract parts of the electorate. Three reasons render it fallacious to 
infer from the emergence of new parties at elections that they will successfully appeal to 
voters. First, the new party might misread the programmatic demand of voters and fail to 
address discontent voters. Second, the programmatic supply of existing parties might be 
homogeneous and issues may remain unaddressed, but these issues are not important to the 
voters and there are no dissatisfied voters to whom the new party could appeal. Third, the new 
party acts as a policy entrepreneur and offers policies for which it has to stimulate demand in 
the medium run (Zons 2013: 3; De Vries and Hobolt 2012). Macro-level studies (Hino 2012) 
that link the programmatic offers of existing parties to the electoral success of new parties do 
not suffer from these problems. Electoral success implies that a new party receives a 
sufficiently large number of votes, i.e., there is indirect evidence for supportive voter 
behavior. However, such studies have to make cross-level inferences and draw conclusions 
about voters based on macro-level results. They suffer from well-known problems of 
ecological inference (King 1997) that threaten the validity of causal inferences on voter 
behavior. For these reasons, an empirical individual-level analysis of the interplay between 
the programmatic profile of existing parties and individual vote choices for new and existing 
parties is in order. We formulate multiple hypotheses on the effects of the programmatic 
supply of existing parties and voter-related determinants on the voters’ choice between new 
parties, existing parties and abstention. Our main hypothesis is that a decreasing diversity of 
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the existing parties’ programmatic supply increases the probability of voters opting for a new 
party. We use data from the European Social Survey and Comparative Manifesto Project to 
test the hypotheses in a multilevel model comprising 20 elections in parliamentary 
democracies from 1999 to 2010. The main hypothesis finds empirical confirmation and the 
results are robust to different model specifications. This finding underlines the importance of 
the existing parties’ programmatic profiles for voter behavior and the prospects of new 
parties. Moreover, our study points to the essential role of new parties for parliamentary 
democracies as they provide voters with an alternative when existing parties fail to address 
parts of the electorate. 
2. New parties at national elections: review 
The distinction between the supply and demand side of the political market has been central to 
the literature on the formation and success of new political parties. On the supply side, the 
behavior of existing parties represents the prime factor in the analysis (Hauss and Rayside 
1978; Harmel and Robertson 1985; Hug 2001; Tavits 2008; Lago and Martinez 2010; Hino 
2012; Zons 2013). Apart from general features of party systems and party competition such as 
party system size or the dimensional structure of the policy space (Harmel and Robertson 
1985: 505), in recent years, studies on new parties have taken a more direct look on parties’ 
programmatic behavior. Hug (2001) develops a game-theoretical model which describes the 
interaction between existing and (potential) new parties. Following this, Zons (2013) shows 
that a lower programmatic diversity of existing parties increases the probability of the 
emergence of genuinely new parties. In a similar vein, the niche party literature investigates 
the effects of the programmatic behavior of existing parties on the fate of these parties 
(Meguid 2005; 2008; Hino 2012). 
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With regard to the demand side of the political market, early research focused on societal 
cleavages (Hauss and Rayside 1978; Harmel and Robertson 1985). In follow-up analyses, the 
idea of “new issues” entering the political market was introduced, but was only captured by 
crude proxies in empirical terms such as, for example, economic performance indicators and 
indicators for social diversity (Hug 2001: 55f; 88; Tavits 2006). 
 
The supply and demand sides of the political market have been studied on their own terms, 
but the interplay between them plays a central role in the theory about the formation and 
success of new parties. Here, the rise and prospering of new parties are the result of the failure 
of existing parties to address programmatic demands present in the electorate (Hauss and 
Rayside 1978: 46). Harmel and Robertson (1985: 502) refer to this as ‘representational 
needs’, whereas Lago and Martinez (2010: 7) describe these mismatches as ‘electoral market 
failure’. All these studies share the at least implicit assumption that new parties automatically 
profit from mismatches between programmatic supply by existing parties and demands in the 
electorate. However, this does not necessarily need to be the case. First, the dissatisfaction of 
voters might have already reached levels at which they completely turn their backs on parties. 
Second, it is not guaranteed that new parties offer policies which are suitable for overcoming 
electoral market failure because the new party might misinterpret the demand for a new 
contender. Third, the new party might not want to address the mismatch in the short run. De 
Vries and Hobolt (2012) and Zons (2013: 3) describe an entrepreneurial type of programmatic 
innovation which aims at generating demands in the electorate that were previously 
non-existing or non-salient.  
 
These studies share that their units of analysis are parties or party systems. Although voters 
play a central role on the theoretical level, they do not figure in empirical analyses or only in 
form of aggregated macro variables. The multilevel nature of electoral market failure is 
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empirically ignored, which can give rise to the well-known problems of cross-level causal 
inferences (King 1997). Our review of research on the occurrence and success of new parties 
points to blind spots that need to be addressed. First, we should take into consideration that 
neither electoral market failures due to the supply side, nor new programmatic demands on 
the side of voters are sufficient for the appeal of new parties to voters. This might be the case, 
but we find it more plausible to assume that demand and supply side factors both matter. 
Voter demand for new issues should have different consequences on vote choice depending 
on the state of programmatic supply, and vice versa. Second, as voter behavior depends on 
programmatic supply as a party-system variable, its explanation requires a multilevel theory 
and statistical multilevel analysis. 
3. New parties and vote choice: hypotheses  
Our analysis of vote choices for new parties is based on two assumptions. First, we assume 
that the programmatic behavior of parties and voters is best couched in terms of salience 
theory (Robertson 1976; Budge and Farlie 1983; Dolezal et al. 2014), which, in recent years, 
has become more important in party research (Jensen 2010; Meyer and Müller 2013; e.g. 
Steenbergen and Scott 2004). Salience theory has a high level of plausibility in our context 
because usually, new parties only emphasize a small number of issues in order to become 
owners of these issues and receive an advantage in the electoral market (Guinaudeau and 
Persico 2013). Second, in formulating the hypotheses, we presume that voters evaluate 
existing parties based on a comparison of their own policy demand and the available party 
platforms. The assumption of programmatic linkage excludes other forms of party-voter 
linkage such as clientelism (Kitschelt 2000). This premise is justified for our analysis, which 
draws on consolidated Western democracies where programmatic linkage has traditionally 
been strong. Voters might also judge new parties programmatically, but, as we argue below, 
one also needs to take into account that voters might vote for new parties based on valence-
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related reasons such as presenting itself as an anti-establishment party. In the sensitivity 
analysis, we further discuss that voter behavior might additionally be subject to strategic 
concerns. 
 
Our theoretical and empirical unit of analysis is the vote choice of an individual voter. We 
distinguish three types of behavior: abstention, voting for an existing party and voting for a 
new party. We define a new party as one that runs for votes at a given election for the first 
time.1 An existing party is defined as a party that participates in an election for at least the 
second time. The set of existing parties can be a heterogeneous group comprising parties 
competing for votes the second time or the tenth time. We consider this distinction justified 
because the attractiveness of a new party flows from its newness, which pertains to its first 
occurrence at an election. A party that offers a platform for the second time can no longer 
claim a newness bonus and we assume that voters judge new parties and all other parties 
differently when making a vote choice. We exclusively focus on elections that involved new 
parties because we want to study the effects of programmatic diversity given that voters can 
vote for new contenders. 
 
The party-system variable on which we focus is the programmatic supply of existing parties 
in terms of the diversity of their policy offers. Our premise for all hypotheses is that a voter 
makes a vote choice in light of the existing parties’ programmatic diversity. High 
programmatic diversity of existing parties means that they cover a broad range of issues. The 
broader the programmatic supply, the more likely it is that a voter perceives herself to be 
represented by one of the existing parties and vote for it. There is no reason to run the risk of 
switching to a new party when a voter feels programmatically represented by an existing one. 
                                                 
1 According to the definition given by Hug (2001: 14), we count splits from existing parties 
and genuinely new parties as new parties, whereas fusions and electoral alliances are not 
regarded as new parties. 
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Voting for a new party is risky because it is uncertain whether it will make it into the 
parliament (see below) and how reliable the new party is in terms of its offered policies and 
longevity (Bolleyer 2007; Bolleyer and Bytzek 2013). However, when existing parties feature 
a low programmatic diversity and the platforms become more homogeneous, it is more likely 
that a voter does not feel represented. New parties can seize the opportunity and address 
unrepresented voters in two complementary ways. First, a new party can put issues that are 
demanded by parts of the electorate high on their political agenda. This line of reasoning 
resonates with arguments about the emergence of new parties. For example, Zons (2013: 3) 
argues that a low level of programmatic diversity creates room for programmatic innovation 
by a new party that can appeal to discontent voters. Second, the party can follow a valence-
oriented strategy and try to build on the discontent of non-represented voters by establishing a 
reputation as an anti-establishment party. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The higher the programmatic diversity of existing parties, the less likely it is 
that a voter votes for a new party as opposed to an existing party. 
 
There is a second way in which decreasing programmatic diversity of existing parties might 
influence voting behavior. Following our assumption of programmatic linkage, we 
hypothesize that a decreasing programmatic diversity increases the probability of non-voting. 
An increased probability of non-voting can pertain to voters who are considering voting, but 
cannot identify a satisfactory programmatic offer that meets their demands. Alternatively and 
on a more general level, a voter might be discontent with the functioning of party competition 
and the political system and lose the general will to cast its vote for any party. This argument 
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ties in with the literature that regards abstention as an expression of voters’ dissatisfaction 
with parties (Hortala-Vallve and Esteve-Volart 2011).2  
 
Hypothesis 2: The higher the programmatic diversity of existing parties, the less likely it is 
that a voter abstains as opposed to voting for an existing party. 
 
Taking together hypotheses 1 and 2, decreasing heterogeneity should make abstention and 
voting for a new party more likely. Ideally, we would be able to distinguish non-represented 
voters who are more likely to abstain from voters who are more likely to vote for the new 
party when diversity decreases. Theoretically, the probability of voting for a new party should 
increase when the voter feels programmatically attracted to the new party or finds its anti-
establishment strategy appealing. Decreasing programmatic diversity should increase the 
probability of non-voting if neither of the mechanisms of attraction apply. Empirically, the 
problem is that cross-national survey data do not include items allowing us to distinguish 
types of voters along these lines. Consequently, we formulate two general hypotheses 
predicting that both voting for a new party and abstention should increase when diversity 
declines. 
 
With regard to individual-level determinants of vote choice, we expect that the voters’ 
decisions between abstention, voting for an existing party and voting for a new party should 
be influenced by their general party preference. The general preference in turn should be 
driven by a voter’s party identification, his judgment of competencies related to valence 
issues (Stokes 1963) and the perception of party candidates and leaders (Enelow and Hinich 
                                                 
2 Hypotheses 1 and 2 do not contradict each other because the outcome has three categories 
and we run a multinomial model estimating the effects of heterogeneity on the probability of 
abstention relative to voting for an existing party, and on the probability of voting for a new 
party relative to voting for an existing party (see below). 
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1982). If the individual has already developed a general affinity to a new party, this should 
increase the probability that this person will vote for this new party. If the voter is attached to 
neither a new party nor an existing party, the probability of abstention should increase 
compared to voting for either type of party. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Voters who feel close to a new party are more likely to vote for that new party 
as opposed to abstention and voting for an existing party. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Voters who do not feel close to new or existing parties are more likely to 
abstain as opposed to voting for a new party and an existing party. 
 
Our second theoretical expectation on individual-level determinants of voting behavior 
pertains to political information. New parties usually dispose of fewer resources than existing 
parties for drawing voter attention on a large scale. Voters therefore need to consume more 
political information in order to perceive the emergence of new parties and their 
programmatic profile. Voters who inform themselves about everyday politics should have a 
higher probability of knowing that there is a new contender in the political arena and its 
profile, which is in turn a prerequisite for casting a vote for a new party and should increase 
the probability of voting for it, on average. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Voters with a higher level of political information are more likely to vote for a 
new party as opposed to an existing party or abstaining. 
 
Correspondingly, the less informed voters are about party competition, the less likely it is that 
they will collect relevant information about the occurrence of a new party and its platform. 
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We expect that a decreasing level of political information makes abstention more likely in 
comparison with voting for any type of party.  
 
Hypothesis 6: Voters with a lower level of political information are more likely to abstain as 
opposed to voting for an existing party or a new party. 
 
The level of political information of an individual voter is critical to their awareness of new 
political parties. In addition, we expect that the degree of political information moderates the 
perception of the programmatic supply of existing parties and vice versa. The programmatic 
diversity of existing parties can only influence a voter’s decision if that voter is actually 
informed about their policy offers. This leads us to argue that the effect of programmatic 
diversity on vote choice is moderated by a voter’s level of political information. Building on 
hypotheses 1 and 2, the more informed a voter is, the more amplified the effect of 
programmatic diversity on vote choice should be.  
 
Hypothesis 7: The higher a voter’s level of political information, the stronger the negative 
effect of programmatic heterogeneity on voting for a new party as opposed to an existing 
party becomes.3  
 
Hypothesis 8: The higher a voter’s level of political information, the stronger the negative 
effect of programmatic heterogeneity on abstaining as opposed to voting for an existing party 
becomes. 
 
                                                 
3 Since the non-moderated effect of heterogeneity is negative, a larger effect means that it 
becomes more negative with increasing levels of political information.  
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In addition to the moderating effect of information on the effect of heterogeneity, we argue 
that heterogeneity moderates the effect of political information on vote choice. The higher the 
programmatic diversity of the existing parties, the less political information is needed to 
notice programmatic differences among them. In contrast, the demands with regard to 
political information rise, the more similar party platforms become because it is more difficult 
to identify differences between them.4  
 
Hypothesis 9: The higher the level of programmatic diversity, the smaller the positive effect of 
political information on voting for a new party as opposed to voting for an existing party 
becomes. 
 
Hypothesis 10: The higher the level of programmatic diversity, the larger the negative effect 
of political information on abstention as opposed to voting for an existing party becomes 
.4. Data and empirical strategy 
4.1 Data 
The dependent variable is the vote choice of an individual and has three categories: 
abstention, voting for a new party, and voting for an existing party. The outcome and all other 
individual-level variables are taken from the first five waves of the European Social Survey 
(2002; 2004; 2006; 2008; 2010). The voter types are distinguished based on the item vote and 
we derive the type of party from the items prtvt* (* is a placeholder for the country-election 
abbreviations in the ESS). The appendix to this paper contains the list of parties that we 
classified as new for a given election and that we used to identify voters of new parties. We 
                                                 
4 Gerber et al. (2014) make a similar argument when describing the interaction between the 
clarity of parties’ profiles and the political sophistication of individual voters. 
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determined new and existing parties covered by the ESS by cross-checking their names with 
various sources on the parties’ participation at elections.5 
 
We operationalize the programmatic diversity of existing parties with a measure for 
programmatic heterogeneity proposed by Franzmann (2008).6 It is calculated based on the 
Manifesto Research Group/Comparative Manifestos Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR, 
henceforth CMP) coding of quasi-sentences in party manifestos according to a pre-specified 
coding scheme consisting of 56 categories (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006; 
Volkens et al. 2013). The unit of analysis of the CMP data is the party-election year. Each of 
the 56 categories is linked to one political issue; an additional 57th category captures 
quasi-sentences that do not fit into one of the 56 categories. The CMP raw numbers contained 
in each category denote the percentages of quasi-sentences belonging to each issue and 
represent the salience a party attaches to an issue.7 The formula we use for calculating the 
programmatic heterogeneity of existing parties in country c for the election at time t reads: 
ܪ݁ݐ௖௧ =
1
57 − ݖ∑ ݏ௜௖௧
ଶହ଻ି௭
௜ୀଵ
ඥ݊௣௖௧
 
                                                 
5 As a starting point, we consulted Wikipedia for each election in Western Europe covered in 
ESS rounds 1 to 5 and then used additional sources in order to verify information, including 
national official sources, Nohlen and Stöver (2010) as well as http://www.parties-and-
elections.eu/. 
6 See Zons (2013) for a recent application of this measure in a macro study about the 
formation of new parties. 
7 See Volkens (2001) for a detailed description of the coding procedure. Although the CMP 
approach is based on salience theory (Robertson 1976; Budge and Farlie 1983), its coding 
scheme compromises non-positional and positional categories, i.e., positive and negative 
mentions (McDonald and Mendez 2001). As differences between parties can relate to the 
overall emphasis of issues as well as to positions taken on issues, we use the full range of 
information provided by the CMP data. We ensure comparability because the measure of 
programmatic heterogeneity is applied uniformly across elections and countries.  
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The categories of the CMP coding scheme are denoted by i. ݏ௜௖௧ଶ  is the variance of the salience 
of item i across all existing parties in country c at election t.8 In total, the numerator captures 
the mean variance across all items i at an election in a country. We exclude categories that 
have zero mean variance, denoted by z, which are items that have not been mentioned by 
existing parties at a given election. A look at the zero-categories shows that at least some of 
the non-addressed issues such as ‘anti-imperialism’ are not likely to be demanded by the 
electorate and picked up by new parties in current times. The inclusion of such issues would 
result in a lower mean item-variance and underestimate the degree of diversity. We decide for 
a conservative measurement strategy by leaving zero-categories aside and assess the 
robustness of the results to the use of different diversity measures in our sensitivity analyses. 
The final heterogeneity score is obtained by standardizing the mean variance of salience 
scores by the square root of the number of existing parties at an election (݊௣௖௧).9  
 
The individual-level measure for party attachment is the item prtcl*. The item asks which 
party the respondent feels closer to, with the option of saying that it is none of the parties. 
Based on the identification of new parties, we coded respondents as feeling closer to a new 
party, an existing party or to no party. The response that one does not feel closer to any party 
does not necessarily mean that a person does not feel attached to any party, as one might also 
get the response when the voter feels equally attached to multiple parties. However, we 
consider it more plausible to assume that respondents give this answer when they do not feel 
attached to any party. The base category is ‘feeling closer to an existing party’ and we add a 
‘feel closer to new party’-dummy and a ‘feel closer to no party’-dummy to the models. 
                                                 
8 The ESS includes more parties than the CMP because the latter only contains parties that 
entered the parliament. Still, the CMP-based heterogeneity score is a reasonable proxy for our 
purposes because the voters’ assessment of programmatic diversity in a country is likely to be 
based on the major parties’ platforms that are covered by the CMP. 
9 The denominator serves to account for the number of parties for which programmatic 
differences are considered (Franzmann 2008: 19–20). 
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The variable ‘political information’ builds on the items measuring the consumption of 
political information via television (tvpol), radio, (rdpol), and newspapers (nwsppol). Each 
item asks for the time that a respondent uses the specific medium per week. We measure a 
respondent’s degree of political information by taking the maximum level of information 
across all three media, as we are interested in the level of information and not the specific 
medium.10 The scale of the political-information variable runs from zero to seven, with seven 
representing the highest score. In the basic model, we additionally include individual 
measures for age, gender, employment relations and cognitive capacities. Detailed 
information on these control variables and the previously discussed variables is summarized 
in table 2. Based on this data, our models include 29048 individuals in 20 elections that are 
distributed across 13 parliamentary democracies over the period 1998 to 2010 (see figure 1 
and 2). We describe the data for new-party voters and programmatic heterogeneity in more 
detail at the beginning of section five, which covers the empirical analysis. Descriptive 
statistics for the other data are presented in the appendix. 
 
4.2. Empirical strategy and expectations about parameters 
We are interested in the relationship between systemic as well as individual-level variables 
and a trichotomous outcome that is located on the individual level. This calls for the 
estimation of a multinomial multilevel model in order to avoid the pitfalls inherent in the 
analysis of aggregated micro data (Steenbergen and Jones 2002).11 We take voting for an 
existing party as the base category and estimate the marginal effects of a covariate on the 
                                                 
10 We do not consider it meaningful to add the amount of consumption. We believe that when 
a respondent spends three hours watching TV, listening to the radio and reading the 
newspapers, there is much overlap in terms of the information that is acquired. Combining 
levels of consumption would overestimate the actual degree of consumption. 
11 We estimate the models with the gllamm-routine using Stata 13.1 (Rabe-Hesketh et al. 
2004). 
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probability of abstention and the probability of voting for a new party relative to the base. 
Level 2 represents the election-level and features the election-specific variable ‘programmatic 
heterogeneity of existing parties’. Level 3 represents the country level and takes into account 
that multiple elections held in the same country might not be independent of each other.12 
 
We summarize our expectations on the coefficient estimates in table 1 and present the 
expectations for each pairwise comparison of vote choices covered by our hypotheses. The 
entry ‘none’ signals that we do not have a theoretical expectation for this comparison of 
alternatives. 
 
Table 1: Expectations about parameters 
Variable Voting for new party vs existing party 
Abstention vs voting 
for existing party 
Voting for new party 
vs abstention 
Programmatic 
heterogeneity 
- 
(Hypothesis 1) 
- 
(Hypothesis 2) None 
Close to new party + (Hypothesis 3) None 
+ 
(Hypothesis 3) 
Close to no party None + (Hypothesis 4) 
- 
(Hypothesis 4) 
Political information + (Hypothesis 5) 
- 
(Hypothesis 6) 
+ 
(Hypothesis 6) 
Heterogeneity x 
information 
- 
(Hypothesis 7, 9) 
- 
(Hypothesis 8, 10) None 
 
We follow the advice of estimating multilevel models that are made increasingly complex in a 
stepwise fashion (Hox 2010: 54–9). In the article, we present the estimates for the empty 
model and the relevant models with covariates and refer the reader to the appendix for the 
report of all models and estimates. Model 1 (see table 3) below is an empty model that
                                                 
12 We estimate random effects on the country level as opposed to fixed effects because we do 
not limit our inferences to the countries under analysis. 
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Table 2: Concepts, operationalization and sources13 
Concept Indicator Operationalization Source 
voting decision (dependent variable) vote at the last election 0 – abstention 
1 – vote for an existing party (reference category) 
2 – vote for a new party  
ESS item 
prtvt* – party voted for in last national 
election   
general party attachment closeness to a party close to a new party (0 – no; 1 – yes) 
close to no party (0 – no; 1 – yes) 
reference category: close to existing party 
ESS item  
prtcl* – which party feel closer to 
political information political consumption maximal hours spent on acquiring political 
information among TV, radio and newspaper per 
weekday 
0 – no time 
1 – less than 0.5 hours 
2 – 0.5 hour to 1 hour 
3 – more than 1 hour, up to 1.5 hours 
4 – more than 1.5 hours, up to 2 hours 
5 – more than 2 hours, up to 2.5 hours 
6 – more than 2.5 hours, up to 3 hours 
7 – more than 3 hours 
ESS items  
tvpol – TV watching, 
news/politics/current affairs on average 
weekday 
rdpol – radio listening, 
news/politics/current affairs on average 
weekday 
nwsppol - Newspaper reading, 
politics/current affairs on average 
weekday 
cognitive capacities level of education 0 – lower secondary education or lower (ISCED 0-2) 
(reference category) 
1 – upper secondary education or higher 
(ISCED 3-5) 
ESS item  
edulvla – highest level of education 
age age age ESS item  
agea  - age of respondent, calculated 
gender gender 1 – male; 2 – female (reference category) ESS item gndr – gender 
employment status employment status unemployment 
0 – no (reference category); 1 – yes 
ESS item  
emplrel – employment relation 
programmatic supply of existing parties programmatic diversity of 
existing parties 
programmatic heterogeneity 
higher score mean larger heterogeneity 
(minimum = 0 when all parties have exact the same 
programmatic profile) 
Manifesto Research Group / Comparative 
Manifestos Group (CMP) (Klingemann 
et al. 2006; Volkens et al. 2013)  
 
                                                 
13 We do not include an income variable because of too many missings. 
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estimates the random intercepts on the election-level and country-level (Snijders, Tom A. B 
and Bosker 2012: 46–8).14 Model 2 includes the individual-level variables that are estimated 
as fixed effects. Model 3 adds programmatic diversity as an election-level variable. Model 4 
is a fully specified model according to our hypotheses and contains a cross-level interaction 
between heterogeneity and political information that is then estimated as random slopes.15 We 
run deviance tests comparing the more complex model to the simpler (see appendix). For all 
comparisons of models in the main analysis, the deviance test is significant, suggesting that 
the complexification of a model is warranted.16 
 
We do not weight observations because we are interested in model-based inference as 
opposed to design-based inference (Snijders, Tom A. B and Bosker 2012: 216–31). Model-
based inference is concerned with finding the appropriate “data generating mechanism” 
(Snijders, Tom A. B and Bosker 2012: 217) for the dependent variable and can include 
additional variables related to the survey design and potentially connected to the outcome. In 
addition, model-based analyses seek to generalize inferences beyond the sample at hand 
(Snijders, Tom A. B and Bosker 2012: 216; 223; 225-231; Heeringa et al. 2014: 245–6). We 
follow the model-based approach because of our interest in modeling the data-generating 
process and generalizing the results. We do not use weights in the estimation procedure, but 
                                                 
14 The estimation of an empty model often includes the calculation of the intraclass coefficient 
(ICC) serving as an indicator for the degree of variation which is due to the upper level. 
However, for multinomial outcomes, there exists one ICC per outcome category that is more 
difficult to interpret than for models with a continuous outcome (Hedeker 2008: 255–6; 
Twisk, Jos W. R. 2006: 46). Since we perform deviance tests, we do not report the ICCs. 
15 The appendix contains the results for a model with political information estimated as 
random slopes without the interaction term. 
16 A deviance test comparing the cross-level interaction model with a random-slopes model 
for political information is not significant (see appendix). A full stepwise complexification of 
the models indicates that the cross-level interaction is not warranted, which is confirmed by 
our results (see below). 
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add the ESS design weight as a control variable in the robustness analysis for determining the 
sensitivity of our results toward weighting (Heeringa et al. 2014: 250).17 
 
Finally, we choose to not center the variables ‘political information’ and ‘programmatic 
heterogeneity’ that constitute the cross-level interaction. The rationale for centering is to 
avoid misinterpretation of the marginal effects of the two constitutive variables (Dalal and 
Zickar 2012). Misinterpretation can occur when a variable has no zero point or a zero point 
which is unlikely to be observed empirically (programmatic heterogeneity). However, the 
political science literature on interaction models dealt with this issue in great detail in the 
2000s and raised our awareness of it (Brambor et al. 2006). We use the original scores 
because estimation with non-centered variables does not create econometric problems and the 
mean of the variables is of no theoretical interest to us (which would be the zero point after 
centering). 
5. Empirical analysis 
We begin our empirical analysis with descriptive insights on new-party voters and 
programmatic heterogeneity. Figure 1 presents the distribution of new-party voters across 
elections. It shows that the new party voters are unevenly distributed across elections. A low 
number of new-party votes per election is not a problem per se for the estimation of multilevel 
models (Snijders, Tom A. B and Bosker 2012: 56). However, relying on the data of one new-
party voter for a given election or a very large number such as for the Netherlands in 2002 
creates concerns about the sensitivity of the results towards the inclusion of these elections 
                                                 
17 The models are estimated without robust standard errors clustered by countries. Cluster-
robust standard errors improve estimation with a large number of units on the level at which 
the clusters are located which is the country level in our analysis. The recommendation is to 
have at least 100 units (Hox 2010: 216). Since we do not have that many countries, we do not 
estimate robust standard errors because the costs in terms of efficiency would outstrip the 
benefits. 
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because they have larger weight than elections with a small number of new-party voters 
(Snijders, Tom A. B and Bosker 2012: 56). We will return to this issue in the sensitivity 
analysis. 
 
Figure 1: Voters of new parties across elections 
 
 
Figure 2 presents the scores for programmatic heterogeneity across elections. The distribution 
varies within and across countries which is variation we exploit for our empirical analysis. 
The outstanding heterogeneity score for Israel in 1999 equally creates concerns about the 
robustness of the results which we will assess below. 
 
The estimates for models 1 through 4 are presented in table 3. Model 3 includes the central 
explanatory variable programmatic heterogeneity, the two individual-level determinants and 
 
 
6
4
35
10
282
10
40
45
20
1
25
17
28
7
8
124
26
1
23
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
Number of new-party voters
NO
NL
LU
IT
IL
GR
FI
ES
DK
CH
BE
AT
2001
2010
2006
2003
2002
1999
2001
1999
2004
2007
2008
2007
2007
1999
2010
2007
2003
1999
2006
 20 
 
Figure 2: Programmatic heterogeneity across elections 
 
 
voter-related control variables. The estimates confirm hypothesis 1 because voting for a new 
party as opposed to an existing party becomes significantly less likely with increasing 
heterogeneity. The probability of voting for a new party increases by a factor of 1.14 per one-
unit decrease in heterogeneity.18 The effect of heterogeneity on abstention compared to voting 
for an existing party is positive and the opposite of what we expected in hypothesis 2. While 
statistically significant, the marginal effect is substantively small because a one-unit decrease 
in heterogeneity increases the probability of abstention only by a factor of 1.03. On the 
individual level, the estimate for the dummy variable indicating closeness to a new party 
confirms hypothesis 3. The marginal effect is significantly positive and large, as the 
probability of voting for a new party is about 330 times larger for voters who feel close to a 
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Table 3: Regression results 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
New-party voters     
Constant -3.799*** -4.226*** -3.682*** -3.924*** 
 (0.043) (0.198) (0.203) (0.218) 
Close to no party  1.700*** 1.669*** 1.670*** 
  (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) 
Close to new party  5.737*** 5.800*** 5.792*** 
  (0.152) (0.154) (0.154) 
Political information  0.072** 0.077** 0.062 
  (0.027) (0.027) (0.040) 
Cognitive capacity  -0.317*** -0.247** -0.259** 
  (0.095) (0.095) (0.095) 
Age  -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Male  0.119 0.104 0.105 
  (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) 
Unemployed  -0.173 -0.160 -0.142 
  (0.194) (0.196) (0.196) 
Programmatic heterogeneity   -0.130*** -0.079* 
   (0.021) (0.039) 
Progr. het. * political information    -0.005 
    (0.011) 
Non-voters     
Constant -1.691*** -0.278*** -0.111 -0.365*** 
 (0.025) (0.071) (0.073) (0.080) 
Close to no party  1.339*** 1.344*** 1.344*** 
  (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Close to new party  1.492*** 1.493*** 1.488*** 
  (0.185) (0.185) (0.185) 
Political information  -0.105*** -0.107*** -0.118*** 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.020) 
Cognitive capacity  -0.789*** -0.772*** -0.784*** 
  (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) 
Age  -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.025*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Male  0.096** 0.094** 0.099** 
  (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Unemployed  0.709*** 0.694*** 0.714*** 
  (0.055) (0.055) (0.056) 
Programmatic heterogeneity   0.027*** 0.075*** 
   (0.006) (0.011) 
Progr. het. * political information    -0.005 
    (0.004) 
Random estimates     
Intercept-variance level 1 0.192 0.039 0.109 0.002 
 (0.023) (0.007) (0.015) (0.006) 
Slope-variance  
 political information 
   0.008 
   (0.003) 
Covariance random intercepts 
and slopes level 1 
   0.003 
   (0.002) 
Intercept-variance level 2 0.371 0.438 0.125 0.182 
 (0.029) (0.047) (0.012) (0.016) 
Log-likelihood -17834.09 -14588.04 -14549.96 -14540.85 
N 29969 29048 29048 29048 
Estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) in log-odds form; p < .05 *; p < .01 **; p < .001 *** 
Reference category of dependent variable: Voting for existing party. 
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new party as opposed to an existing one. Hypothesis 4 is corroborated by the estimate for the 
dummy capturing closeness to no party for non-voters. It has a significantly positive effect 
and shows that the probability of abstention vs voting for an existing party increases by a 
factor of 3.83. For political information, we estimate a positive and significant effect on the 
probability of voting for a new party versus an existing party. This confirms hypothesis 5, but 
the effect is not large because the probability of voting for a new party increases by a factor of 
1.08 per one-unit increase in information. For abstention, the level of political information has 
a significantly negative effect, confirming hypothesis 6. The probability of abstention versus 
voting for an existing party decreases with higher levels of political information with a factor 
of 0.90.  
 
The estimates for assessing the second part of hypotheses 3, 4 and 6 cannot be easily derived 
from the results for model 3 because the hypotheses stipulate the effect of a covariate on the 
probability of abstention as opposed to voting for a new party. For enhanced interpretation, 
we therefore estimate model 3 using abstention as the reference category. We present the full 
results in the appendix and only report the relevant estimates here. The probability of voting 
for a new party versus abstention increases by a factor of about 59 if a voter feels close to a 
new party, which is confirming evidence for hypotheses 3. When a voter does not feel close to 
any party, the probability of voting for a new party goes up by a factor of 1.32. This is in 
opposition to hypothesis 4 because we expected a negative association between the close-to-
no-party dummy and voting for a new party. We find hypothesis 6 confirmed because a one-
unit increase in political information increases the likelihood of voting for a new party by a 
factor of 1.18. 
 
All estimates of model 3 are robust to the inclusion of the multiplicative interaction term 
involving political information and heterogeneity. In model 4, the coefficient for the 
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multiplicative interaction is not significant, meaning the change in the marginal effect of 
programmatic heterogeneity for a one-unit change in the level of political information is not 
distinguishable from zero, and vice versa. Thus, hypotheses 7 to 10 do not receive empirical 
confirmation. The significance of the marginal effect of programmatic heterogeneity for any 
given level of political information and vice versa cannot be discerned from the regression 
table. Although the interaction term is not significant, it is important to calculate the marginal 
effects of a variable because they might only be significant for a range of values of the 
moderating variable (Brambor et al. 2006: 74). Figure 3 presents the marginal effects with 
95% confidence intervals for programmatic heterogeneity for both voter types across all 
levels of political information. 
 
Figure 3: Marginal effect of programmatic heterogeneity for levels of political information 
 
 
Figure 3 shows for non-voters that the larger the level of political information, the smaller the 
marginal effect. Similarly, the marginal effect becomes more negative for increasing levels of 
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political information for voters of new parties. The plot shows that we can reject the null 
hypothesis of no effect of heterogeneity on vote choice for all levels of political information. 
Figure 4 contains the marginal effects of political information across the range of observed 
values of programmatic heterogeneity. We see a similar picture as in figure 3 because the 
marginal effect for non-voters is always significantly different from zero and non-
distinguishable from zero for new-party voters.19 
 
Figure 4: Marginal effect of political information for levels of programmatic heterogeneity  
 
The marginal-effects plot is instructive because it shows that programmatic heterogeneity has 
an effect in the expected direction which confirms hypotheses 1 and 2. However, the 
estimates for the interaction term imply that it is not necessary to add it to model 3. 
Substantively, we see no gain in making the random intercept model unnecessarily more 
                                                 
19 The non-significance of the marginal effect for new-party voters contrasts with the 
significance of heterogeneity in model 3 without the cross-level interaction. However, the 
non-significance of the interaction term and the non-significant deviance test comparing a 
random slopes model with the cross-level interaction indicate that the interaction is not 
warranted. 
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complex by estimating random slopes and a cross-level interaction. We settle on model 3 for 
the following discussion of conditional probabilities and the sensitivity analysis. 
 
Figure 5: Predicted probabilities of heterogeneity values for voters feeling close to a new 
party 
 
 
For enhanced substantive interpretation of the results, we calculate the predicted probabilities 
for all three vote choices across different values of programmatic heterogeneity for 
individuals feeling close to a new party. We present the estimates for this group because 
model 3 points to the importance of feeling close to a new party.20 For programmatic 
heterogeneity, we derive the probabilities for the minimum score, the first, second and third 
quartiles and the maximum score. All other variables are set to their grand mean or grand 
median in case they are dummy variables. Figure 5 demonstrates that low heterogeneity 
scores are linked to probabilities of voting for a new party more than 60 percent. For the third 
                                                 
20 The predicted probabilities for the other two types of closeness are presented in the 
appendix. 
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quartile of the heterogeneity scores with a score of 2.857, the probability of casting a vote for 
the new party remains above 60 percent. 
 
Based on model 3, heterogeneity therefore not only has a significant effect, but is also 
associated with substantively high predicted probabilities of voting for a new party. Toward 
the right end of the spectrum, the probability of voting for a new party is slightly smaller than 
the probability of abstention. However, the uncertainty of the predictions is large in this range, 
as 75 percent of all heterogeneity values are less than 2.857 and concentrated at the lower end 
of the spectrum.21 
6. Sensitivity analysis 
In this section, we assess the robustness of the estimates of model 3 toward various alternative 
specifications. Strategic voting might influence voting behavior because people considering 
voting for new parties might decide against it because of fears of wasting their votes. In model 
5, we take strategic voting into account by including district magnitude as a control variable. 
We use the data by Bormann and Golder (2013) and utilize the natural log as a macro-variable 
(Gschwend 2009). Model 6 controls for potential effects of the state of the macro economy on 
vote choice (Lewis-Beck and Nadeau 2011). We add a variable taken from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI, 2014) measuring the growth of the gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita at market prices based on constant local currency in pre-election years. 
 
Model 7 adds a federalism dummy because federal countries offer citizens more opportunities 
for political participation (Weldon 2006). The possibility of holding elections on multiple 
territorial levels might increase satisfaction with existing parties and reduce the incentives to 
                                                 
21 The gllamm-routine did not allow us to estimate the uncertainty of the predicted 
probabilities. 
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vote for a new party. On the other hand, federalism might also allow new parties to gain 
experience and prominence on the sub-national level, which could increase their chances in a 
later national election. We control for potential federalism-related effects and add a dummy 
variable from Persson and Tabellini’s data (2003).22 Model 8 picks up the question of whether 
the estimation should include weights (see section 4.2). Following Heeringa et al. (2014: 250), 
we control for potential effects of non-weighting in our baseline analysis and add the 
individual design weight contained by the ESS as a covariate. Table 4 shows that the 
estimates for the key covariates measuring closeness, political information and programmatic 
heterogeneity are robust across all models. 
 
Table 4: Regression results for sensitivity analysis 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
New-party voters     
Constant -5.313*** -4.233*** -4.225*** -4.159*** 
 (0.236) (0.206) (0.205) (0.247) 
Close to no party 1.672*** 1.665*** 1.639*** 1.669*** 
 (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) 
Close to new party 5.739*** 5.818*** 5.680*** 5.803*** 
 (0.157) (0.153) (0.153) (0.154) 
Political information 0.061* 0.080** 0.058* 0.079** 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) 
Cognitive capacity -0.161 -0.253** -0.154 -0.245* 
 (0.097) (0.095) (0.096) (0.095) 
Age -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.012*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Male 0.159 0.110 0.094 0.103 
 (0.088) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) 
Unemployed -0.052 -0.145 -0.175 -0.165 
 (0.196) (0.196) (0.195) (0.196) 
Programmatic heterogeneity -0.105*** -0.127*** -0.065** -0.101*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Logged average district magnitude 0.298***    
 (0.029)    
Lagged GDP/growth per capita  0.009   
  (0.020)   
Federalism   0.047  
   (0.161)  
Individual ESS design weight    0.054 
    (0.116) 
Non-voters     
Constant -0.533*** -0.748*** -0.678*** -0.213* 
 (0.086) (0.076) (0.078) (0.089) 
                                                 
22 We extended the data on the time dimension because none of the countries under analysis 
changed their form of territorial organization during the period of analysis. 
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 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Close to no party 1.342*** 1.342*** 1.347*** 1.344*** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Close to new party 1.483*** 1.500*** 1.433*** 1.485*** 
 (0.186) (0.185) (0.186) (0.185) 
Political information -0.102*** -0.105*** -0.104*** -0.105*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Cognitive capacity -0.793*** -0.782*** -0.801*** -0.779*** 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.036) 
Age -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.026*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Male 0.089** 0.094** 0.097** 0.098** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Unemployed 0.689*** 0.696*** 0.715*** 0.687*** 
 (0.055) (0.057) (0.056) (0.055) 
Programmatic heterogeneity 0.078*** 0.028*** 0.065*** 0.056*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Logged average district magnitude -0.081***    
 (0.012)    
Lagged GDP/growth per capita  0.062***   
  (0.008)   
Federalism   1.085***  
   (0.063)  
Individual ESS design weight    -0.267*** 
    (0.043) 
Random estimates     
Intercept-variance level 1 0.041 0.065 0.047 0.097 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.019) 
 
Intercept-variance level 2 0.258 0.277 0.065 0.114 
 (0.028) (0.021) (0.019) (0.014) 
Log-likelihood -14461.84 -14546.57 -14523.22 -14531.40 
N 29048 29048 29048 29048 
Estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) in log-odds form; p < .05 *; p < .01 **; p < .001 *** 
Reference category of dependent variable: Voting for existing party 
 
We explained in section 3 that programmatic heterogeneity as our key macro variable 
involves all 57 CMP categories, i.e., it includes the peruncod category with quasi-sentences 
not fitting into one of the 56 substantive categories and excludes all categories not addressed 
by any existing party (zero-categories). While we deem this the most plausible 
operationalization of programmatic diversity, we assess the robustness of the estimates to the 
use of alternative measurement strategies. Table 5 presents the estimates for four models 
representing the possible combinations of including or excluding the peruncod category and 
zero-categories. The first column reproduces the estimates of model 3 for purposes of better 
comparison. Table 5 shows that our findings are robust to different ways of measuring 
programmatic diversity. 
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Table 5: Regression results for alternative measures of programmatic heterogeneity 
 57 categories 
no 0s 
57 categories, 
with 0s 
56 categories 
no 0s 
56 categories 
 with 0s 
New-party voters     
Constant -3.682*** -3.888*** -3.884*** -4.049*** 
 (0.203) (0.204) (0.203) (0.208) 
Close to no party 1.669*** 1.403*** 1.672*** 1.651*** 
 (0.106) (0.107) (0.106) (0.106) 
Close to new party 5.800*** 5.664*** 5.800*** 5.785*** 
 (0.154) (0.151) (0.153) (0.155) 
Political information 0.077** 0.071** 0.082** 0.076** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Cognitive capacity -0.247** -0.214* -0.259** -0.235* 
 (0.095) (0.094) (0.095) (0.096) 
Age -0.012*** -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.012*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
 
Male 0.104 0.137 0.103 0.102 
 (0.087) (0.086) (0.087) (0.087) 
Unemployed -0.160 -0.195 -0.164 -0.186 
 (0.196) (0.190) (0.196) (0.196) 
Programmatic het. -0.130*** -0.239*** -0.137*** -0.222*** 
 (0.021) (0.031) (0.021) (0.033) 
 
 
Non-voters     
Constant -0.111 -0.461*** -0.316*** -0.696*** 
 (0.073) (0.071) (0.072) (0.079) 
Close to no party 1.344*** 0.982*** 1.348*** 1.339*** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
close to new party 1.493*** 1.354*** 1.493*** 1.462*** 
 (0.185) (0.182) (0.185) (0.185) 
Political information -0.107*** -0.102*** -0.103*** -0.104*** 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
Cognitive capacity -0.772*** -0.781*** -0.789*** -0.791*** 
 (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) 
Age -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.025*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Male 0.094** 0.142*** 0.092** 0.094** 
 (0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) 
Unemployed 0.694*** 0.694*** 0.690*** 0.701*** 
 (0.055) (0.052) (0.055) (0.055) 
Programmatic het. 0.027*** 0.028** 0.024*** 0.101*** 
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.011) 
Random estimates     
Intercept-variance level 1 0.109 0.072 0.081 0.077 
 (0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
Intercept-variance level 2 0.125 0.349 0.345 0.314 
 (0.012) (0.031) (0.030) (0.049) 
Log-likelihood -14549.96 -15592.59 -14549.45 -14529.63 
N 29048 32399 29048 29048 
Estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) in log-odds form; p < .05 *; p < .01 **; p < .001 *** 
Reference category of dependent variable: Voting for existing party 
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Figure 6: Estimate for programmatic heterogeneity under election-wise deletion 
 
 
The final issue we need to address is the sensitivity of the estimates to the inclusion of single 
elections in the analysis. This is warranted because figure 1 highlighted an uneven distribution 
of new-party voters across elections and figure 2 pointed to an outstanding level of 
heterogeneity for the 1999 election in Israel. We perform election-wise deletion in order to 
assess robustness of the results on this dimension, i.e., we run model 3 20 times and leave out 
one election each time. Figure 6 contains the estimates for our key variable programmatic 
heterogeneity for voters of new parties in the form of 95% confidence intervals. The top 
interval refers to the estimate in model 3 and the shaded area in the plot highlights the range 
of estimates that do not significantly differ from the estimate in the main analysis. The figure 
shows that the estimate is sensitive to the inclusion of the elections in Israel in 1999 and the 
Netherlands in 2002. The exclusion of Israel leads to a much larger effect of heterogeneity, 
but also considerably increases the uncertainty of the estimate. This finding for Israel can be 
understood in light of the special nature of party competition which strongly revolves around 
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the Palestine conflict and Israel’s foreign policy in the Middle East. Moreover, the Israeli 
electoral and party system stands out because the effective number of parties is much larger 
than in the other countries and the election in 1999 features the highest effective number of 
parties (both in terms of votes and seats) for Israel itself (Gallagher and Mitchell 2005: 343; 
Gallagher 2014: 20). 
 
The election in the Netherlands in 2002 contributes about 40 percent of all new-party voters in 
our sample. In this light, we believe that the non-significant estimate attached to the 
elimination of this election is due to a loss of power. The effect of heterogeneity in model 3 is 
not large and thus is much less likely to be significant when we take away 40 percent of all 
new-party voters. In a qualitative view, this election does not stand apart from other elections 
in our sample. The 2002 election in the Netherlands saw the appearance of the List Pim 
Fortuyn, i.e., a right-leaning populist party. This does not render this election special because 
the Austrian election of 2006, for example, witnessed the advent of the BZÖ as a right-wing 
populist party. In 2002, programmatic heterogeneity was low in the Netherlands, suggesting 
that Pim Fortuyn could take advantage of unaddressed issues, but other elections have 
similarly low levels of heterogeneity. On the system-level, the Netherlands is equally 
comparable to other parliamentary democracies in terms of political and economic variables. 
Although we can only provide a short qualitative discussion of the Netherlands in 2002 here, 
we see no apparent issue explaining the change due to the exclusion of this election. This 
leads us to conclude that the decline in new-party voters and the loss in information account 
for it. 
 
Figure 7 presents the results for election-wise deletion for non-voters. Again, we see that the 
effect and the attached uncertainty increase when Israel in 1999 is excluded. Eliminating the 
Netherlands in 2002 does not significantly alter the estimate compared to the complete model. 
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This is reassuring evidence for our previous argument because if this election was special in 
some respect not accounted for by model 3, we would also expect a strong impact on the 
estimate for non-party voters. However, the elimination of five other elections than the Israel 
1999 election results in an estimate that is significantly different from the pooled model. The 
non-robustness toward five elections concerns four different countries at different points in 
time and the common element that could explain this insight is not apparent to us.  
 
Figure 7: Estimate for programmatic heterogeneity under election-wise deletion 
 
7. Discussion 
We summarize our findings by relating the reported estimates to the hypothesis in table 6. The 
empirical analysis confirms our first hypothesis that the probability of voting for a new party 
decreases with an increasing programmatic diversity of existing parties. This supports our 
reasoning that higher programmatic diversity entails reduced incentives for voting for a new 
party because a voter is likely to feel represented by an existing party. Seen from the other 
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side, a lower programmatic diversity of existing parties makes it more likely that individual 
voters turn to new parties. This indicates that existing parties can at least partially shape the 
electoral prospects of new parties and have it in their hands whether a voter decides for a new 
contender or not. This association makes it worthwhile to examine why existing parties decide 
to emulate each other’s platforms and create opportunities for new parties. Two possibilities 
exist: first, they might misinterpret voter demands and underestimate the share of voters to 
which new parties can appeal. Second, existing parties might intentionally abandon parts of 
the electorate because the electoral benefits of abandonment are perceived to outweigh the 
costs (Budge 1994: 461). 
 
Table 6: Comparison of expectations with estimates 
Variable 
Voting for new party 
vs existing party 
Abstention vs voting 
for existing party 
Voting for new party 
vs abstention 
Programmatic 
heterogeneity 
- 
(Hypothesis 1) 
- 
(Hypothesis 2)  
Close to new party + (Hypothesis 3)  
+ 
(Hypothesis 3) 
Close to no party  + (Hypothesis 4) 
- 
(Hypothesis 4) 
Political information 
+ 
(Hypothesis 5) 
- 
(Hypothesis 6) 
+ 
(Hypothesis 6) 
Heterogeneity x 
information 
- 
(Hypothesis 7, 9) 
- 
(Hypothesis 8, 10)  
Shaded cells denote confirmed hypotheses; white cells denote non-confirmed hypotheses; blank cells denotes 
that the we did not formulate an expectation 
 
Hypothesis 2 stipulates a negative of effect of diversity for the probability of abstention 
versus voting for an existing party, but the results consistently point in the opposite direction. 
The probability of abstention increases with programmatic diversity, although the effect and 
the substantive significance are small. This finding underlines the benefits of making a three-
fold distinction of voting behavior and demands further investigation. Some voters might 
regard a high level of programmatic diversity as a sign of malfunctioning of party competition 
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because parties emphasize different issues or the same issues to a different degree. The 
emphasis on programmatic differences instead of similarities might be disliked by those parts 
of the electorate who prefer a more consensual style of politics and therefore abstain from 
voting. This finding suggests unobserved heterogeneity among the electorate because voters 
could differ regarding their interpretation and appreciation of programmatic diversity. 
 
Feeling close to a new party has a strong positive effect on the probability of voting for this 
type of party, which confirms hypotheses 3 and illustrates that, despite their newness, party 
attachment matters. Feeling attached to no party is associated with an increase in the 
probability of abstention as opposed to voting for an existing party, confirming one half of 
hypothesis 4. The second part does not receive confirmation because the probability of 
abstention decreases compared to voting for a new party if a voter feels close to no party. This 
speaks to the potential of new parties to appeal to voters, even when a voter does not develop 
an attachment to them. 
 
Our findings confirm hypotheses 5 and 6 on the positive influence of political information 
because more informed voters are less likely to abstain. With higher levels of information, 
voters seem to be more likely to perceive new parties as viable choices and correctly perceive 
the diversity of the existing parties’ programs. In contrast, uninformed voters would rather 
abstain from voting as they lack crucial information about parties and their platforms and see 
less value in voting. Hypotheses 7 to 10 capturing the moderating relationships do not find 
empirical support. Figure 3 showed that the level of programmatic heterogeneity has a 
significant effect for all levels of political information. This insight and the estimates for 
model 3 point to the relevance and strong perceptibility of the programmatic competition 
between political parties. Our finding that the effect of political information is independent of 
the level of programmatic diversity indicates that respondents may additionally absorb 
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political information beyond the parties’ platforms, e.g., about characteristics of candidates or 
parties’ past performances. The strength of the signal in terms of the degree of programmatic 
diversity would then only be one element voters use to form their opinions. Taken together, 
our findings show that the vote choice is influenced by individual-level factors and the 
existing parties’ programmatic heterogeneity. 
 
Our results are robust regarding the inclusion of several control variables, in particular, 
district magnitude covering effects of the electoral system and incentives for strategic voting. 
However, our sensitivity analysis points to the influence of some elections on the estimates. 
The strong influence of the Israeli election can be understood in light of the country’s special 
situation and electoral system, which sets party competition there apart from other established 
democracies. The consequence of eliminating the Netherlands’ 2002 election is in our reading 
a sign for diminished statistical power due to the loss of about 40 percent of new-party voters 
in our sample. Follow-up studies covering more elections and new-party voters should be less 
susceptible to the exclusion of one election and potentially validate our claim that the non-
significance of heterogeneity without the Netherlands 2002 election is a statistical artefact. 
8. Conclusion 
Our guiding research question was how the programmatic supply by existing parties shapes 
the voters’ decision between voting for a new party, an existing party and abstention. 
Following the literature on the formation and success of new parties, we argued that the 
probability of voting for a new party increases when programmatic diversity of existing 
parties decreases. We moved beyond the existing literature on new parties by theorizing 
multiple structural and individual determinants of voting behavior and testing them in a 
multilevel analysis. The multinomial analysis allowed us to take an integrated perspective by 
acknowledging that abstention and voting for a new party are alternatives of the same choice 
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set and should not be considered in isolation. The empirical results offer support for our 
hypothesis that programmatic diversity matters for individual voting in the context of new 
parties. The probability of voting for a new party decreases with the programmatic diversity 
of existing parties. However, we also unexpectedly find the opposite effect of programmatic 
diversity on the probability of abstention. Although the effect of programmatic supply on 
abstention needs further investigation, in general, our results underline the relevance of 
programmatic diversity of existing parties. For the set of developed democracies that we 
studied, the effect of the programmatic supply points to the general importance of the 
competition between parties for voting behavior. Moreover, our results underline the 
important role of new parties for the functioning party systems in that they offer an alternative 
when existing parties do not present a sufficient range of policies. As this is, to our 
knowledge, the first study using a multilevel approach for the analysis of voting behavior 
regarding new parties, there certainly is need for follow-up studies examining the interplay 
between programmatic supply and voting behavior. These studies could cover a broader range 
of countries and elections or use longitudinal data from a smaller number of countries that 
would allow one to make more empirical distinctions than we could. New studies could 
distinguish different types of new parties in terms of organizational origin or party family 
membership. On the voter side, added value would be derived from distinguishing between 
discontent voters who can be mobilized in principle and those that are turned into committed 
non-voters and hence lost. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1: Party classification 
Country Election ESS 
Round 
ESS 
vote 
variable 
Party Name Status 
Austria 2006 3 prtvtaat SPÖ old 
    ÖVP old 
    FPÖ old 
    BZÖ new 
    Grüne old 
    LIF old 
    KPÖ old 
    other  
Belgium 1999 1 prtvtbe Agalev old 
    CVP old 
    SP old 
    VLD old 
    VU-ID old 
    PVDA-AE old 
    Vlaams Blok old 
    VIVANT new 
    ECOLO old 
    PSC old 
    PRL-FDF old 
    PS old 
    FRONT NATIONAL old 
    PTB-UA old 
    OTHER  
Belgium 2003 2 prtvtabe Agalev/Groen! old 
    CD&V old 
    N-VA new 
    SP.A-Spirit old 
    Vivant old 
    Vlaams Blok old 
    VLD old 
    CDH old 
    Ecolo old 
    Front National old 
    MR old 
    PS old 
    Other  
    Blank  
    Invalid  
Belgium 2007 4 prtvtbbe Groen! old 
    CD&V + N-VA old 
    Lijst Dedecker new 
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Country Election ESS 
Round 
ESS 
vote 
variable 
Party Name Status 
    SP.A. + Vlaams - Progressieven (Spirit)  old 
    Vlaams Belang new 
    Open VLD + Vivant old 
    CDH old 
    Ecolo old 
    Front National old 
    MR old 
    PS old 
    Other  
    Blank  
    Invalid  
Belgium 2010 5 prtvtcbe Groen! old 
    CD&V old 
    N-VA old 
    Lijst Dedecker old 
    SP.A old 
    PVDA+ old 
    Vlaams Belang old 
    Open VLD old 
    CDH old 
    Ecolo old 
    Front National old 
    MR old 
    PS old 
    PTB old 
    Parti Populaire new 
    Other  
    Blanco  
    Ongeldig  
Denmark 2007 5 prtvtbdk Socialdemokraterne - the Danish social old 
    Det Radikale Venstre - Danish Social-Li old 
    Det Konservative Folkeparti - Conservat old 
    SF- Socialistisk Folkeparti - the Socia old 
    Dansk Folkeparti - Danish peoples party old 
    Kristendemokraterne - Christian democtr old 
    Venstre, Danmarks Liberale Parti - Vens old 
    Ny Alliance - New alliance new 
    Enhedslisten, De Rød-Grønne - The Red-G old 
    Andet - other  
Finland 2007 5 prtvtbfi The National Coalition Party old 
    The Swedish People´s Party (SPP) old 
    Liberals, (The liberal party of Finland old 
    The Centre Party old 
    True Finns old 
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Country Election ESS 
Round 
ESS 
vote 
variable 
Party Name Status 
    Christian Democrats old 
    Finnish People's Blue-whites old 
    Senior Citizens' Party old 
    Independence Party new 
    The Green League old 
    Finnish Social Democratic Party old 
    The Left Alliance old 
    Communist Party of Finland old 
    The Communist Workers' Party of Finland old 
    Workers Party old 
    Other  
Greece 2004 2 prtvtagr PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) old 
    ND (New Democracy) old 
    KKE Communist Party) old 
    SYN (Left Wing Coalition) old 
    DIKKI (Democratic Social Movement) old 
    LAOS (Popular Orthodox Party) new 
    Other  
Israel 1999 1 prtvtil Israel ahat old 
    Likud old 
    Shase old 
    Meretz old 
    Mafdal old 
    Yahadut-hatora, Agudat-Isarel, Degel-ha old 
    Am ehad new 
    Shinuy old 
    Haehud haleumi old 
    The center party new 
    Israel baliya old 
    Israel byteno new 
    Hadereh hashlishit old 
    Pnina Rozenblum new 
    Tzomet old 
    Gimlaim old 
    Hadash old 
    Balad old 
    Hatnua Harabit Hameauhedet old 
    Haravi Hahadash old 
    Other party  
    White Ballot  
Italy 2001 2 prtvtait Democratici di sinistra old 
    La Margherita old 
    Comunisti Italiani new 
    Verdi e SDI (Girasole) old 
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Country Election ESS 
Round 
ESS 
vote 
variable 
Party Name Status 
    SVP (Sudtirol Volkspartei - Partito Pop old 
    Rifondazione Comunista old 
    Forza Italia old 
    Alleanza Nazionale old 
    CCD-CDU old 
    Lega Nord old 
    Nuovo PSI old 
    Lista di Pietro new 
    Democrazia Europea new 
    Pannella-Bonino old 
    Fiamma Tricolore old 
    Other  
    Scheda bianca  
    Ulivo old 
    Ha votato solo al maggioritario  
Luxembourg 1999 1 prtvtlu Parti Chrétien Social (PCS) old 
    Parti Socialiste Ouvrier Luxembourgeois old 
    Parti Démocrate (PD) old 
    Les Verts old 
    La Gauche new 
    Comité d'action pour la Démocracie et l old 
    Autres  
Netherlands 2002 1 prtvtnl Christian Democratic Party  old 
    Labour Party old 
    Party for Freedom and Democracy old 
    List Pim Fortuyn new 
    Democrats `66 old 
    Green Left old 
    Socialist Party old 
    Christian Union old 
    Liveable Netherlands new 
    Social Reformed Party old 
    Other  
Netherlands 2003 2 prtvtanl Christian Democratic Party  old 
    Labour Party old 
    People's Party for Freedom and Democrac old 
    List Pim Fortuyn old 
    Democrats 66 old 
    Green Left old 
    Socialist Party old 
    Christian Union old 
    Liveable Netherlands old 
    Political Reformed Party old 
    Party for the Animals new 
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Country Election ESS 
Round 
ESS 
vote 
variable 
Party Name Status 
    Other  
    Blanc  
Netherlands 2006 4 prtvtcnl Christian Democratic Party old 
    Labour Party old 
    Party for Freedom and Democracy old 
    List Pim Fortuyn old 
    Democrats `66 old 
    Green Left old 
    Socialistic Party old 
    Christian Union old 
    Liveable Netherlands old 
    Social Reformed Party old 
    PVV (List Wilders) new 
    Party for the Animals old 
    Other  
    Blanc  
Netherlands 2010 5 prtvtdnl Party for Freedom and Democracy old 
    Labour Party old 
    PVV (List Wilders) old 
    Christian Democratic Party old 
    Socialistic Party old 
    Democrats `66 old 
    Green Left old 
    Christian Union old 
    Social Reformed Party old 
    Party for the Animals old 
    TON (List Verdonk) new 
    Other  
    Blanc  
Norway 2001 2 prtvtno Red Electoral Alliance (RV) old 
    Socialist left party (SV) old 
    Labour Party (A) old 
    Liberal Party (V) old 
    Christian Democratic Party (Krf) old 
    Centre Party (Sp) old 
    Conservative Party (H) old 
    Progress Party (FrP) old 
    Coast Party (KYST) new 
    Other  
Spain 2008 5 prtvtbes Partido Popular old 
    Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE old 
    Izquierda Unida (IU) old 
    Convergència i Unió (CiU) old 
    Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) old 
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Country Election ESS 
Round 
ESS 
vote 
variable 
Party Name Status 
    Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV) old 
    Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG) old 
    Coalición Canaria-Partido Nacionalista old 
    Nafarroa-Bai (NA-BAI) old 
    Unión Progreso y Democracia (UPyD) new 
    Other  
    Blank vote  
    Spoiled vote  
Switzerland 1999 1 prtvtch Radicals old 
    Christian-democrats old 
    Social-democrats old 
    Swiss People's Party old 
    Liberal Party old 
    Alliance of the Independents old 
    Evangelical People's Party old 
    Christian-Social Party new 
    Swiss Labour Party old 
    Green Party old 
    Swiss Democrats old 
    Federal Democratic Union old 
    Freiheits-Partei old 
    Women's Parties old 
    Lega dei Ticinesi old 
    Others  
Switzerland 2007 4 prtvtbch Radicals old 
    Christian democrats old 
    Socialist party old 
    Swiss people party old 
    Liberal party old 
    Christian-social old 
    Swiss labor party old 
    Green party old 
    Green liberal party new 
    Swiss democrats old 
    Federal Democratic Union old 
    Evangelical People's Party old 
    Lega dei Ticinese old 
    Blank paper  
    Mixed vote  
UK 2001 1 prtvtgb Conservative old 
    Labour old 
    Liberal Democrat old 
    Scottish National Party old 
    Plaid Cymru old 
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Country Election ESS 
Round 
ESS 
vote 
variable 
Party Name Status 
    Green Party old 
    Other  
    Ulster Unionist Party (nir) old 
    Democratic Unionist Party (nir) old 
    Sinn Fein (nir) old 
    Social Democratic and Labour Party (nir  old 
    Alliance Party (nir) old 
    United Kingdom Unionist Party (nir) old 
    Women's Coalition (nir) new 
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Descriptive statistics 
Figure A.1: Level of political information 
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Figure A.2: Logged average district magnitude (tier 1 of electoral system) 
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Figure A.3: Voter age 
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Figure A.4: Voter gender 
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Figure A.5: Employment status of respondent 
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Figure A.6: Respondent feels close to 
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Figure A.7: Cognitive capacity of respondent 
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Figure A.8: Growth of gross domestic product per capita in pre-election year 
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Figure A.9: Territorial organization 
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Table A.2: Table 3 in manuscript plus random slopes for political information (model A.1) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model A.1 Model 4 
New-party voters      
Constant -3.799*** -4.226*** -3.682*** -3.787*** -3.924*** 
 (0.043) (0.198) (0.203) (0.204) (0.218) 
Close to no party  1.700*** 1.669*** 1.671*** 1.670*** 
  (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) 
Close to new party  5.737*** 5.800*** 5.807*** 5.792*** 
  (0.152) (0.154) (0.154) (0.154) 
Political information  0.072** 0.077** 0.106*** 0.062 
  (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.040) 
Cognitive capacity  -0.317*** -0.247** -0.268** -0.259** 
  (0.095) (0.095) (0.095) (0.095) 
Age  -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Male  0.119 0.104 0.104 0.105 
  (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) 
Unemployed  -0.173 -0.160 -0.157 -0.142 
  (0.194) (0.196) (0.196) (0.196) 
Programmatic heterogeneity   -0.130*** -0.136*** -0.079* 
   (0.021) (0.021) (0.039) 
Progr. het. * pol. information     -0.005 
     (0.011) 
Non-voters      
Constant -1.691*** -0.278*** -0.111 -0.229** -0.365*** 
 (0.025) (0.071) (0.073) (0.076) (0.080) 
Close to no party  1.339*** 1.344*** 1.346*** 1.344*** 
  (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
close to new party  1.492*** 1.493*** 1.502*** 1.488*** 
  (0.185) (0.185) (0.185) (0.185) 
Political information  -0.105*** -0.107*** -0.075*** -0.118*** 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.020) 
Cognitive capacity  -0.789*** -0.772*** -0.791*** -0.784*** 
  (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
Age  -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.025*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Male  0.096** 0.094** 0.097** 0.099** 
  (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Unemployed  0.709*** 0.694*** 0.698*** 0.714*** 
  (0.055) (0.055) (0.056) (0.056) 
Programmatic heterogeneity   0.027*** 0.020** 0.075*** 
   (0.006) (0.007) (0.011) 
Progr. het. * pol. information     -0.005 
     (0.004) 
Random estimates      
Intercept-variance level 1 0.192 0.039 0.109 0.003 0.002 
 (0.023) (0.007) (0.015) (0.005) (0.006) 
Slope-variance (pol. information)    0.007 0.008 
    (0.002) (0.003) 
Covariance random intercepts 
and slopes level 1 
   0.003 0.003 
    (0.002) (0.002) 
Intercept-variance level 2 0.371 0.438 0.125 0.218 0.182 
 (0.029) (0.047) (0.012) (0.026) (0.016) 
Log-likelihood -17834.09 -14588.04 -14549.96 -14541.97 -14540.85 
N 29969 29048 29048 29048 29048 
Estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) in log-odds form; p < .05 *; p < .01 **; p < .001 *** 
Reference category of dependent variable: Voting for existing party 
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Table A.3: Model 3 with non-voting as reference category 
 New-party voters Existing-party voters 
Constant -3.742*** 0.311*** 
 (0.209) (0.073) 
Close to no party 0.280** -1.350*** 
 (0.109) (0.034) 
Close to new party 4.077*** -1.524*** 
 (0.195) (0.187) 
Political information 0.173*** 0.103*** 
 (0.029) (0.012) 
Cognitive capacity 0.623*** 0.816*** 
 (0.098) (0.036) 
Age 0.015*** 0.025*** 
 (0.003) (0.001) 
Male -0.012 -0.088** 
 (0.090) (0.033) 
Unemployed -0.943*** -0.721*** 
 (0.195) (0.055) 
Programmatic heterogeneity -0.179*** -0.079*** 
 (0.020) (0.006) 
Random estimates  
Intercept-variance level 1 0.061 
 (0.010) 
Intercept-variance level 2 0.546 
 (0.034) 
Log-likelihood -14490.19 
29048 N 
Estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) in log-odds form; p < .05 *; p < .01 **; p < .001 *** 
Reference category of dependent variable: Abstention 
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Predicted probabilities 
Figure A.10: Predicted probabilities for voters feeling close to no party 
 
 
Figure A.11: Predicted probabilities for voters feeling close to existing party 
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Table A.4: Deviance scores and critical chi2-value for main models (see table A.1) 
Model comparison Critical chi2 value (p<.05) Deviance score 
1 versus 2 23.68 6492.09 
2 versus 3 5.99 76.17 
3 versus A.1 5.99 15.98 
A.1 versus 4 5.99 2.24 
3 versus 4 9.49 18.23 
 
 
